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Abstract 
 
The central question addressed in this study is “How are the conceptualization and 
operationalization of education for democratic citizenship similar to or different within and 
across the two Islamic civil society associations.” Using qualitative methods, I explored the 
ideas and experiences (practices) of two large Islamic civil society associations: 
Muhammadiyah (M) and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), in Indonesia.   
Muhammadiyah and NU members have similar ideas about democracy, democratic 
society and educating for democracy. Within both organizations members argue Islam has 
tenets, such as shura and adl (justice), congruent with democratic ideas, but their responses 
to the Western conceptions of democracy vary.  Accomodationists in both organizations state 
that Islamic tenets are conglruent with the Western ideas of democracy, while rejetioinists 
express that Islam has concept of happiness as the goal of democracy, sovereignty, and 
freedom differ from Western concepts of democracy. Moreover, although most informants 
from M and NU subscribe to democratic values, such as individual freedom, respect for 
differences or plurality, tolerance, open-mindedness, and criticism; some see the notions 
 iv
individual sovereignty, accepting of other religious groups’ beliefs, and gender equality as 
problematic for Muslims in Indonesia. Adopting these values in certain ways, they argue, can 
be seen to contravene core/fundamental Islamic beliefs.      
Muhammadiyah and NU work to educate their members and the community at large 
by promoting democratic or civil values, political awareness, and participation. Both 
organizations have developed voter education and education for anti-corruption programs. 
In addition, NU organizes programs to transform orthodox understandings about the fiqh 
tradition, “citizen forums” to influence the provision of public services, and workshops to 
disseminate ideas of “inclusive, emancipatory or moderate Islam.” M’s programs focus on 
developing gender sensitivity among officials, candidates, and community members as well 
as on developing civil values for the students of its schools and colleges through civic 
education.   
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1. BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
  
    
1.1. Indonesia, Islam and Democracy 
Indonesia is a diverse multi-ethnic and multi-religious country of 228,437,870 people. The 
majority of the Indonesian population (88.22 percent) identify themselves as Muslims.  
Minority religious groups of Christians (8.92 %), Buddhists (0.84 %) and Hindus (1.81 %) 
make up the Indonesian nation. This means that the Indonesian umma (community of 
believers) is by far the largest of any nation in the world (Fealy, 2003).    
Indonesia is currently making a transition to democracy.1 In examining the 
development of Indonesian democracy, we need to consider several issues related to its 
religious makeup. First, although Indonesia is neither a secular nor a religious (theocratic) 
state, its citizens have enjoyed freedom of religion (at least) since the adoption of the 1945 
Constitution. Second, the concept of unity in diversity, which has constituted the 
philosophical basis in for the nation state, implies respect and tolerance for diverse religions 
                                                 
1 Indonesia is still in a preliminary stage of transition to a democracy with the 1999 general election 
being seen as one of the necessary, minimal conditions of a democratic state. Clarke& Foweraker 
(2001) and Diamond & Kim (2000) explain that    democracy or a democratic state, according to the 
concept of a ‘minimalist’ or ‘thin’ democracy, is characterized by such factors as having a secret ballot, 
universal adult suffrage, regular elections, participation, competition, associational recognition, and 
access and executive accountability.   
 1
 and religious groups.   Third, there is a debate among Muslim as well as non-Muslim scholars 
regarding whether Islam is compatible with democracy2.  
In regard to the third issue, non-Muslim scholars can be divided into two categories: 
a) rejectionists, who do not think that Islam and its culture, including the Islamic concept 
and practice of civil society, support democracy,3 and b) accomodationists who argue that 
Islam’s fundamental values are compatible with democracy. Several factors are identified by 
the rejectionists who claim Arab culture and Islam are incompatible with democracy 
including lack of enthusiasm or support for political liberalization and the lack of a 
democratic tradition in the Middle East (Esposito, 1995) as well as the existence of tyrannies 
in (several) Muslim countries. Lewis (1996), for example, argues that of the 53 members of 
OIC (Organization of Islamic Countries), only Turkey can pass Huntington’s test of 
                                                 
2 The term “democracy” was not apparent in pre-modern Muslim literature.  However, Muslim 
thinkers were concerned about issues like justice (‘adl) and oppression (zulm) as stated in the holy 
Qur’an, which serves as an ethical guidance to set up a societal arrangement. While, the term 
“democracy” can be first found in the works of Al-Farabi and Ibnu Rusyd, Muslim scholars in the 
medieval ages. After that (al-Farabi and Ibnu Rusyd’s), the word democracy, dimuqratiyah, was not 
commonly found in Arabic political writings until the end of nineteenth century (Rosenthal, 1960).   
3 This standpoint was first advocated by Montesquieu more than two and half centuries ago when he 
said that “Islam had a violent streak that predisposed Muslim societies to authoritarianism …. [The] 
Mohammedan religion, which speaks only with a sword, continues to act on men with the 
destructive spirit that founded it” (Fish, 2002: 15-16). Some contemporary writers have opinions 
similar to Montesquieu’s,   saying that Islam offers the least prospects for liberal democracy (Lewis, 
1993: 1); Islam cannot tolerate diversity (Trifkovic, 2000: 19); Islam is incompatible with democracy 
(Goddard, 2002). Moreover, according to rejectionists, the true agenda of the Islamic movement is to 
gain power, establish authoritarian rule, repress dissent, and suppress the freedom of speech (Kramer, 
2000: 34; Pipes, 2000: 56). 
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 democracy.4 Based on this fact, he and other rejectionists assert that there are no democratic 
values in Islam (Stepan, 2000).   
Muslim scholars can also be divided into two categories: a) Islamists who argue that 
democracy is not compatible with Islam because democracy emphasizes the sovereignty of 
the people—a concept that contradicts a fundamental tenet of Islam,  the concept of 
hakimiyyat Allah (the sovereignty of God) (Goddard, 2002; Maududi, 1997), and  b) 
Liberalists or Modernists or reformists, who argue that democracy is neither a monolithic 
concept but rather a multi-faceted phenomenon, and thus various form of democracy may be 
developed in both Muslim and  non-Muslim societies (Ahmad, 2003; Esposito, 2003).5   
Both liberalist or reformist Muslim and accommodationist non-Muslim scholars  
argue that Islam contains fundamental doctrines such as musawat (equality); hurriyah 
(freedom, including freedom of religion); shura (consultation and deliberation); and ‘adl 
(justice),6  all of which can be interpreted as supporting a democratic society (Ahmad, 2003; 
                                                 
4 The realization of democracy in the Muslim world is seen in terms of issues of government, 
governance, and human rights (Lewis, 1996) 
5 Western democracy has taken many forms from Greece to modern France, Great Britain, and the 
United States. Therefore, historically democracy in the West has taken many forms, adapting itself to 
local condition (Esposito, 1995, 2003). 
6 Ahmad (2003) and Zaidan (1982) refer to several verses of the Qur’an and other texts presenting the 
prophetic tradition in which are stated basic principles of Islam that are compatible with the (liberal) 
notion of democracy. These include equality. “O Mankind, We created you from a single (pair) of a 
male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you know each other. The most 
honorable in the sight of Allah is the one who excels in piety and heedfulness (Chapter 49:13);” (b) 
freedom (freedom of religion): “Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from 
error (Chapter II: 256); (c) commanding right and virtue: “Let there arise out of you a band of people 
inviting to all that is good, enjoying what is right, and forbidding what is wrong (Chapter III: 104);” 
(d) justice “Oh ye who believe stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to God even as against 
 3
 Amstrong, 2000; Esposito, 1995; Esposito, 2000, 2003; Khan, 2003; Wright, 2000).  Islam is 
also seen as compatible with democracy because it provides a tradition  that encourages 
people to promote freedom of mind and  public debates in the forms of  ijtihad 
(reinterpretation), ijma (consensus), and ikhtilaf (disagreement/difference of opinion), 
istislah (public interests), tasamuh (tolerance)  and hisba (public accountability and 
ombudsmanship) (Ahmad, 2003, Esposito, 1997; Feldman, 2003 Wright, 1996).7  However, 
these Islamic values, which serve to promote democracy, have been interpreted in many 
historical and societal contexts in ways that have thwarted democratic development 
(Mousalli, 2001: 4).8   
                                                                                                                                                             
yourselves, or your parents, or your kin (Chapter IV: 135); and (e) freedom of speech “The best form 
of jihad is to utter a word of truth to a tyrannical ruler (Hadith).” 
7 Esposito (2000) argues, furthermore, that Islam is not a dangerous ideology, but simply a religion not 
so different from Christianity and Judaism; it is not the source of violence. Esposito (2000) insists that 
there is no inherent clash between the values of Islam and those of Western civilization. In contrast 
to the popular view that equates Islam with “fundamentalism” and violence, only a small minority of 
Muslims advocate violence, oppression, and authoritarianism (Esposito, 2000).  As Esposito (1995) 
comments: “At the heart of Western misinterpretation, stereotyping, and exaggerated fears of Islam is 
a clash of viewpoints. Older stereotype of “the Arab” and Islam in term of Bedouin, desert, camel, 
polygamy, harem, and rich oil shaykhs have been replaced by those of gun-toting mullahs or bearded, 
anti-Western fundamentalists. Western fears and antipathy are fed not only by media reports and 
headlines events but are also rooted in a secular outlook on life which is often antithetical to that of 
Islamic activities.  Esposito (1995: 242), hence, states firmly that “contemporary Islam is more a 
challenge than a threat. It challenges the West to know and understand the diversity of the Muslim 
experience. It is a challenge to Muslim governments to be more responsive to popular demands for 
political liberalization and greater popular participation, to tolerate rather than repress nonviolent 
opposition movements, to build viable democratic institutions. At the same time, it challenges 
Western powers to stand by the democratic values they embody, distinguish between authentic 
populist movements and violent revolutionaries, and recognize the right of the people to determine 
the nature of their governments and leadership”.        
8 Fish (2000: 16-17) similarly concludes that the Islamic world has not been the site of a grossly 
disproportionate amount of political violence. However, Esposito calls attentions to the fact that the 
majority of Muslim regimes are authoritarian (Esposito, 1996).     
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    In order to create a more democratic society, the Indonesian state has engaged in a 
variety of educational initiatives to develop among its citizens fundamental democratic 
values, such as those identified by Cohen (2002) and Christopher (1989): respect for the 
rights of an individual, including liberty of thought and conscience; freedom of association, 
freedom of speech, and freedom from fear. These educational efforts were designed to 
promote the national cohesiveness and citizens’ commitment to the building of Indonesian as 
a unified, democratic nation and state. However, political dynamics during previous orders 
(the Old and New Orders of Indonesia which will be discussed below) discouraged the 
process of democratization. 
1.2. Democratization and Education for Democracy in Indonesia 
Since declaring its independence (17 August 1945), Indonesia has experienced three eras: the 
Old Order, the New Order and the Era of Reformasi. Neither the Old Order of Sukarno 
(1945-1965) nor the New Order of Suharto (1965-1998) could manifest democracy in terms 
of political representation and individual freedoms in the political arena (Legge, 1965; Liddle, 
1999, 1996; Uhlin, 1997), but some progress toward democratization has occurred during the 
Era of Reformasi.  
1.2.1. The Old Order  
At the onset of the Old Order, the Indonesian elite attempted to implement a multi-
party democracy, but this project was aborted after Sukarno promulgated both a “Guided 
Democracy”  and a “Guided Economy”  as the basis for development of the country 
 5
 (McCormack, 1999: 52).9 Guided Democracy was an attempt to stabilize the political system 
by adapting Western liberal democracy and its institutions to suit Indonesian “realities” 
(Vasil, 1997: 40) and to reflect the heritage, values and the spirit of the Indonesian people, 
including relying on a model of consensus based upon musharawah and mufakat (Vasil, 1997: 
41). In this way, consensus was not defined by the open expression of differences but was, 
instead, marked by the degree of conformity to group norms, which are ultimately defined 
by those at the top of the power structure, especially President Sukarno (Kingsbury, 2002: 
43). President Sukarno’s style was similar to Javanese rulers who avoided direct political 
criticisms, arbitrated conflict, and balanced political power in relation to a variety of social 
and political groups. He manipulated, negotiated and bargained, bestowed and withdrew 
approval and appointment, pre-empted the probable responses of his supporters and other 
leaders, and used his power to attack the opposition groups with his power (Kingsbury, 2002: 
45-46).  
                                                 
i
9 Weatherbee (1966) argues that the framework of guided democracy was intended to provide the 
requisite apparatus and stability for the continuation of the revolution (Indonesian socialism) toward 
“the just and prosperous society.” An economic structure that was national and democratic had to be 
established in order to free Indonesia from imperialism and feudalism (guided economy).  The basic 
principle of Guided Economy was to channel and reinforce the people’s potential so that it could 
develop as fully as possible on the basis of orderly planning and implementation and through 
calculation. Its underpinning ideology stressed mass participation within the context of guided 
economy (gotong rojong economy). Private ownership was to be limited, and was declared to be 
legitimate only to extent that it served a social function. The domestic economy was strengthened 
against capitalism and imperialism. A revolutionary people, however, had to learn to stand on their 
own feet (berd kari), to be independent of outside assistance and investment, ideas that were 
originally derived from North Korean efforts toward an “independent and self-reliant” economy. In 
guided democracy, Indonesia returned to patterns, and to a constitution, which grew out of the 
Indonesian revolutionary struggle, history, and way of life (Weatherbee, 1966: 41-45). 
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 Under “Guided Democracy” President Sukarno sought to establish himself as the 
repository of all power, exercising control over the country, providing guidance and creating 
the ideological and institutional bases of the system (Vasil, 1997: 44). Sukarno soon became 
“President for Life,” banned political parties such as the Masyumi (Majlis Syuro Muslim 
Indonesia or Confederated Muslim Party) and the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party), both of 
which opposed the President (Hefner, 2000: 44). He also issued a decree dissolving the 
Constituent Assembly (Vasil, 1997: 43), because its members were not able to reach an 
agreement on the state’s ideology and constitution.10   President Sukarno also sought to 
balance the powerful political forces of the army and the PKI (Communist Party of 
Indonesia) (Legge, 1965; Liddle, 1996: 58; Liddle, 1992). 
Ideologically, Sukarno emphasized the notion of “diversity in unity” along with 
promoting a single national language (Bahasa Indonesian) and a spirit of anti-imperialism 
(Kingsbury, 2002; Vasil, 1997; Vatikiotis, 1998). The concept of “Bhineka Tunggal Ika” 
                                                 
10  During those first years within the cabinet remained the focus of heated political controversy 
(Hefner, 2000). Indonesia became Negara Serikat Indonesia (the Indonesian United States) and 
enacted a UUDS or Undang-Undang Dasar Sementara (a provisional constitution). After 1950 the 
state operated under a provisional constitution, which specified that an elected Constitutional 
Assembly, known as the Konstituante, would eventually approve a constitution. In late 1955, the 
Assembly was charged with drafting a constitution to replace the provisional one under which the 
country had been operating since 1950. To do so, the Assembly had to resolve the question of 
whether Indonesia was to be a nonreligious state or some kind of Islamic one. It deadlocked on this 
controversial issue of Islam’s relation to the state (Hefner, 2000: 42-43). On 5 July 1959, President 
Sukarno issued a decree which had three important effects: it abruptly ended both the country's 
Western type of parliamentary democracy and its liberal economy; it dissolved the Indonesian 
Constituent Assembly; and it resurrected the original Constitution of 1945 (Undang-Undang Dasar or 
UUD 1945) as the nation's organic law. Its preamble contained Pantja Sila, the five principles that 
formed the philosophical basis of an independent Indonesia (McCormack, 1999: 51-52). For Sukarno, 
Pancasila accomodated the principles of diverse religions, including Islam. 
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 (diversity in unity) was laid down by the founding fathers on 28 October 1928, seventeen 
years before the 1945 Indonesian independence, as the ideological basis for building and 
sustaining Indonesia as a nation state of about 300 ethnic or tribal groups representing a 
variety of religions. However, because Indonesia’s transition was unstable, both economically 
and politically11, Sukarno’s efforts did not succeed in building and sustaining unity within 
the country.      
1.2.2. The New Order  
In the New Order regime, which began with the September 1965 coup,12 Suharto 
controlled all spheres of Indonesian society by means of the army as well as the government 
bureaucracy at all levels (village, sub-district, district, province and national). Suharto 
pursued “liberal” (free market) policies with respect to economic development, while 
limiting the role of civil society (Eklof, 1999). However, in the political arena, the 
government apparatus played a dominant role over “the people”, leaving limited space for the 
development of civil society.      
People’s participation in local-national level, electoral politics was controlled by 
Suharto with the support of the military. This was accomplished through ‘secret’ 
                                                 
11 Some factors were supposed to create such a condition are, for instance, the Dutch state stubbornly 
strove to recolonize Indonesia through Dutch military power and alliance. Indonesia experienced a 
frequent reshuffling of its cabinets since its independence (McCormack, 1999). 
12 Vasil (1997) argues that the coup, led by Lt. Colonel Untung of the Tjakrabirawa Presidential 
Guards, sought to eliminate the top leadership of the army, which supposedly organized themselves 
into a Council of Generals to seize power should President Sukarno die. In contrast, Kingsbury (2002) 
suggests that some junior pro-Sukarno officers, led by Untung, moved against the generals, believing 
that the generals to have been planning a coup against President Sukarno (Kingsbury, 2002: 49). 
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 identification of members of a society who were not affiliated with the ruling party; 
intimidation during the general election campaign, especially of groups critical of the 
government/ruling party; and funding for communities that supported the ruling party. In 
order to maintain his position, Suharto sought to mobilize the people’s support for the ruling 
party (Golkar or Functional Group)13 and to marginalize non-government political parties, 
such as PPP (United Development Party) and PDI (Indonesia Democratic Party). The New 
Order issued a regulation that any candidate seeking to be a member of Parliament had to be 
screened (known as litsus) by the Directorate General of Social Politics of the Ministry of 
Home Affairs. 14  This process served as a means to ensure that all candidates from all parties 
would support the policies of the government, affirm President Suharto’s position, and 
refrain from criticizing his family’s business (Liddle, 1999). 15 Any member of parliament 
                                                 
13 Reacting to the excessive support by the armed forces  for the state political party (Golkar--
Golongan Karya or Functional Groups), during the 1977 election campaign, army officers in the 
Army Staff and Command School (Seskoad or Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat) wrote the 
Seskoad paper urging the armed forces to refrain in the future from taking sides in general elections. 
However, Suharto made a firm statement in Riau in March 1980 that ABRI (the Armed Forces) 
would, as a part of one big Golkar family, support Golkar and not stand above all political parties 
(Said, 1998: 538).  In 1989 and 1990 some members the ABRI fraction in the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat or Parliament) formed a group and pushed for   keterbukaan (Openness). However, at the 
same time, senior ABRI commanders such as Try Sutrisno, Edy Sudrajat, and Harsudiyono Hartas 
continued to issue strong reminders of persistent threats to Pancasila, including threats from 
“liberalism” and Western-style democracy (Ramage, 1995: 149).  
14 As an example of how tightly the government controlled the operation of the general election, Bird 
(1998) states that the 1997 campaign period (29 April to 23 May) was strictly regulated and the 
government’s new rules seemed to guarantee a tepid celebration at best; all candidates had to be pre-
cleared, all party symbols had to be standardized, all speeches had to be pre-approved, and outdoor 
rallies were banned.  
15There are at least two cases, involving Murdani and Wardoyo, indicating that Suharto was very 
sensitive to criticism. General Murdani was removed from his position as the High Commander of the 
armed forces and the Ministry of Defense, because he gave unwelcome advice to Suharto on his 
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 who did criticize Suharto was removed from office. The New Order also restricted individual 
freedoms, for example, via the Press Law and the Anti-Subversion Law, which was stipulated 
that, in order to hold a meeting attended by more than ten people, a civil society association 
had to request permission from the local government or military/police authority. 
During the 1980s a civil society movement appeared, advocating for democracy and 
human rights,. President Suharto gave the impression of sanctioning more openness, and, 
during the first half of the 1990s, the government of Indonesia launched the “Indonesian 
model of perestroika” (Keterbukaan or openness), instituting greater freedom of expression 
(Eklof, 1999: 17).  In his August 1990 national address, President Suharto called on the 
people not to be afraid of expressing views that differed from the government’s, though in 
his 1991 national address he noted that openness required responsibility: 
There have been people who … have been influenced by other systems and who 
consider that political development here has not yielded anything… A political 
system based on another system must be viewed with caution lest our resolve be 
undermined by those who aim to use another system (quoted in Vatikiotis, 1998: 
144) 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
children’s business affairs (Said, 1998: 540). Wardoyo was the Ministry of Agriculture who in early 
1992 promoted reform of a trade policy that affected private companies (e.g., those involved in 
producing/trading soy beans). Beginning in 1986, licenses for soybean importation had increasingly 
been restricted to Sarpindo, a company owned by Hutomo Mandala Putra (the youngest son of 
President Suharto), which eventually became the sole supplier of soy meal to the Indonesian market 
(monopoly). The government subsidized Sarpindo at the rate of (US) $21 million annually.  Wardoyo 
argued that the freeing of soy meal imports would lower the cost of processed agricultural goods and 
help boost Indonesia’s non-oil exports, one of the goals of the economic reform program. Suharto said 
“Kalau mau membunuh Sarpindo silakan (If you want to kill Sarpindo, go ahead)”, using the Javanese 
euphemism expression that meant that, in fact, he should not act abruptly to end Sarpindo’s 
monopoly. In July 1992, the trade reform bill was finally announced to the public, it had no provision 
affecting soybeans at all (Schwarz, 2000: 133-134).        
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   President Suharto always stated that any criticism of the government had to be 
raised through formal channels such as the Constituent Assembly. Any other act or 
statement critical of the tenets of Pancasila,16 President Suharto, the government, its 
institutions or its policies would be interpreted as socially disruptive and in violation of the 
Anti-Subversion Law. As a consequence, individuals could be convicted of subversion, and 
face penalties up to and including death (Kingsbury, 2002: 193). Similarly, any publication 
that criticized the five tenets of the Pancasila, government policy, or the president and his 
family was banned under Article 11 of The Press Law (Kingsbury, 2002: 127).17 The notion of 
“responsibility” under Suharto was analogous to the concept of mufakat (consensus) 
                                                 
16 Pancasila is the Indonesian state ideology. The concept of Pancasila was first presented by 
Sukarno before the Investigating Committee for the Preparation for Independence (BPUPKI) on 1 
July 1945. ‘Panca’ means five and ‘sila’ refers to principles or basis (Sukarno, 1945). These five 
principles were later incorporated in the preamble of the 1945 Constitution.  These five principles 
are: (1) belief in the one and only God; (2) a just and civilized humanity; (3) the unity of Indonesia; 
(4) democracy led by wisdom of deliberation among representatives; and (5) social justice for all 
people of Indonesia.  The initial purpose of Pancasila was to create a common ground for the 
establishment of an independent, unified, modern state (Ramage, 1995).    Sukarno was credited with 
the formulation of Pancasila, which served as a political means for accommodating the main 
contending forces: the Muslim majority, the nationalist independence movement, a strong socialist 
movement, and the separatist interests of several outer islands (Sander, 2000; Ramage, 1995). The 
New Order elaborated on the fourth principle of Pancasila creating seven points, which were then 
incorporated into the P-4 rule for the practice of democracy: (1) give priority to the interests of the 
state and society; (2) do not impose your own will upon others; (3) emphasize consensus in decision–
making for common interests; (4) conduct deliberations  to reach consensus in the spirit of  
brotherhood; (5) accept and carry out in good faith and  with a sense of responsibility all decisions 
reached by consensus; (6) conduct deliberations with common sense and in accordance with your 
conscience; and (7) make decisions that are morally justifiable to God, thereby upholding human 
dignity and worth and the values of truth and justice (Sander, 2000: 351). 
17 In 1994, the magazines Tempo, Editor, and Detik were shut down or banned because they 
published information or articles opposing government policy. Ramage (1995: 115) states that such 
acts could be interpreted as demonstration of the limits of military to support openness; in this case, 
the military did not speak out about freedom of press. 
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 (Vatikiotis, 1998: 194), which had been advocated by President Sukarno and which reflected 
the traditional Javanese political prohibition of direct criticism against government policy.                              
Suharto put forth the concept of “wawasan nusantara” (national outlook) aimed to 
develop open-mindedness, mutual understanding, and respect for others. In order to 
maintain national cohesiveness and unity, he also instituted education programs about 
Pancasila (State Ideology) through P4 (Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila or 
A Guide on Appreciation and Application of the State Ideology), which was approved by a 
decree of the MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly) on 22 March 1978 (Ramage, 1995: 32). 
This program focused on the following documents: the Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and 
the state policy on the national development (GBHN).  P4 was initially designed as a two-
week course for civil servants who wanted to be promoted. Later, P4 courses were conducted 
overseas for Indonesians studying abroad, as well as for high school and university students 
in Indonesia and for board members of civil society associations and political parties.18   
 
                                                 
18 One of my friends told me the P4 courses emphasized that only the New Order was committed to 
addressing the aspirations of the Indonesian people and to promoting development and that any 
group that criticized the government and its policies, as well as of President Suharto and his family, 
were considered to be  anti-development groups or “latent and threatening groups.”   The “extreme  
left” (leftists or communist) and “extreme right” (Moslem fundamentalists) were among the political 
lexicon used by the New Order regime to refer to critical individuals/groups, to counter attack their 
critiques, as well as to give legitimacy to the government to convict  these people of “criminal 
activities”. According to Vatikiotis (1998), the course itself contains little (critical) discussion or deep 
reflection about Pancasila.  Pancasila was designed to encompass all aspects of social, spiritual, and 
political life—and to rule out alternatives. Even those intellectuals seeking to articulate alternative 
and more pluralistic expressions of political activity never questioned the relevance of Pancasila 
(Vatikiotis, 1998: 106).    
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 1.2.3. The Era of Reformasi 
With the downfall of Suharto’s “authoritarian” New Order regime on 28 May 199819, 
Indonesia moved toward a political system with relatively fair general election processes and 
with more room for those citizens who had different political viewpoints. King (2003: 179-
81) explains that at its October 1999 general session the Assembly made changes to nine 
articles of the Constitution, which collectively became known as the First Amendment. This 
amendment strengthened the legislative and judicial branches of the government vis-à-vis 
the executive branch, for example, by reconstituting the General Election Commission on an 
independent and non-partisan basis; abolishing appointed, military seats in the House, and 
restricting the armed forces and police from having representatives in the People of 
Consultative Assembly beginning in 2004. In August 2000, the Assembly passed a bill and 
issued several other decrees addressing civil-military relations, the decentralization of power 
to the regions, and a bill of rights.  
Democracy has become a burning issue in this era of Reformasi.   Efforts to apply 
principles of democracy, such as individual freedoms and equitable treatment before the law, 
and efforts to promote democratic attitudes, such as tolerance, respect for diversity, and 
                                                 
19 The downfall of the New Order regime,  according Effendy (2003) & Smith (2001),  was  because of 
several reasons : a) the monetary crisis as the main reason that hit  Indonesia hard and was blamed  
by many Indonesia people as the impact of corruption, collution and nepotism; b)  demonstration led 
by students  who demanded greater democracy; c) an urban poor riot against the removal of  subsidies 
on basic commodities (mandated by the IFM); c) bloodshed and enormous desctruction in cities like 
Jakarta, Medan, Solo, Banyuwangi, Yogakarta, Padang, and Surabaya; d) the political stance of elites 
of Suharto loyalists such as Harmoko who inversed to Suharto by supporting the demands of 
demonstrators; and e) the reluctant stance of the military head, general Wiraanto, to act against 
demonsration, removing Suharto’s last hope of retaining power. 
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 dignity of individuals, have been initiated toward constructing a more democratic society 
and state.   However, Indonesia is still in the preliminary stages of a transition to democracy. 
For example, the 1999 general election did inspire euphoria but the operation of this general 
election did not reflect fully democratic principles (Diamond, 1999; King, 2003; Tempo, 
1998).  There are still large numbers of appointed seats in the People’s Consultative Assembly 
which are reserved for members of the Military and Police.  Moreover, people from different 
religious/ethnic groups and/or political parties do not believe that they will be treated fairly 
by the government system (Tempo, 1998). 
1.3. Education for democracy 
In most societies, education (both formal and non-formal program for adults and 
children/youth) is expected to play a significant role in developing democracy, by 
transmitting the knowledge, skills, and values needed by citizens in a democratic society. In 
Indonesia, as in other nations, education for citizenship focuses on knowledge of the 
government system as well as knowledge of the rights and responsibilities of citizens to the 
state and vice versa. It also promotes democratic values such as tolerance, mutual respect, 
and cooperation.     
Education for democratic citizenship has been developed for the general population 
of Indonesia and has taken several forms. During the Old Order of Sukarno administration, 
education for citizenship focused on promoting concept of “unity in diversity”, a national 
language (Bahasa Indonesian), a spirit of anti-imperialism and loyalty to state (Kingsbury, 
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 2002). During the New Order of the Suharto administration (1965 to 1998), education for 
citizenship was manifested through the P4 (Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan 
Pancasila or A Guide on Appreciation and Application of the State Ideology) program, which 
serves as a means to develop “wawasan nusantara” or a national outlook among the 
population in Indonesia (discussed above). It has been argued, however, that the realization 
of the P-4 program was subject to abuse as being primarily a means of maintaining the power 
of the regime (Sander, 2000).   
In November 1998, the first post-Suharto session of the Indonesia’s People 
Consultative Assembly (Majlis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR) repealed   the P-4 decree 
of 1978, effectively removing the central apparatus for propagating the regime’s 
interpretation of Pancasila (Print & Coleman, 2003; Sander, 2000).  During this time, the 
Ford Foundation20 approached religious (Islamic) civil society associations to develop 
programs to promote the idea of civil society and democracy, and to establish a marriage 
between Western ideas of democracy and the tenets of Islam. These issues were approached 
from an Islamic perspective in order to strengthen pluralist and democratic values within the 
Muslim community and to reach into all levels of society (the Ford Foundation, 2000). 
Prior to the 1999 general election, education for democracy was promoted in 
Indonesia through civil society organizations, such as NGOs and mass or civic associations, in 
response to the process of democratization, especially the holding of general elections. Such 
                                                 
20 This foundation set up a packaged program in enabling Islamic civil society associations to play a 
significant role in the process of Indonesian democratization (i.e. strengthening democratic values).  
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 efforts by civil society organizations have also been facilitated by civil society programs, 
which financially have been supported by international agencies such as UNDP (the United 
Nations for Development Programs) and USAID (United State Agency for International 
Development) (Encarnacion, 2001: 59). In practice, education for democracy or democratic 
citizenship has had a narrow focus on participation of Indonesian citizens in formal politics 
(e.g., voting in the 1999 general election).  
 After the 1999 general election, the government introduced Law 22/1999 
(Decentralization law), which was enacted to accommodate diversity, participation, and real 
autonomy, and to ensure democratization and people empowerment (i.e., to promote popular 
participation in development programs at the village level). Education for democracy aims to 
provide village representatives with democratic knowledge and skills, thus helping the BPD 
(village council) to function as a governing body at the village level (Hadiwinata, 2003).   
1.4. Islamic Civil Society Associations and Education for Democracy  
Two large Indonesian Islamic civil society associations, Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and 
Muhammadiyah (M), were created during the colonial period. NU was established in 1926 by 
Javanese ulama (Javanese religious scholars) who were  concerned with strengthening 
traditional Islam and unity of Indonesian Muslims against the threat posed both by the 
secular appeals of nationalism and communism and by  the rival religious appeal of 
reformists such as Wahabbism, and  Muhammadiyah (Kingsbury, 1998: 13, 35, 49; Sukma, 
2003: 15).  
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 The Muhammadiyah (followers of Muhammad) was founded in Jogjakarta, Java on 18 
November 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan, who was educated for several years in Mecca, where he 
was influenced by the writings of the Egyptian reformist Muhammad Abduh. Abduh 
advocated the purification of Islamic thought and practice, and the defense of Islam against 
its critics (Kingsbury, 1998: 141). M seeks to purify Islam against bid’ah (heresy) and khurafat 
(myths) often practiced by Indonesian Muslim. M embarked upon a tajdid movement21, 
which means renewal, restoration, and modernization. For the promotion of these aims, M 
expands its activities in religious, social, and educational fields through extensive networks of 
                                                 
21 Some writers such as Voll (2004) and Esposito (1998) define tajdid as “renewal” and islah as 
“reform.” Together they reflect a continuing tradition of revitalization of Islamic faith and practice 
within the historic communities of Muslims. Tajdid provides a basis for the conviction that 
movements of renewal are an authentic part of the working out of the Islamic revelation in history.  
Tajdid group or revivalists advocate three major issues as: first, calling for a return to the 
pristine ways of scripture and the recorded example of the Prophet Muhammad (the Qur’an 
and the Sunna of the Prophet); anything that works against or dilutes that devotion is 
considered ungrateful or unbelief and needs to be eliminated by the process of tajdid and 
islah. In broader terms, mujaddids were recognized as being more literalist in their 
interpretation and less likely to utilize symbolic or esoteric interpretations of the Qur’an. 
Second, the right of independent analysis (ijihad) of the Qur’an and the Sunna is encouraged 
in this application and taqlid (the adherence to the opinions of the preceding generations of 
the Muslim clerics of medieval age) is discouraged.  Third, the affirmation of the authenticity 
and uniqueness of the Qur’anic experience has to be maintained.  Ijtihad serves as a means to 
determine the proper application of the Qur’anic message in changing circumstances. Visible 
syncreticism and adoption of ideas and methods clearly originating from outside the 
historical Islamic experience have been rejected. The tajdid-islah mode vigorously affirms 
that the Qur’an and the Sunna are complete as guides for humanity, and they apply in all 
times and places. Ijtihad, according to Voll (1983), is to be solely an interpretive effort rather 
than an effort to supplement an already complete guidance framework. The goal is moral 
construction of Muslim society in order to restore to its Islamic center (Esposito, 1998).   
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 youth and women’s associations, clinics/hospitals and a modernized system of Islamic 
education (Sukma, 2003: 15).  
Both NU and M have  national, provincial, district, branch and sub-branch 
organizations, and each has approximately 30 million members, with NU’s membership 
concentrated in rural areas and Muhammadiyah’s members mainly live in urban areas.  Both 
NU and M are actively involved in societal development through schooling, health, and 
religious guidance (dakwah). However, NU is better known by its traditional religious 
boarding schools (pesantren), while M runs hospitals, schools (from kindergarten to 
university), and orphan care facilities/programs.  
Although each has different approaches to employing Islamic tenets in some aspects 
of furuiyah or in modern terminology al-mutaghayyir (flexible elements), both the NU and 
the M affirm the Sunni doctrine of Islam.  For example, M rejects such cherished traditional 
practices as sacrificial meals (selamatan), visits to holy graves (ziarah kubur) or recitations of 
magically powerful text at life cycle ceremonies. In addition, M defends its principle of 
ijtihad (independent interpretation of the Qur’an and hadith), which goes against following 
one of the four traditional schools of Islamic jurisprudence (madzhab) (van Bruinessen, 
1995). Hooker (2003) suggests that the main difference is that attempts to deduce law 
directly from the Qur’an and hadith without consulting fiqh (technical rules of law, positive 
‘black’ prescription) texts and this way or tradition is not permitted” within NU (Hooker, 
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 2003: 56). In addition, ulama (religious scholars) are less dominant in the leadership of M 
than in the leadership of NU (Fealy, 2003)22.   
Both M and the NU have organized members throughout the Indonesian society and 
thus have the potential to restructure the socio-cultural and political spheres of Indonesian 
life without becoming political parties (Ali, 2003). Both Islamic civil society associations have 
a lot of experience in organizing people of Indonesia as a way to promote their potential and 
to facilitate people in solving problems. This includes educating people about ‘politics’ in a 
broad sense, for instance, in terms of awareness of problems that  arise in a community, 
participation in decision making, and the like. Furthermore, both the NU and M transmitted 
religious values congruent with the principles of western democracy, including tolerance, 
respect for differences, freedom of speech or opinion, and decision making 
(shura=deliberation for making decision).   
In addition, during the Old Order of the Sukarno administration both NU and M 
were involved in the political process under the umbrella of Masyumi, which served as a 
pan-Islamic political federation. NU withdrew from Masyumi in 1952, later organizing itself 
into a political party that functioned until 1972.  In 1973, Suharto forced NU to join together 
with three smaller Islamic parties to form the politically ineffective PPP (United 
Development Party). NU withdrew completely from the political arena in 1984 in order to 
                                                 
22 In the past, such differences may have resulted in a minor friction between the members of the 
two Islamic civil society associations. Currently, the different perspectives between these two Islamic 
civil society associations in the area of furuiyah have not prevented them to interact and cooperate. 
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 concentrate on programs related to social and religious issues (Kingsbury, 2002: 11). M left 
the arena of electoral politics earlier than NU, continuing its activities as a non-party 
organization in 1960 (Hefner, 2000: 87; Kingsbury, 2002: 116). Such experiences helped to 
familiarize NU and M members with the manifestations of politics in Indonesia beginning 
with its days of independence.   
 Prior to era of reformation, both NU and M were actively involved in civil society 
programs, including education for democracy, through interlocking the principle of Islam 
with the principles of Western democracy (the Ford Foundation, 2000). During the era of 
Reformasi, both M and NU have been involved in programs for democratization and are 
committed to developing and sustaining democracy in various spheres of life via their own 
programs. Prior to the 1999 general election, both NU and M were involved in voter 
programs. They are currently involved in promoting values congruent to democratic 
principles, such as tolerance and mutual respect to their members by offering training, 
workshops, and other programs for their members.  M’s commitment is to preserve   such 
civic virtues as open-mindedness, tolerance, pluralism, and respect for the dignity of 
individuals to its members through its programs. M has exhibited the principle of democracy 
in the decision making process (participatory approach) and in the bottom-up approach by 
designing its programs to include community development projects (Abdullah, 2001; 
Nakamura, 2001). Currently, NU aspires to develop a democratic civil society in Indonesia, 
which is basically non-Islamic and non-military (Falaakh, 2001). To pursue this mission, NU 
has developed various programs such as human rights advocacy, gender awareness advocacy 
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 for Muslim society, education for democracy in rural areas, and advocacy for good 
governance (Lakspedam, 2003).   
1.5. Research Problem 
This study will focus on how both M and NU conceptualize and operationalize 
education for democratic citizenship. This study will address the following general questions: 
How are the conceptualizations and operationalizations of education for democratic 
citizenship similar to or different within and across the two Islamic civil society associations.  
More specifically, the study will seek to answer the following questions: 
•  How do the members of these Islamic civil society associations conceptualize and 
operationalize democracy and democratic society?  
•  What values and principles do they highlight in their conceptualization of 
democracy?   
• What values and principles are reflected in the way of the organization functions in 
decision making and other other activities? 
• How do the members of these Islamic civil society associations conceptualize and 
operationalize citizenship in a democratic society?  
• How do they conceptualize the roles, rights, and responsibilities of citizens in 
democratic society (in relation to other citizens, the state and people from other 
nation states)? 
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 • How are M and NU Members involved in these organizations and what notions 
of citizenship are implied by such levels/forms of (non) involvement?  
• How do the members of these Islamic civil society associations conceptualize and 
operationalize education for citizenship in a democratic society?  
• How do they define education in relation to developing democratic citizens?  
• What values, attitudes, principles, knowledge, and skills do members believe should 
be developed among citizens in democratic society?  
• What strategies do these associations use to develop democratic citizens among 
their members and the community at large?   
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2. FRAMING EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP 
 
In order to theoretically frame this study, I discuss the literature regarding democracy, 
citizenship and education for a democratic citizenship, including a focus on civil society. The 
discussion of each issue will be highlighted from various perspectives such as liberal, 
communitarian, critical, and Islamic. I am not able to find the literature on the Islamic 
perspective about education for democratic citizenship; therefore I will exclude discussion of 
the Islamic perspective.   
2.1. Democracy, Citizenship and Civil Society   
2.1.1.  Democracy 
 Literally, the word democracy comes from the Greek word “demos” (people) and 
“kratia” (rule or authority) and means rule by the people (Lane & Errsson, 2003) or 
government by and for the majority. Democracy can thus be contrasted with rule by a single 
individual (as in monarchy or tyranny) or rule by a few (e.g. aristocracy or oligarchy) (Clarke 
& Fowaker, 2001; Craig, 1998; Dahl, 1998; Jahanbakhsh, 2001; Manent, 2003).  
Democracy may be defined narrowly as a type of government system (Lane & 
Errsson, 2003: 25). Democracy is an institutional arrangement for arriving at political 
decisions in which individuals acquire power to decide by means of a competitive struggle 
for the people’s vote (Arblaster, 2002: 50; Hague & Harrop, 200: 16). Democracy serves as a 
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 means to protect ‘the ruled’ from the abuse of power by ‘the ruling’ (Berry, 1989: 40). 
Democracy is a political system in which sovereignty is held by the people, rulers are held 
periodically accountable to the ruled, minority rights (including the right to become the 
majority) are protected, and political competition among individuals and ideas is open 
(Zartman, 2000: 232).   A democratic government is characterized by free and fair elections 
with a secret ballot; the principles of one person/one vote; a division and separation of 
powers between government branches; the rule of law and justice for all before the law; 
open channels of communication between citizens and government officials; and basic 
human rights, such as freedom of speech or expression or freedom of religion (Cohen & 
Arato, 1992; Ginsburg, 2001: 169; Print, Orstrom & Nielsen, 2002: 199; Rosenberg, 1993: 230; 
Roshwald, 2000: 19-83; ). 
  Democracy may be viewed in a broader perspective as well,  addressing more than 
just a form of government (Lane & Errson, 2003) and more than just the constitutions, the 
elections and the rule of law (Levinger, 2000). It may be defined as a way of life, addressing 
willingness to compromise, tolerance, and a willingness to listen to and be influenced by 
arguments (Print, Omstrom & Nielsen, 2002). Democracy can also be defined as the 
acceptance of a social contract that entails responsible action, good citizenship, and the belief 
that no one is above the law (Levinger, 2002: 2). 
According to Levin (1998), democracy comprises two dimensions: formal politics and 
a participative process. By “formal politics” he means voting, election, and political parties. 
With respect to formal politics, democracy is viewed as simply a market mechanism, i.e., the 
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 voters are the consumers and the politicians are the entrepreneurs. In order to get support 
from public (masses), politicians use all means (such as money) to obtain political interests 
(for instance ‘money politics case’)23. A participative process implies the involvement 
(participation) of the people in determining the programs and policies that government 
establishes. With respect to the participatory dimension, democracy aims to empower people 
(community) to make decisions and policies fairly (without repression or discrimination). 
Therefore, democracy ideally encourages and allows all people to be involved in making 
decisions (Levin, 1998: 58). 
 Democracy depends on two essential elements: liberty, or freedom, and equality. 
Freedom is defined as “the capacity to act in accordance with one’s will” (Roshwald, 2000: 
20). Freedoms for individuals implies freedom of speech or expression, freedom of religion, 
freedom from danger and fear, freedom from want, freedom of mind, freedom of association, 
which implies freedom of an individual to participate in the formation of the government as 
the basis of human rights (Print, Orstrom & Nielsen, 2002; Roshwald, 2000). Equality, the 
second element on which democracy depends, takes various forms. All human beings who 
have diverse backgrounds such as their race/ethnicity, religion, or economic status should 
have equal rights; that is, they should be treated equally before the law.    In the political 
                                                 
23 Harris (2003: 16) argues that political corruption entails vote buying; in some this is a routine 
political activity. At an obvious level, vote buying is akin to drug taking in competitive sports in that 
once one side embarks on it with impunity the choice facing others is between possibly winning 
corruptly and certainly losing honestly. Because the resources required to buy the vote must 
themselves be acquired, one form of corruption seldom stands alone. The corrupt politician takes 
bribes, reinvesting part of them in vote buying ….   
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 sphere, for example, each citizen should have an equal and direct role in decision making 
(Jahanbakhsh, 2001). 
    There are various perspectives with respect to democracy: liberal, communitarian and 
critical. Liberal democracy is founded on several assumptions: individual freedom or 
autonomy and restriction of government to interfere with individual freedom (Gutex, 2004). 
Writers such as Waldron, Magsino, and Cohen & Arato state that individual freedom or 
autonomy serves as a fundamental value of liberal democracy. Within liberalism, the 
interests of individuals do not necessarily or naturally harmonize with the interests of other 
individuals (Magsino, 2002; Waldron, 1998). Therefore, individual autonomy is necessary to 
enable citizens to choose from a variety of options, and also enable them to decide for 
themselves what “living a good life” means (Crittenden, 2002: 32-41). A person is free, 
capable of forming, revising, and pursuing his or her interest. Competitiveness between 
individuals is natural when it comes to pursuing   and achieving their interests. With respect 
to polity, citizenship is considered as instrumental to the attainment of non-political goals of 
autonomous individuals making private choices, while political activity is conceptualized as 
mainly aiming at establishing a legal framework for the social intercourse of private 
individuals in their pursuit of individual interests (Axtmann, 1996: 37).  
In liberalism, freedom implies the absence of government coercion, a limited role 
for government, and sovereignty of individuals (Dehsen, 2000). Based on a strong value of 
individual autonomy, the liberal view of democracy asserts that the state does not have the 
right to interfere in a citizen’s life, except in restricted situations (Crittenden, 2002, Cohen 
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 & Arato, 1992; Heater, 1999).  The role of the government is to protect an individual’s 
fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property. Such a role, according to Sehr (1997), 
constitutes the notion of privatized democracy. Should government abuse power, the 
people have the right to overthrow it and to establish a new government that would protect 
their liberties. Mistrust of government and minimal government intervention in economic 
and other affairs are required (Dehsen, 2000).  
In contrast, communitarians state that individuals are situated within an historical 
and social context. Individual freedom must be integrated into the interests of society as a 
whole. Civic virtues involve a communal practice of citizenship that should be integrated 
within institutions of society at all levels and become habituated in the character, customs, 
and moral sentiments of every citizen (Cohen & Arato, 1992). A healthy public life requires 
citizens who are able to assert both individual and common interests (Perczynnski & Vink, 
2002) in order to achieve the goal of democracy: building a strong community or good 
society based on a common identity within diversity, mutuality, autonomy, participation, 
and integration (Andersen & Hoff, 2001: 2; Janoski, 1998: 19). Communitarianism is anti 
individualism founded on the several  principles: a) the non reducibility and significance of 
collectives, institutions, relations, meanings and the like; b) that  the locus of value is not only the 
individual as such, but also the social individual, or even the community or society of which an 
individual is a member, as well as  the importance of  a range of values that have tended to be 
neglected in individualist philosophies: reciprocity, trust, solidarity, tradition and the like; and that 
the way  to practice ethics and to derive political principles is not to try to deduce and apply 
 27
 universally valid fundamental principles, but to interpret and refine values that are immanent in the 
ways of life of really living groups—societies/communities (Frazer, 1999). 
The critical perspective is founded on following assumptions: a) many institutions, 
especially political, economic, and educational ones, maintain and reproduce inequitable and 
exploitative conditions that favor one group or class, the dominant one, over subordinate 
groups or classes; b) relationship between classes or groups  serves centers of conflict ; c) the 
dominant class controls sources for their favored position and makes socially and 
economically disadvantaged classes subordiante; and  d) to transform such unequal relations 
it is necessary to advocate for disempowered and subordinate groups. The proponents of a 
critical perspective believe that people have rights to be self-determined, or empowered, 
rather than to be controlled by those who hold power in an institutional position; e) The 
goals are to raise the consciousness of the oppressed members of society about the conditions 
of exploitation, and to liberate, and empower the disadvantaged groups to take control of 
their own lives and shape their own futures (Gutek, 2004).   
Advocates of a critical perspective view democracy as an ideological struggle and 
are governed by competing conceptions of power, politic, and community (Giroux, 1988).  
A public democratic sphere offers everyone, especially marginalized groups, an 
opportunity to participate in shaping, influencing, and criticizing public opinion. 
Democracy can exist whenever popular sovereignty or public autonomy and private 
autonomy are guaranteed. Private autonomy can be justified through public autonomy, 
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 which constitutes the notions of popular sovereignty. Communicative autonomy is linked 
to individual autonomy, which refers to the freedom of actors in society to shape, 
criticize, and reproduce essential norms, meanings, values, and identities through 
communicative action (Chamber, 2002; Cohen & Arato, 1997; Habermas, 1996).    
Muslim scholars argue that shura has a meaning that is comparable to and 
compatible with democracy. Shura24  implies a system of government’ and the new 
Islamic political or “Islamic democracy”, which encompasses democratic ideas and 
institution in the light of the following values or norms: First, the ultimate and absolute 
power is vested in God. Shura is based on the principles of the sovereignty of God and 
supremacy of Shari’ah. Second, the supreme and higher power in the Islamic state is the 
Divine Texts—the Qur’an and the Sunnah—and people as the second. Third, the people 
of the Earth derive their authority from God’s authority according to the concept of 
istikhlas (vicegerency) (al-Sulami, 2003; Maududi, 1997; Moten, 1996; Mousalli, 1999).  
 Both Muslim’s modernists and Western accommodationists argue that Islam advocates 
civil liberties such as freedom and equality25 (Abdalati, 1995; Ahmad, 2003; Al’anani, 1990; 
                                                 
24 In addition, Shura has other meanings: (a) deliberation and consultation with respect to religious 
affairs and societal matters; (b) consultation of the head of state with scholars; (c) people’s 
involvement in (decision making) political matters and issues pertaining to community; and (d) an 
obligation to give advice to leaders and other people. Shura has to be developed starting from the 
family base and extending to life in all areas (Ali, 2002; Al-Sulami, 2003; Maududi, 1997; Mousalli, 
1999; Osman, 2002). 
25 Islam teaches freedom (freedom of religion) as stated in several verses of al-Qur’an, such as, “No 
compulsion in embracing Islam (al-Qur’an 2: 110),” “You have your religion and I have mine (al-
Qur’an 109:6).These two verses of al-Qur’an constitute a basic principle of freedom of religion, and 
imply peaceful and mutual respect, justice for all people regardless diverse backgrounds, mutual 
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 Amstrong, 2000; Esposito, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2003; Feldman, 2003;  Hanafi, 2002; Khan, 2003; 
Maududi, 1997; Moussalli, 2000, 1999; Rosenthal, 1960; Wright, 1996, 2000; Zartman, 2001). 
Civil liberties have a religious basis, at-Tawhid, which implies a principle that liberates 
human from submission to other humans (Al-Sulami, 2003). Hurriyah or freedom implies a 
variety of dimensions:  (a) an individual is free from subjugation, sin, inherited inferiority, 
and ancestral hindrance, as well as self-determination; (b) individual rights are sacred as long 
as he/she does not deliberately violate the Law of God or violate the rights of others; (c) 
implies sovereignty, accountability and responsibility; (d) sovereignty of individuals is 
temporary, and the ultimate sovereignty belongs to God; (e) with the temporary sovereignty, 
every one has to be responsible for  his/her acts before the public (umma) in the present 
world and, finally, God in the hereafter; and  (f) balance between respecting  the autonomy 
of the group and  preserving a wide scope for individual freedom (Abdalati, 1995;  Al’anani, 
1990;  Maududi, 1997;  Moussalli, 2000, 1999). Equality (musawat) implies that all people in 
the sight of God are equal. In addition, they are diverse in terms of abilities, potentials, 
wealth and the like; but none of these differences can establish a status of superiority of one 
person or race to another (Abdalati, 1995).    Also, equality implies the protection of human 
rights, including security of life and property, and should be demonstrated by an individual’s 
faith in God’s message and expected behavior of believers (Kurdi, 1984: 45-46).   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
respect of, and freedom or autonomy of different religious communities. Islam also teaches that, in 
the sight of God, all people are equal (al-Qur’an 49:13). 
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 2.1.2. Citizenship 
   From the lexical standpoint, citizenship is “the condition of being a citizen” (Black, 
1990: 244; Clarke & Fowaker, 2001: 52) or making a “distinction between those who are 
properly part of a nation (i.e. citizens) and those who are not” (Matyl, 1989). Citizenship 
refers to an identity or an attribute that encourages individuals to think of themselves as 
being part of a society or a state. Citizenship is also a fundamental identity that helps situate 
individuals in society (sense of citizenship) (Hindess, 2003; Lister, Smith & Middleton, 2003).  
Citizenship is also a status (full membership of a state) conferred by nation states, which 
carries rights (the horizontal aspect) and responsibilities or consequences (the vertical aspect) 
(Osler & Starkey, 2002; Zilbershats, 2002: 3).  
   The development of the modern concept of citizenship dates from the 1789 French 
Revolution and its development of the idea of citoyen (Turner, 1986). Citoyen is derived 
from cite, which denotes an assembly of persons who enjoyed certain limited rights within a 
city. This notion is synonymous with the idea of “denizen” in English, which is used to refer 
to the notion of living in a city (Turner, 1993). The concept of citizenship has been 
developed along with issues such as the inclusion of women in the category of a citizen, 
social change, political liberation and economic equality (Turner, 1986: 18-20).   
 There are various perspectives with respect to citizenship, such as liberal, 
communitarian, and critical. The liberal perspective emphasizes civil rights which have to be 
honored by the state and are much less demanding of individuals (Heater, 1999).  Marshall 
was one of the influential scholars with respect to the liberal view of citizenship. He first 
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 addressed the problem of citizenship in conjunction with the relationships between 
democracy and capitalism, i.e., trying to reconcile the formal political framework of 
democracy with the social consequences and organization of capitalism as an economic 
system.   That is, while citizenship deals with democracy, which advocates equality (at least 
before the law and in terms of participation rights), capitalism advocates individualism and 
competition which produces inequality (Marshall, 1965). According to Marshall, while all 
citizens are equal with respect to the rights and duties for which the status is endowed, there 
are no universal principles that determine what those rights and duties shall be. Societies 
differ in their images of the ideal citizens against whom achievement can be measured and 
toward whom aspiration can be directed (Marshall, 1965: 92-93).   
 Marshall states that citizenship contains three sets of rights: civil (18th century), 
political (19th century), and social (20th century) elements. Civil rights include those rights 
necessary for freedoms of individuals—liberty of person; freedom of speech, thought, and 
faith; the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts; and the right to justice.  
Political rights developed along with the growth of modern state systems (e.g., parliamentary 
democracy), and were institutionalized in the parliamentary political system of competing 
parties. Political rights pertain to the access to a decision making process through 
participation in the choice of a parliament by universal suffrage. This concept emerged in the 
19th century reflecting, in part, the demands of the working class for citizenship (political 
power).   The social rights of citizens range from economic welfare and security to the right 
to share completely in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being, according to 
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 the prevailing societal standard.  Social rights of citizenship became more important in the 
20th century and were institutionalized in the welfare state (Barbalet, 2000; Hindess, 1993; 
Hogan, 1997: 46; Lipset, 1965; Marshal, 1965; Turner, 1993).  
In liberalism, citizenship serves as an instrument to the attainment of non-political 
goals of autonomous individuals making private choices (Axtmann, 1996). Liberalism puts 
emphasis on the maximization of individual rights and the minimalization of the pursuit of 
the public interests (Cogan, 1998). Citizenship is founded upon the important normative 
principles of political equality that requires equal formal political rights among those who 
considered being citizens. The practice of good citizens in liberal democracy is confined to 
the requirement of voting in elections and possibly serving on juries. Civic capacities and 
practices are assumed from a market model in which human beings are understood as 
competitive individualists. These individuals give priority to the pursuit of freedom and 
fulfillment in their private lives. Citizens’ participation is within the context of the nation-
state and government (Stoke, 2002). The government has to promote the freedom of 
individuals to be a more positive notion as the ability to participate in society as full citizens 
(Lister, 2003).   
Communitarians view citizenship as achieved membership of an ethical community. 
Communitarians advocate the concept of active citizenship in terms of active participation in 
a community unified by shared values and respect for the common good. It is natural for 
citizens to join in common action with others to pursue a common good. The notion of 
public good existed prior to and is independent of individual desire and institutions (Mouffe, 
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 1995). Being a citizen involves belonging to a historical development of community, that is, 
citizens are viewed to act responsibly when they stay within the limits of what is acceptable 
to the community (common identity). Individual autonomy and judgment cannot exist 
without a common basis (van Gunsteren, 1998: 17-21). In the creation of a common identity, 
individuals are to assimilate to the societies they have entered because they want to be 
accepted as full members (human association serves as a source of self-identity) (Little, 2002). 
Individuals from minority groups (such as immigrants)  join in a dominant culture, which 
produces a continual evolution of the original culture, and functions morally, culturally, and 
politically as diaspora in relation to the immigrants’ home country (‘inner exclusion concept’) 
(Taylor, 2003). Communities survive through individual member’s sense of loyalty and 
strength, and individuals gain support and strength from being part of community. 
Communitarians stress duties more so than rights (O’Byrne, 2003).    
  From a critical perspective, Giroux advocates the concept of active citizenship. By 
active citizenship, he means that people have to struggle to obtain their own rights. The 
citizen has to be an active agent in questioning, defining, and shaping one’s relationship to 
the political sphere and the wider society. He further argues that “active citizenship would 
not reduce democratic rights to mere participation in the process of electoral voting, but 
would extend the notion of rights to participate in the economy, the state, and other public 
spheres” (Giroux, 1988: 170-174).  Active citizenship is developed and grasped from below by 
popular struggle and by popular social movement (Turner, 2000: 43-44). The role of 
government is limited to protect the individual freedom regardless of their backgrounds 
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 (inclusion). The government has to promote the individual freedom to be a more positive 
notion as the ability to participate in society as full citizens (Lister, 2003) in the affairs of the 
public arena, in order to defend democratic society and critical citizenry (Giroux, 1988; 
Turner, 2000).  
In Islam the discussion of citizenship has a connection with the concept of Umma. 
Umma means the brotherhood of faithful society across various boundaries such as 
geographical areas, ethnicity, and social and economic status (Kelsay, 2002; Kurdi, 1984). Its 
discussion is inseparable from civil society, which will be discussed in the next sub-section. 
2.1.3. Civil Society 
The term ‘civil society’ derives from   societas civitas, the Latin translation of 
Aristotle’s koinonia politike, defined as “an ethical-political community of free and equal 
citizens who participate in ruling and being ruled under a legally defined system of public 
procedures and shared values” (Graig, 1998: 369), or it simply refers to “a community, a 
collection of human beings united within a legitimate political order” (Khilnani, 2001: 17). 
Civil society also derives from societas civilis—the definition of Cicero, a thinker of the pre-
enlightenment era, who refers to it as ‘the state [civitas] and a partnership in law (societas) 
with equality of legal status among members’ (Black, 2001: 33). Civil society deals with a 
city, which is called the “liberty of citizen”, in which the inhabitants dwell safe from 
violence [civ tas  id est ‘c t (tra) vi (m) (habi) tas]. The relations among inhabitants of such 
places were normally governed by law (contract theory) (Palmer, 2002: 50). These 
i , i
 35
 definitions were used for societies in which only a minority of residents was accorded 
“citizenship”. 
In the current usage, civil society has a variety of meanings. The libertarians (liberal 
market supporters) put forward the concept of civil society in the context of two 
cells/rivalries or a dichotomy (dualism) that places the public sector in opposition to private 
sector, economics in conflict with culture, and the state with the private sphere. From this 
perspective, civil society is a characteristic of the private sector but not economy. The public 
sector is where the government plays a predominant role, whereas the private sector deals 
with individuals, social organizations and civic (including religious) associations. Libertarians 
argue that government (which is public sector) tends to be coercive, whereas the private 
sector advocates equality (mutual respect), liberty, or freedom (Barber, 1999; Janoski, 1998). 
 In line with liberal perspective, Barber (1999) also explains the concept of three cells 
in civil society, which implies government, the private sector (individual, contract acts) and 
civic sectors (civic communities that qualify as members). From a liberal perspective the civic 
sector is viewed to be sufficiently open and egalitarian so people will be permitted to 
participate on voluntary bases—openness, voluntarism, and inclusion. Thus, restricting the 
role of government is necessary for maintaining a civil society (Barber, 1999).  
Similar to liberalists, the developmentalist and neo-Tocqueveilian groups such as 
Putnam hold to an idea similar to the conservative thinker, de Tocqueville, defining civil 
society as the realm of intermediary associations. Civil society is a sphere between state and 
family structure populated by organizations, which are separate from the state, enjoy an 
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 autonomous position in relation to the state, and seek to have a significant influence on 
public policies. In addition, those associations are formed voluntarily by members of society 
to protect or advance their interest (Blair, 1998, White, 1996). They refer to a wide range of 
voluntary organizations, including traditional volitional institutions as well as contemporary 
civic institutions and associations, including NGOs (non-government organizations), POs 
(people’s organizations), and philanthropic organizations (Mitsuo, 2001).    
The communitarians describe civil society as a complex mass of social relations that 
ties people together into families, clans, neighborhood, communities and hierarchies. Civil 
society is a zone of human interaction, embeddings and bonding. It refers to associations of 
small and intimate communities with a shared sense of morality (Trentmann, 2000: 12).  
In contrast to previous perspectives, critical theorists such as Gramsci argue that 
civil society is an arena over which intellectuals26 struggle to secure hegemonic leadership 
of the working class and the masses (Turner, 2000), or an arena of struggle between the 
state and the citizens, in which the social and cultural hegemony of the ruling elite is 
permanently being contested (Hamzawy, 2003: 20-35). 
                                                 
26 Sear (1997: 20-25) explores two main types of intellectuals advocated by Gramsci:  traditional and 
organic intellectuals.  Traditional intellectuals are intellectuals whose positions in society were 
established under previously existing social relations of production. They have remained in existence 
despite far-reaching social transformation. Traditional intellectuals see themselves as independent of 
class interests. These groups organize and maintain the unequal social relations of capitalism through 
their work in business, government, and cultural production. Organic intellectuals perform essential 
economic, social, and political functions for the classes with which they are connected. These 
intellectuals provide the focus and direction necessary for their group to organize as movement 
through their articulation of alternative ideologies. Alternative ideologies create new understanding 
of the social world, and new visions that help mobilize people to struggle for social change. The 
radical social change is central. 
 37
 Muslim scholars, including Middle Eastern (Arab’s) scholars, have a variety of 
conceptualizations of and responses to civil society. Muslim scholars apply the concept 
umma to civil society. Umma27 means brotherhood of faithful society across various 
boundaries such as geographical areas, ethnicity, social and economic status.  Umma has 
positive elements, such as mutual support and security for individuals, which were 
established to combat negative elements like factionalism and nepotism that had to be 
resisted (Zubaida, 2001: 236). According to Hanafi (2002), the concept of umma does not 
exclusively exist in Moslem communities but also exists in various communities bound 
together by a treaty. Within this system, the rights of each religious community, i.e., to live 
within the confederated umma and exercise their own self-rule in many areas of communal 
life, are recognized and any efforts pertaining to modern ethic and religious cleansing have 
to be prevented (Hanafi, 2002: 63).   
Umma is based on the following principles: a) solidarity, cohesion among members, 
across territorial borders, and heterogeneity (classes, ethnicities); b) bound with similar faith  
                                                 
f
27 Muslim scholars trace the concept umma from the 6th century, the time of the Prophet, when he 
was to lead the Muslim people in a campaign by which he sought to unite the various Arab tribes into 
a new societal entity that would include Christians and Jews (Kelsay, 2002: 288, Kurdi, 1984: 131). 
Umma, according to Madjid, refers to “al-mujtama’ al-madani” in modern Arabic, which has a 
meaning similar to the concept of civil society or to, more appropriately, “civilized society (al-
mujtama’ al-mutamadyin)” (Madjid, 2001). It is a model of societal arrangement of a pluralistic 
society. The model of society at that time was bound by the concept of Mithaqi Madina (Ali, 1999), or 
Shahi atul Madinah (Safi, 2002), or the constitution of Medina (Madjid, 2001), which was translated 
into the Medina Charter or an agreement among tribes and believers such as Muslims, Christians and 
Jews to coexist in partnership and harmony. The Medina Charter was aimed at maintaining peace and 
cooperation, protecting the life and property of the inhabitants of Medina, fighting aggression and 
injustice regardless of tribal or religious affiliations, and ensuring freedom of religion and movement 
(Safi, 2002). 
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 (Tawhid or the Unity); c) polity, which is based on the Tawhid that God is the ultimate 
sovereignty, and subject to the rules and norms of the Sha iah; and d) common affairs are 
undertaken in mutual consultation and discussion (shura) among members of Umma, and 
decisions are arrived at through ijmak (consensus among people and/or scholars) (Moten, 
1996).  
r
In response to the concept of civil society advocated by Western scholars, the 
contemporary Muslim and/or “Arab” scholars are divided into the following mainstreams:  
a) Islamists/fundamentalists  view civil society as an expression of modern secularism whose 
conceptual power is solely dependent upon the history and present reality of Western 
society (for example see Kautharani and Ismail Syaed). For them, the idea of civil society 
implies the suppression of religious movements and associations because they are believed 
to support traditional practices to be anti-democratic nature (Hamzawy, 2003); b) Moderate 
or liberal scholars have adapted Western ideas to explain civil society (see the Western 
concept of civil society); e) Critical theorists such as Kamil are influenced by the ideas of 
Antonio Gramsci.  According to Kamil, this notion of civil society applies to the religious 
institutions and other civil instiutions that are rooted in society, which react and represent 
peaceful, political resistance against the authoritarian states   (Hamzawy, 2003: 20-35). 
2.2. Education for Democratic Citizenship  
Writers use different terms to address the concept of education for democratic 
citizenship. For instance, Naval, Print & Veldhuis (2002) refer to the concept of education for 
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 democratic citizenship, while, other writers discuss education for citizenship or citizenship 
education (Russell, 2002; Barber, 1989), education for democracy (Levin, 1998) and even 
democratic education (Gutmann, 1987). Education for democratic citizenship aims at 
developing people’s capabilities of thoughtful and responsible participation as democratic 
citizens in a political, economic, social, and cultural life (Naval, Print & Veldhuis, 2002: 114).  
 In defining education for democratic citizenship, writers place emphasis on different 
points.  The notions of education for democracy may be classified into the following:  
a) Developing people’s capabilities of thoughtful and responsible participation as democratic 
citizens in various spheres of life (Naval, Print & Veldhuis, 2002). Naval, Print & 
Veldhuis (2002) places emphasis on the process of making people democratic. It provides 
opportunities for acquiring (a) the knowledge, (b) skills, (c) attitude, and (d) values linked 
to democratic culture.  
b) Providing a set of core values of democracy or democratic attitudes such as respect for 
reasonable differences, different viewpoints, and human dignity, respect for minority 
rights, a caring attitude toward others, justice, equality, participation, freedom as 
requirements of citizens in order to create a democratic society (Bank, 1997; Calcendo, 
2000; Christopher, 1989; CIVNET, 2000; Hoge, 2002; Kaltsounit, 1990; Meyer, 1990; 
Schwarzmantel, 2003), mutual respect, cooperation, recognition of the importance of 
law, and facilitation of individuals in making political judgments related to controversial 
issues in society (Engle & Ochoa, 1988; Mei-Hui, 1999; Eoh, 1999).  These values are 
needed to form and maintain a vital democratic community or society (Dynneson, 2001). 
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 c) Teaching how to use the concept of democracy in terms of a form of government 
especially, a democratic government. Education for citizenship provides people with 
knowledge and capability needed to understand and assess the application of a 
democratic government and human rights. It also teaches people about what citizenship 
is, how it is acquired or lost in particular political system, and its various rights and 
responsibilities (Patrick, 2000: 20).   
d) Making citizens ‘political’: citizens believe in, commit to, uphold, and carry out 
fundamental democratic principles and become effective citizens or politically literate 
(Conley, 1993; Pring, 1999). 
Liberal democratic education relies upon the principles of liberalism such as 
autonomy of individuals. It presupposes a necessary condition of protective citizenship in 
line with the liberal democratic constitutional and institutional arrangements and social 
norm (Hogan, 1997). Communitarians view education for democratic citizenship group; 
emphasizing the need to belong to an ethno-cultural group; identifying communities’ 
fundamental characteristics; and preserving essential elements which define personal 
identity such as language, gender, ethnicity, religion, and race (Hebert, 2002). It promotes 
democratic rules or norms that create a high degree of mutual understanding, trust, and 
commitment among members of society (Taylor, 2003).   
To educate for democratic citizenship, according to the critical perspective, is to 
prepare people for active, critical, publicly oriented citizenship, committed to democratic 
public life. Educating people to be active citizens—common people are the only ones who 
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 could guarantee that the government would not be corrupted (Ginsburg, 2001; Giroux, 1988; 
Sehr, 1997)--starts with the process of acquiring knowledge and critical awareness to 
understand and question oppressive patterns of social, political, and economic organization. 
This type of education contributes to an understanding of power relations and power 
structure (Lapayese, 2003). 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
To address the research questions, I conducted a qualitative study. I employed “ethnographic 
methods” to explore conceptions and practices of members of two Islamic civil society 
associations in Indonesia (M and NU) with respect to “democracy”, citizenship, and 
education for democratic citizenship.  
Ethnography is an approach to learning about the social and cultural life of 
communities, institutions, and other settings (LeCompte & Schensul, 1999, p. 1).    According 
to LeCompte and Schensul (1999: 9), ethnographic research is carried out in natural settings; 
involves intimate and face-to-face interaction with participants; presents reflection of 
participants’ perspectives and behaviors; uses inductive, interactive and recursive data 
collection and analytic strategies to build local cultural theories; draws on multiple data 
sources, including both quantitative and qualitative data; and frames all human behavior and 
belief within various contexts. In this study, the (emic) perspective serves as an instrument to 
understanding and describing a situation and behavior (Fetterman, 1998: 20) with respect to 
three issues mentioned above.  
3.1. Selection of Organizational Units and Key Informant 
I carried out an ethnographic field study for about four months in Jakarta and 
Yogjakarta, Indonesia, from March to July 2004. I focused on two Islamic civil society 
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 associations: Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah (M).  I  selected M and NU for 
several  reasons: a) the two Islamic civil society associations have greater potentials in terms 
of members, programs and network than any other civil society organizations including 
NGOs; b)  their involvement in a political party (Masyumi) during the previous regimes 
makes it possible for these associations and members to get more familiar with political 
dynamics in Indonesia; c) their involvement in the process of democratization, including 
their participation in education for democracy, d) what roles M and NU serve in relation to 
state/government, international agencies, as well as super power states,  especially in 
representing the Muslim society of Indonesia; and e) responsive  to developing the tenets of 
Islam with respect to societal matters  (muammalah) such as democracy,  civil society and the 
like.   
In addition, I was a board member of Lembaga Pengembangan Masyarakat dan 
Sumber Daya Manusia or the Center for Community and Human Resources Development 
(M-LPMSDM) from 1993 until 1996 (one period). I was also involved in establishing M sub-
branch in my village during the summer break of 2001. My colleagues who are involved in 
one NGO, in which I was involved, are activists of NU-LAKPESDAM. Some members of my 
family, such as cousins, are activists of NU in the sub-district of my hometown. Moreover, 
my wife was a member of NU-Student Union (PMII) when she was an undergraduate 
student. Such a personal background has sparked my interest in studying M and NU, 
especially within the context of educating for democracy.    
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 My field of study was effectively carried out from April to July 200428.  With respect 
to Muhammadiyah, I changed the site of my field study from Jakarta to Yogjakarta, because I 
met an improper person in the office of M in Jakarta. That man talked to me for less than ten 
minutes and later ordered me to follow a formal procedure, i.e. sending a letter to the board 
of M and waiting for approval. A relative of mine helped me to meet the president of 
Muhammadiyah University of Yogjakarta (MUY), my friend, who serves the chair of Majlis 
Pembinaan Kader and Sumber Daya Insani of M (Council for Cadre and Human Resource 
Development of M). The president of MUY offered me chances to do my field study, and also 
he facilitated me to make contacts with the boards of M at all levels (national, provincial, and 
district) as well as to access information in the libraries of and the University of M 
inYogjakarta.  I had to spend extra time to make appointments with key actors because of the 
general election and preparation for the direct presidential election. Some boards of M and 
NU were involved in supporting their own candidates for president and vice president. 
Therefore, it was not easy for me to make a contact with resource persons (key actors) of 
both M and NU.  
                                                 
28 Because of a hot water burn on my leg, I was unable to walk, so I took rest for a month [the first 
week of March 2004]. 
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 M has councils and institutes29 as well as  autonomous organizations such as Aisyiah 
(female), Nasyiatul Aisyiah (female youth), Pemuda Muhammadiyah (male youth), Ikatan 
Remaja Muhammadiyah (students of Secondary and high school), Ikatan Mahasiswa 
Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Student Association), Tapak Suci Putera Muhammadiyah 
(Traditional Defense), and Hizbul Wathan (boy scout).   M has 1112 primary schools, 972 
secondary schools, 504 high schools, 145 vocational schools (high schools), 1168 madrasah 
ibtidaiyah, 530 madrasah thanawiyah, 172 madrasah aliyah, 54 pondok pesantren, 105 
colleges/universities, 311 clinics/hospitals, 309 orphan care centers, 13 Bank Perkreditan 
Rakyat (Small banks for the promotion of small scale enterprises), 125 baitul tanwil (saving 
and loaning bank serving the smallest scale enterprises), 4 business corporation, and 794 
cooperatives  (PP. Muhammadiyah, 2004). 
The central board of NU has 17 institutions serving da’wah (proselityzation), 
education, economy, and social and cultural affairs. In addition, NU has 10 autonomous 
organizations constituting Muslimat NU (Female), Fatayat NU (female youth), Gerakan 
Pemuda Ansar (male youth), Ikatan Putra-Putri NU (Students of secondary and high 
schools), am’iyyah Ahli Thariqat al-Mu’tabarah an-Nahdliyyah (spiritualism/Sufism), J
                                                 
29 Council has hierarchically organizational structures from the central to the district levels; for 
example, the Council for Primary and Secondary Education, the council for Higher Education, the 
Council for Economic Development, the Council for Social Welfare, the Council for Health 
Promotion [Services], the Council for Islamic Guidance, the Council for Islamic Jurisprudence and 
Islamic Thought Development, and the Council for Institutional Property. The institute operates at 
the national level such as the Institute for Special Proselityzation, the Institute for Community and 
Human Resource Development, the Institute for Organizational Development, and the Institute for 
Financial Control and Guidance.   
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 jamiy h al-Qurra wa  al-Huffazh (the association of those who memorize and understand the  
Qur’an), Ikatan Sarjana NU (NU Scholar Association), Ikatan Pencak Silat Pagar Nusa (Pagar 
Nusa Traditional Defense) and Lakpesdam-NU (Ka’bah, 1998). NU has 5742 pesantrens, 
which encompasses 4114 kindergartens, 780 junior high schools, 299 senior high schools, 19 
universities and 26 other academic institutions (Riddell, 2002: 70). 
a
  I collect data from several persons as key informants (Johnson, 1990) or key actors 
(Fetterman, 1998) Informants were selected based on their familiarity with and/or 
involvement in a civil society program, especially a program for education for democracy.  
According to both Johnson (1990: 29-33) and Fetterman (1998: 48), key informants/actors:   
(a)  play a pivotal role in a community that will expose him/her to significant information; 
(b) have knowledge or information possessed as a result of a respective role; 
(c) have knowledge about the contemporary interpersonal relationship, a wealth of 
information about the nuances of everyday life; and 
(d) Possesses willingness to communicate, cooperate, and be impartial.     
 All key informants were selected based on whether they were involved in a program in 
relation to the promotion of democracy or civil society, or they became familiar with the 
issues because they have a pivotal role in civil society associations (critera a and b).  
In M, those key informants are selected from M (central, provincial and distict board), 
Ashiah (female), Nashiatual Aishiah (female youth), LP3 (Center for Educational Research 
and Development)-Muhammadiyah University of Yogjakarta, and JIMM (a network of 
young intellectuals of M =NGO). Both Aisyiah and Nashiatul Aisyiah were involved in 
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 educating for voters and electoral control. LP3-Muhammadiyah University of Yogjakarta has 
been developing civic education with a new perspective that is more responsive to the 
promotion of democracy and civil society and education for anti-corruption.  JIMM is a M’s 
NGO, which is advocating and developing critical perspectives   pertaining to the religious 
studies (Islamic studies) by employing hermeneutics, social theories, and social movements 
(see Table 1). 
With respect to NU, I selected key informants of Lakpesdam-NU, Fatayat-NU and 
P3M (Center for Pesantren and Community Development), an NGO that is ideologically 
affiliated with NU and founded by the NU30 , and ‘modernist group’ 31 (Billah, 2004:374). 
These organizational bodies were selected for their involvement in   initiating, advocating, 
and developing such contemporary issues as democracy, human rights, and gender equality 
within the NU. Lakpesdam-NU and P3M have been involved in developing critical 
perspectives with respect to the NU ideology (ahlussunnah wal jama’ah) and the scriptural 
text. They keep working on promoting the ideas of moderate, inclusive or pluralist or 
transformative or emancipatory Islam the public of Indonesia. In addition, both Lakpesdam-
NU and P3M have developed a program about raising political awareness at the grass roots 
level by promoting citizens forums in several districts of Java (see table 1).   
                                                 
30 NU leaders who were involved in forming this NGO are Abdurrahman Wahid, KH. Yusuf Hashim 
(Wahid’s uncle), KH. Sahal Mahfudz, Abdullah Syarwani, and Nasihin Hasan. 
31 The notion of modernist and traditionalist is described in the chapter 5. The modernists who were 
involved in the formation of this NGO are Dawam Rahardjo, and Adi Sasono (Muhammadiyah, 
Masyumi, HMI); Utomo Dananjaya (Persis, PII); KH Sholeh Iskandar (PUI, BKSPP); and Tuty 
Alawiyah. 
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 Table 1  Minimal number of key informants/actors 
Muhammadiyah Nahdhatul Ulama 
1. M board (national) 5 1. NU Board 2 
2.  M board (province) 4 2. NU-Lakpesdam Board  
[National] 
5 
3. M Board (District) 3 3. NU-Lakpesdam 
[Provincial] 
1 
4. Aisyiah  Board (Nat) 5 4. NU Lakpesdam/NU 
[District] 
4 
5. Nasyiatul Aisyiah board 
(National) 
2 5. NU-Fatayat 4 
6. Muhammadiyah Univ. 
 Yogjakarta 
3 6.  P3M  [NGO of NU 
people/activist] 
5 
 7.  JIMM [NGO of M 
activists] 
1 7. ‘Pesantren’ 
[indigenous boarding] 
1 
  8. Expert in political 
Islam  [NU] 
1 
 23  23 
 
 
I employed snow-ball techniques:  making contact with a small set of informants who were 
then asked to name other potential informants. Those informants were then asked to name 
further potential informants, and so on, until I got all the data needed to figure out the 
conceptions with respect to democracy, citizenship and education for democracy (Dobert, 
1982: 218).     
3.2. Data Collection Strategies 
To obtain the relevant information, I did “limited” observation, conducted interviews, 
and collected documents (e.g., articles, reports, newsletters). In ethnographic studies, the 
researchers employ and make use of data from a variety of approaches (triangulation) 
 49
 (Norman & Lincoln, 2000: 3; Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983). According to Denzin (1978), 
there are four basic types of triangulation: 
1) data triangulation or the use of a variety of data sources in a study 
2) investigate or triangulation or the use of several different researchers 
3) theory triangulation or the use of multiple perspectives to interpret a single set of data 
4) methodological triangulation or the use of multiple methods to study a single problem 
(Denzin, 1978: 294-305”). 
 
3.2.1. Observation 
  During my field study (in Yogjakarta), I stayed in the M office guest room. This gave 
me opportunities to interact with people from various levels and districts of this 
organization, as well as faculty members of M University of Yogjakarta. I was invited to take 
a part in a workshop about “educating for anti-corruption movement” conducted by the 
Anti-Corruption Alliance among religious believers (Islamic, Protestant, Hindu, Buddis and 
Confucians) in which M is  a member of this alliance and led this workshop. I was a member 
of group that redesigned a manual for training for trainers about “Islam and anti-corruption.”   
The board of Aishiah (a female, autonomous organization of M) allowed me to observe a one-
day seminar about Islamic proselytization.32 Such a situation enabled me to conduct informal 
interviews. In addition, the board of M (general secretary) allowed me to participate in a 
coordinating meeting of M boards of district level from all Java and Bali provinces.  This 
meeting was the follow-up to the Annual Meeting of M (Tanwir) in a response to a political 
situation.  This forum made me to understand M in response to current issues of Indonesian 
                                                 
32 The seminar focused on how Islamic proselytization should be done in response to societal 
dynamics (approaches and activities). 
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 politics, especially M standing points of view. In Jakarta, the LAKPESDAM (NU Institute for 
Human Resource Studies and Development) gave me an opportunity to take part in a panel 
discussion about “NU and its Principles (khittah)33 in relation the political struggle.”  Such a 
forum gave me some information about NU and politics within the context of Indonesian 
democratization. However, I missed one meeting of the NU younger generation, which was 
carried out in a district of Banten province, because I had appointments with two key actors 
of NU at the same time.  
 As part of my ethnographic field work, I used a set of procedures: inscription, 
description, and transcription. Inscription is the act of making mental notes prior to writing 
things down.  Inscription involves learning to notice what is important to other people and 
what one has not been trained to see.  Description involves writing things down in jottings, 
diaries, logs, and field notes (Bernard, 1995, p. 181) and producing “thick descriptions” 
(Geertz, 1973) or narrative of events, behaviors, conversations, activities, interpretations, and 
explanation. Taken together, the component of this step helps to create a portrayal of the 
soul and heart of a group, community, organization, or culture. 
3.2.2. Interviews 
   The semi structured interviews, using open-ended questions, were designed to 
explore how both NU and M organization members conceptualize democracy, citizenship, 
                                                 
33 Calling for a return to the 1926 khittah (Basic principles) of NU refers to the concept of NU as a 
social and religious association, which is dedicated and committed to the development of Islamic 
proselyzation, Islamic education and economics of the majority of people (poor) (will be discussed in 
chapter 6).      
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 and education for democratic citizenship and how they perceive their organization putting 
these into practice (see interview guide in Appendix). In my report (case 1 and 2), I 
employed initial names of each key informant I interviewed.    I interviewed 23 key actors, 
which were composed of 6 females and 17 males of the M Association. I interviewed the 
chair of the Central board of Aisyiah (An autonomous women’s organization). I conducted a 
group interview with three key actors (LPP Aisyiah – Institute for study and development, 
an autonomous organ of Female Muhammadiyah). I was unable to interview the president of 
M until the last day of my field study in Yogjakarta.  
I conducted interviews with 23 key actors of the Nahdhatul Ulama association 
consisting of 5 females and 18 males. I interviewed a woman key actor of NU Lakpesdam 
(program coordinator for political education for public). I interviewed the coordinators of 
emancipatory Islam program, voter education and education for anti-corruption of P3M 
(Center for Pesantren and Community Development).    Also, I did a group interview with 4 
females in the Fatayat-NU (Autonomous women youth organization). A relative of my wife 
helped me to access information on families of KH Hasyim Muzaddi (the NU president who 
was nominated to be a candidate of Indonesian vice president) and a chair of Majlis Shura of 
NU (NU Legislative Council), the former Ministry of Religious Affairs during the era of 
Abdurrahman Wahid. My brother and I flew to East Java and drove for three hours to 
Malang in order to interview a chair of Majlis Shura of NU and to talk about the possibility of 
interviewing the NU president. Although I was unable to conduct an interview with the 
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 president of NU because he was busy with campaigning for presidential election, I was able 
to interview the acting president of NU.  
The interviews lasted between one-half hour and two hours, depending on the time 
allotted by interviewees and the role they played within the association.  Those key actors 
who are categorized into leaders or researchers paid more attention to conceptual issues than 
to the issues of the implementation. In my interview with the coordinators of voter 
education, civic education, education for the anti-corruption movement, and political 
appreciation my questions focused on how these approaches were implemented.  Therefore, I 
selected certain issues listed in my interview guide and developed questions while 
interviewing key actors (probing).   
My interviews with the females focused on gender issues. During my field study, 
there was a controversy among the NU religious scholars (Ulama) pertaining to gender issues.  
Twelve ulamas (religious scholars) released a fatwa (religious statement) prohibiting women 
to be a leader (president).  Such a situation encouraged to develop my questions with respect 
to gender equality and women’s involvement in the process of democratization.  I did not ask 
every key actor about all issues but considered instead their roles and areas of involvement in 
each association. I asked for detailed information about a program, for instance, civic 
education, education for anti-corruption, and voter education from those key actors who 
were technically involved in the program. On the other hand, I questioned those key actors 
who hold high ranking positions in the association about conceptual issues.  The coordinator 
for research and study program of the Lakpesdam, for instance, was more interested in 
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 talking about the ideas (conceptual framework) or vision than technical issues of 
implementation.  
3.2.3. Collecting documents 
 I collected documents from information centers of both organizations written by 
board members that reflect either their individual or organizational points of view (board 
reports, journal and books).  During my stay in Yogjakarta, I collected materials with respect 
to M in the library of the M office and the library of M University of Yogjakarta.   Pertaining 
to NU, I collected materials from Lakpesdam and P3M. I got information materials of both 
NU and M from the library of PPIM-UIN (Center for the Study of Islam and Society-Islamic 
State University) in Jakarta. In addition, I got books concerning NU and M from book stores 
in Yogjakarta and Bekasi (my town). 
3.3. Data Analysis 
 In processing and analyzing the data, I followed the procedure of ethnographic data 
analysis as described by LeCompte & Schensul (1999) with adjustment.   I organized all data 
that was collected (observation, documents and interviews) for the purpose of analysis.  
Analysis involves ‘tidying up’ data, organizing them in files, labeling the files, putting them 
on a shelf, as well as  organizing and reducing data according to the ideas, themes, units, 
patterns, and structures within them that are beginning to become apparent. This involves 
some form of coding or categorizing data (LeCompte & Schensul, 1999: 11-47).   
I took several steps to organize the data, as follows: 
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 First, I made a transcript from data recorded from my interviews with 23 key actors of M on 
26 cassettes and from 23 key actors of NU recorded on 25 cassettes. I spent 3 to 4 hours for 
transcribing each cassette, depending upon the duration of my interviews with the key 
actors. Second, I edited each transcription because almost all of the participants use 
colloquial language (Bahasa Indonesia). The second step was done in order to get the main 
ideas and supporting ideas. I also edited the datain order to make clear notes. Third, I devised 
themes and placed the  data from each key actor into a matrix  according to 4  themes: (a) 
democracy: the notion or perception of democracy, Islam and democracy 
(compatibility/incompatibility), response to democracy; (b) democratic society: notion, 
conception of the characteristics of democratic society (individual freedom, pluralism, 
tolerant, gender equality, criticism/critical group); (c) citizenship: concept  and 
loyalty/commitment; (d) educating for democracy: concept, model of the implementation of 
educating for democracy. Fourth, I integrated and coordinated the information of each key 
actor according to theme.   
The report of the study (dissertation) is organized into the following chapters:  
Introduction that includes background and research problems and questions (Chapter 1), 
frame of the study (Chapter 2),  methodology (Chapter 3), Muhammadiyah and NU and 
Development of Democracy (Chapter 4);  Case 1: Muhammadiyah’s Conceptualization and 
practice of democracy and education for democracy (Chapter 5), Case 2: NU’s 
Conceptualization and  practice of democracy and education for democracy (Chapter 6), 
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 Comparison between M and NU with respect to conceptualization and practice of democracy 
and Education for democracy (Chapter 7), and conclusion and recommendation (Chapter 8). 
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4.  M AND NU AND DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY  
 
In chapter 1, it was stated that both M and NU are expected to play a significant role in the 
democratization process of Indonesia, because both NU and M are Islamic civil society 
associations that have memberships and are engaged in a variety of activites relevant to the 
establishment of the New Order.   Some experts such as Hefner (2000) say M and NU can 
play their roles in the process of democratization as long as they consistently uphold their 
principles as a civil society organization, i.e., being independent of the state, committed to 
uphold justice and equality, responsiveness to powerless groups, and promoting civic virtues 
or values. 
The discussion in this chapter concerns how both M and NU have related to the state, 
especially during the eras of the Old and New Orders. What kinds of relationships were built 
during each order? What was the political stance of each regime toward “Islam” during the 
two orders in Indonesia? In addition, this chapter will discuss what both M and NU have 
contributed to create democratic atmosphere in the community at large.   Neither M nor NU 
is currently a political party, though both  were involved in the political arena as 
organizational members of a confederated Islamic political party, Masyumi. M never became 
a political party, though NU did from 1952 until 1972 (see NU). Nevertheless, neither M nor 
NU can be separated from politics in Indonesia (during either the Old or the New Order 
regimes). Each Islamic civil society association had different experiences in the political 
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 sphere, which were shaped by the political cultures and leadership of each organization and 
state officials’ perceptions of and policies toward Islam.  
4.1. Muhammadiyah and democracy development  
4.1.1. Muhammadiyah in relation to the state  
This section describes the relation between M and the state during the Old Order and New 
Order regimes. 
4.1.1.1. M and the Order regime of Soekarno 
 M is a social and religious association (Islamic civil society association) that has never 
been a political party. However, Rahmat (1999) argues that M, through its programs and 
activities, has developed the potential of the modernist santris, i.e.,  Muslim devotee who are 
from the family of modernist group (see a footnote about traditionality and modernity in the 
Chapter 5) and its involvement have contributed to societal development in Indonesia. 
During the Old Order, M, together with NU and other Islamic organizations/groups, initiated 
and promoted a confederate Islamic political party, Masyumi (Majlis ‘Ala Shura Muslim 
Indonesia). M was a member of Masyumi until this party was dissolved by President Sukarno 
in 1960. As a newly independent country, Indonesia was politically and economically 
unstable and it experienced continuous conflicts, both horizontally and vertically. 
Horizontally, after Indonesia independence, there was a conflict over the composition of 
ministries in the cabinets and about the state ideology among members of the cabinet and 
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 continued after the first general election in 1955. Vertically, provincial government officials 
were dissatisfied with the national government’s policies and treatment and sought to break 
away from that country. In February 1958, for example, leaders in West Sumatra declared 
the creation of the PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia or The 
Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic) in opposition to the central 
government of Indonesia. 
Some Masyumi leaders, such as Syafruddin Prawiranegara, Mohamad Natsir, and 
Burhanuddin Harahap, were involved in PRRI. By the end of 1960, President Sukarno 
dissolved or identified as illegal the Masyumi party  (Maarif, 1988: 30-33). The leaders of M 
were repressed by the Sukarno regime (Rahmat, 1999). In 1972 the association formally 
declared that it would no longer be involved in “politics,” but would concentrate its 
programs instead in the social, economic, education, and Islamic proselytization fields. 
4.1.1.2. M and the New Order regime of Suharto  
After coming to power in 1965, the Suharto (New Order) regime sought to promote 
and sustain development programs, viewing as necessary both  stability34 and citizen loyalty. 
                                                 
34 To ensure the national stability, the New Order regime operated the so-called ‘Kewaspadaan 
(alertness) doctrine and program. Kewaspadaan would be urgently required to  detect the activities 
of: (a) social organizations which in the past had shown hesitation in accepting Pancasila as the sole 
principle for all social organizations, and latter accepted it in a doubtful way; (b) the fourth 
generation communist group which based its tactics on the new style of communism, that is, no 
longer using physical means but constitutional methods, intellectual activities, government 
administration, and other means in order to “depoliticize” ABRI (Armed Forces); (c) extreme groups 
which would try to use extra-constitutional ways- such as instigating mass riot- to further their 
political interests based on racial and separatist motivation; and (d) a certain group of people (pihak 
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 Any group that would destabilize the county in the sight of the regime, therefore, had to be 
removed (vanquished). 
In line with this approach the Suharto regime established and maintained an 
unaccommodative stance toward “Islam” (Muslims and Islamic organizations) for at least 
three reasons (Gaffar, 2004: 270):  First, there are many Muslims who believe that they can  
articulate and fight for their aspirations (interests) merely through promoting democracy or 
democratization. Second, since they represented a majority of the Indonesian population, 
they were seen to have great potential to threaten the status quo. Third, any Muslim or 
Islamic group was suspected of being associated with a literalist (“fundamentalist”) group that 
strongly criticized the regime and advocated an Islamic state in Indonesia.  It should be noted 
that the hostility of the Muslim community toward the state was also increased as a result of 
a number of the New Order’s policies perceived as offensive to their religious beliefs, such as 
the Ali Sadikin’s (the governor of Jakarta) legalization of gambling, the national 
government’s introduction of a marriage law in 1973 which, according to Muslim groups, 
contradicted the principles of Islamic sharia’ (e.g., such as allowing Kantor Catatan Sipil [the 
office for Civil Affairs]) to justify marriage; the attempts of the regime during the Majlis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) session to elevate aliran kepercayaan) (Javanese mysticism) 
                                                                                                                                                             
tertentu) who wanted liberal democracy with unlimited freedom, and whose activities spread 
through academic forums, discussions, and seminars as well as via the mass media (Honna, 1999: 87). 
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 to the position of a religion, and the imposition of Pancasila as the sole foundation of all 
social and political organizations (see Effendy, 2003: 49-51; Gaffar, 2004)35.   
 The regime of the New Order demonstrated its accommodative stance toward “Islam” 
prior to 1990’s.   Both sides, Muslim groups and the Suharto government, attempted to 
complement one another and avoid conflict.  The accommodative stance of the Suharto 
regime was due to at least two reasons: a) Suharto became aware of the strength of the 
Islamic resurgence and he wanted to neutralize the growing popularity of “democratic ideas “ 
( such as freedom of press, freedoms of expression, openness and the like) among the younger 
generation of Muslims who are involved intensely in analytical discourses about 
development issues in various spheres of life (e.g., economic segregation, corruption, 
nepotism), and b) Suharto was seeking to strengthen relations with various groups to 
counter-balance his deteriorating relationship with those segments of the military leadership 
who were alarmed by the scale of the first family’s corruption (Hefner, 2003). 
Therefore, the New Order regime adopted a number of policies giving four types of 
benefits to Muslims: structural, legislative, infrastructural and cultural (Effendy, 2003).  
Structural accommodation involved giving Muslim’s more access to education, economic 
activities, and government positions (accelerated recruitment and promotion of Muslims to 
                                                 
35 Within this period, each party took a position against one another. The state was suspicious of any 
Islamic movement, and any group of Muslims that criticized the government (Suharto) was accused 
of being “the right extreme”. The New Order regime believed that both ‘the right extreme’ and ‘the 
left extreme (the communist group) would threaten or thwart the process of Indonesian 
development. The New Order regime manipulated a word of development to ban any critical 
movement, including the Islamic movement.   
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 upper levels of the Military and bureaucracy) and by the establishment of ICMI36  (The 
Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) by the end of 1990 (December). The Suharto 
regime also passed legislation a) stipulating in 1988 the obligatory nature of religious 
instruction in non-madrasah (private and public schools); b) strengthening in 1989 the role 
of the Islamic court in adjudicating marriage, divorce, reconciliation, and inheritance issues; 
c) compiling in 1991 Islamic law; d) institutionalizing or legalizing Bazis, the zakat (religious 
alms) collection and distribution agency, in 1991; e) reversing in 1991 a policy that 
prohibited Muslim female high school students from wearing the jilbab or hijab (scarf); and 
f) invalidating in 1993 the Sumbangan Dermawan Sosial Berhadiah (SDSB), a national 
lottery. With regard to infrastructure, The New Order regime provided Muslims presidential 
assistance (Inpres) to develop mosques and religious educational institutions, send  Muslim 
religious leaders (Imams) to the remote transmigration areas, and establish (in 1992) an 
                                                 
36 Commenting ICMI, Hefner (1993: 1-3) says that for many Muslim Indonesians, the act of 
government (president) was merely the latest in a series of overtures the Suharto government has 
made over the past few years to the Muslim community. For other Indonesians, the president’s 
blessing of ICMI seemed to represent a dangerous departure from the non-sectarian principles of the 
New Order. For Western observers unfamiliar with the government’s openings to the Muslim 
community, finally, the scene appeared rich with irony. Here was a man regarded by many foreign 
scholars as abangan (refers to those Javanese less strict in their adherence to Muslim devotional forms 
than the so-called santri, practicing or ‘orthodox’ Muslims) mystic unsympathetic to “orthodox” 
Islam, not merely affecting the forms of Islamic rituals, but doing so while inaugurating an 
organization openly committed to, among other things, the deepening Islamization of Indonesian 
state and society. Was the president’s gesture merely an opportunistic stratagem designed to court 
Muslim support at a time when he was being challenged by segments of the Indonesian military? Was 
President Suharto, therefore, “merely playing the Muslim card,” as one secularist critic of the 
government told me in 1992? Or, as suggested by many members of ICMI with whom I spoke in 
1991, 1992, and 1993, were the president’s actions more strongly influenced by his recognition of 
broader changes in Indonesian society, in particular the deepening Islamization of the urban middle 
class?  
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 Islamic Bank and insurance, BMI (Bank Muamalat Indonesia or Indonesian Muamalat Bank).  
The state evidenced cultural accommodation by incorporating Islamic idioms (e.g., sultan, 
khalifatullah, mushawarah) in official documents, adopting the Islamic greeting (assalamu 
alaikum) as the unofficial national greeting, giving sponsorship for an Islamic cultural 
festivals—Istiqlal Festivals in 1991 and 1995;  and initiating a national television program to 
teach Arabic (Effendy, 2003: 151-170; Fealy, 2004: 141; Gaffar, 2004: 271-272; Hefner, 2004; 
Suwarno, 2002: 125).37  
In this context M’s stance toward the New Order regime was also shaped by its 
political culture and leadership. Its political culture,38 which includes the basic principles laid 
down by M regarding the relationship between the state and the umma, is derived from an 
Islamic tenets, amar ma’ruf and nahyu munkar (enjoining good deeds and forbidding 
wrongdoing), stated in the Qur’an surah Ali Imran 3: 104.39 M’s political culture is also 
                                                 
37 According to Fealy (2004: 114), the regime’s embracing of Islam created resentment and suspicion 
among secular nationalists, and non-Muslim, and caused splits within military, political elites and 
civil society. The regime’s stance has been seen as a factor contributing to a rise in religious conflict in 
areas such as Maluku and Central Sulawesi from the later 1990’s. 
38 Political culture is defined as the total collection of fundamental cognition, feelings, attitudes, and 
beliefs held by citizens toward objects of the political system (Lehner, 1976). Such values as fairness, 
equality, responsiveness, and individualism are embedded in the political culture of liberal 
democracies, and serves as normative standards for evaluating governmental performance (Craigh, 
1993: 66). Political culture contains in itself two main points: citizen’s responsibility for governing 
themselves –politics of participation, and governmental responsibility for making decisions—politics 
of power. Political participation has to do with being interested in politics, inquiring into and 
forming a judgment about some political events (Lehner, 1976; Praeger, 1968).  Citizen participation 
is the functioning of a healthy society. Since citizens control the action of elite decision-makers, 
communicate public wants and needs to the elites and are informed about elite activities (Lehner, 
1976).  
39 According to the Qur’an surah Ali Imran 3: 104 “There should rise from among you believers a 
group to lead the community to invite the people to perform what is good and right, to enjoin on 
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 informed by its members’/leaders’ interpretation of the Islamic tenets about hablun min an-
naas (social relationships). M has elaborated these tenets in terms of the concepts of ijtihad 
(the use of independent and rational investigation) and tajdid (reformation), alal birri (to do 
good deed)  or public interest (masalihu umma), attaqwa (God-righteousness or piety), 
mauizah hasanah (wisdom and good counsel), mujadalah bil ihsan (debate with other side in 
the presence of neutral outlooker), social praxis, responsiveness to problems rising in the 
community, and the employment of appropriate approaches in resolving societal problems. 
Also the M political culture contains such principles as egalitarianism, rationality, collegial 
leadership in the political process of organization, and collegial relationship between its 
board and members (Rais, 1998: 229; Suwarno, 2002).  
  Those principles are accommodated within the New Vision of M: first, the doctrine 
of awheed has to be established as the fundamental basis for various spheres of life. The 
concept of tawheed has not only to be elaborated to the aspects of faith (aqidah) but also 
muamalah ma’a an-naas (social relationship). Second, M has to develop the enlightenment 
process to produce well enlightened Muslims. M has to continue its effort in the 
development of human resources, science, and technology. Third, M has to continue its 
efforts to advocate and develop good deeds (amal saleh). Fourth, M has to establish 
cooperation with various groups, i.e., other Muslim groups, Non-Muslims, and the 
t
                                                                                                                                                             
them practices of the Prophet and to forbid what is wrong. Should such a group emerge from  your 
community, they will be the ones who attain salvation” 
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 government, as well as the armed forces. Fifth, M does not need to involve itself in political 
arena (practice), but does not need to be apolitical either (Rais, 1998: 264-269). 
In the 44th M National Conference (Muktamar) held in 2000 in Jakarta, for example, 
the conference mandated that M had to develop its role as an effective interest group, which 
advocates amr ma’ uf and nahyi munkar (promoting good deeds and forbidding 
wrongdoing). M does not need to be apolitical and a political party, but it has to advocate its 
critical ideas, which can be used to anticipate and make the state’s policies in relation to 
problems of the nation state or public interests. M has to formulate Muslim political ethics 
that serves as a guide for Muslim politicians. M has to develop political awareness among M 
members and the community at large through political education, and the perpetuation of 
the civilized and democratic principles. M has to speak out about cases of injustice that occur 
within society and take benefits from various mass media to articulate aspiration, political 
stance, interests and the like for the M umma and the community at large. M has to attempt 
to unite the political potential of Indonesian Muslims. M has to make an effort to empower 
society in relation to creating civil society under the basis of the principles of the New 
Indonesian society (PP. Muhammadiyah, 2000). 
r
M has provided a guide for its members (and others) in dealing with politics in a 
broader term: the arrangement of the state-umma relationship. With respect to this point, M 
upholds a rationally or critically accommodative stance.  Such a political stance (principle) 
enables M to persist, stand still, and stand right in front of the state. M will have to confront 
any policies that are abusive (the concept of fasad and dhalim) public interests (umma) at any 
 65
 cost. Such confrontative stances were demonstrated by M in response to such issues as the 
teacher ordinance (the policy of the Ministry of Education and Culture Dawud Yusuf), the 
marriage law, and the state reform. M shall be rational and critical of the government 
policies concerning the umma in order to seek solutions (HN).40   
 However, the M political culture – and its stance vis-à-vis the Suharto government – 
has also been shaped by its leadership. From the days of establishment of the New Order 
regime until 1992, the M leadership took a stance similar to Javanese culture, avoiding direct 
political criticism and confrontation with the regime. Such a political stance was related to 
the leadership of the late AR Fachruddin who was an accomodationist and charismatic and 
did not want to demonstrate direct confrontation with the state (the New Order regime). 
Such a political stance was also adopted by his successor (the late Ahmad Azhar Basyir).  
It has been argued that AR Fachruddin’s and Azhar Basyir’s accommodative and 
cooperative stance may have placed M in a subordinated position in relation to the 
government during their leadership (Suwarno, 2002: 73).  Three key informants (As, RH 
&YS) confirmed the idea of Suwarno, saying that M tended to be stagnant (status quo) during 
their leadership.  Their leadership style could be observed in that M did not criticize, let 
alone challenge, the government in relation to the cases of eviction of (poor) people from 
                                                 
40 When the Suharto regime enforced Pancasila as the state ideology, Pancasila had to be the sole 
foundation for any socio-political organizations; for example, M repeatedly demonstrated an 
extended standing point of view. Such a political stance, according to HN, demonstrates M’s criticism. 
M wanted to make sure that the state (government) had to pass its policies through democratic 
processes and did not want to give a blank check to the government.   
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 their land for development project. In return, those (poor) people got the least reasonable 
price for a piece of land such as Kedung Ombo dam project and Tawang Mas housing for an 
elite group of society.  YS, for example, stated that in the Tawang Mas case in Semarang the 
M leadership did not take any action to defend the rights of the lives of fishermen. And 
Hadinata (2003), who is not a member of M, criticizes M of only acting like a charity 
association or foundation rather than taking stances against the government on critical 
issues.   
 Such a M’s political stance, according to HN, was also assumed to have a connection 
with the issue of “elite biases” of M. M produced many highly educated people through its 
schools and universities, and some of them were recruited into positions in Suharto’s 
government. It is estimated that 78 % of the M leadership group was involved in the 
government sector as public servants, and that this may have driven them (and the 
association) to be less critical of the state.  According to a key informant from NU (MFM), 
the M elites were being trapped in the so called ewuh pakewuh stance (being less critical and 
loyal to the regime or feeling uneasy to demonstrate critiques toward the regime of the New 
Order), since they were public servants holding high positions in the bureaucracy 
(executive). 
In addition, as we know, the New Order regime attempted to force socio-political 
engineering in various spheres of life, in the name of development, and tended to establish 
patron-client relationships. By doing so, the New Order regime was able to control various 
spheres of life.  Abdillah (2000) reports that M received many facilities from the government 
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 to develop its amal usaha (practical deeds) such as schools, universities, and hospitals, and 
because M did not want to lose such financial support, it did not publicly criticize the New 
Order regime.  
It is true, as stated by Rais, that M supported the New Order, but M did not give the 
New Order regime a blank check. M supported the New Order regime as far as this regime 
was committed to meet public interests and to fight corruption and injustice. Otherwise, M 
challenged the New Order regime.  HN argues that M has been intensely involved in the 
quality promotion of the human resources of Indonesia through its schooling (schools and 
universities); the New Order regime considered these efforts to be objectively helping the 
state to solve the problems of education. M argues that M has lessened the burden of 
government in term of schooling, and, in turn, the government has to support M’s efforts. So, 
the state (financial) assistance would serve only as a stimulant factor for the M schooling 
development41.  
In 1993, M demonstrated its stance differently from the previous one. Amin Rais, one 
M board member, advocated the issue of successional leadership of Indonesia. Amin Rais and 
his colleagues argued that Suharto was not the only one who should lead the Republic of 
                                                 
41 Let’s take an example:  M built a campus of the University of Muhammadiyah of Yogjakarta 
(UMY), which is situated in the area of 26 hectares. President Suharto contributed Rp 500 millions, a 
small portion of total budget for the UMY to purchase this lot. So does M conceive of the state 
assistance more as the state obligation or duty, before its citizens than a political and ideological 
negotiation (subordination).  In addition, M, like other Islamic civil society associations, was 
marginalized at least from the days of the New Order’s establishment until 1985 by the New Order 
regime (see the policy of the Minister of Education and Culture, Dawud Yusuf). 
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 Indonesia for his lifetime. Moreover, Suharto misled the mandate of the Indonesian public 
for his own or group interests (corruption and cronyism)42.  In the National Meeting per 
annum (Tanwir) M issued a decree that Indonesia had to reform itself in order to be a 
democratic nation and state and this statement was restated on the 1995th M National 
Congress (Muktamar) in Aceh. On these occasions, Amin Rais advocated the idea of political 
reform – understood as a critique of the New Order regime.  
  Through the 1995th M Congress (Muktamar), Amin Rais was elected as the M 
president. Rais’ ideas and criticism promoted awareness among the M younger generations, 
though some of his colleagues who had different points of view than him (e.g., Lukman 
Harun, and Yusril Ihya Mahendra) rejected such a political stance (Rais’ idea). In the sights 
of the M younger generations, first, M was older than this republic; M has inner impetus 
(e.g., the spirits of reformism (tajdid) and  interpretation (ijtihad) which enables M to be  
open or responsive to and critical of  societal problems including critical issues such as 
human rights, political rights of the minority and gender equality. However, M tended to 
demonstrate its stance supporting the status quo of the regime of the New Order which had 
been corrupt. The opinion of the M younger generation was in line with the Rais’ idea, 
saying that M leaders seemed to be exhausted and paid less attention to societal dynamics 
which have changed dramatically. Currently, M seemed to lose its spirits of reformism, as 
laid down in 1912. M needed to transform itself to be more responsive and diligent in 
                                                 
42 Rais criticized the New Order regime of Suharto through advocating the cases of Busang and 
Freeport. In turn, Rais was forced to resign from the position of ICMI boardhip.  
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 realizing the spirits of ajdid and ijtihad with respect to societal issues such as social justice, 
human rights, corruption, nepotism, and the interests of powerless (Rais, 2004: 82-83).  
Second, M had to play a significant role to break through the obstinacy of the New Order 
regime; this effort was an implementation of the Islamic tenets about amr ma’ruf nahyi 
munkar (promoting good deeds and forbidding wrongdoing).  
t
 Rais’ leadership was expected to transform within M itself and to encourage M to 
play a significant role (leading) in the process of Indonesian reformation (more critical). Rais’ 
leadership, according to the M younger generation, encouraged M to move from a social and 
proselytization association to play a more critical and progressive role such as ‘civil Islam’ (in 
terms of Hefner). Although this did not mean that M has to be directly involved in political 
practice, M would have to play a role in the control of power abuse (As).    
4.1.1.3. M’s critical stance:  High politics and “social tawheed”  
  The concept of high politics was advocated by Amin Rais in the 43rd M Congress 
(Muktamar) in 1995; this idea was derived from Rais’ analysis on the national political system 
in both its cultural and structural dimensions. The political sphere evidenced conflicts of 
interest with the elite groups seeking to meet their own interests and caring little for 
defending or advocating public interests.  Politicians in the executive branch of government 
tended to talk about their interests and the interests of the ruling class more than the 
interests of the Indonesian public, and the legislature tended to serve as a rubber stamp to 
legitimate the executive policies. Business created unhealthy economic competition, fully 
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 supported by the power holders. Monopoly, monopsony, and business conglomeration 
flourished, disrespecting the principles of social justice. Four percent of the population 
controlled seventy-five percent of the socio-economic resources, and ten percent of the 
conglomerates held national assets equal to one-third of the GDP (Gross Domestic Product). 
The License for Auctioning Forest Concession (Hak Pengusaahaan Hutan, HPH) is unjustly 
dominated by ten people who maintain a monopoly over more than half of the tropical forest 
in the country. All of these demonstrated the economic injustices which have been 
manifested for a long time in the country (Rais, 1998: 112; Saleh, 2001: 180-181).   
Based on his analysis, Rais insists that M has to play a significant role in promoting 
high politics. M has to encourage those who are involved in the legislative, executive, and 
juridical branches of government to behave in accord with religious-based ethics (high 
politics). M has to control the power of the rulers, so the ruling group would not abuse its 
power (but has to be committed to public interests) and none shall be marginalized 
economically, socially and politically by the ruling elites. In short, Rais’ idea about high 
politics constitutes three main elements: (a) all politicians should commit to serve the public 
interest; (b) government officials should be trustworthy and accountable to the public (the 
manifestation of trust or mandate); and (c) they should uphold the principles of brotherhood 
(Suwarno, 2002).  
The concept of high politics was derived from the concept of tauhid sosial. The idea of 
tauhid sosial was advocated by Rais, stating that any religious tenets (Islam) have to be 
interpreted in response to societal problems, which are complex and developed along with 
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 the times. “Tauhid social” (Social Tawheed), which refers to manifesting the belief in the 
oneness of God (Tawheed), should guide one’s endeavor to promote social justice.   The 
concept of tawheed gives every Muslim the assurance that a society can be built free of the 
exploitation, feudalism, and rejection of discrimination based on social class, race, or gender 
(Rais, 1998: 54, 107-111; Saleh, 2002: 178).  
Rais’ idea was derived from his understanding of the following verse of the Qur’an:  
You believers must bear in mind that God commands you to be just for all human being 
and generous to your kinsfolk; He forbids all evil deeds and shameful actions, all injustice 
and oppression. These are God’s instructions to (those of) you believers who intend to 
rule and govern (in His name); may you remembers these instructions at all times (surah 
An-Nahl 16:90).  
 
In this regard, Islam advocates justice for all (equal rights to access economic resources and 
forbidding any privileged treatment such as monopoly by conglomerates, crony system and 
the like), shura (upholding ethical and moral principles), and salvation of the musthadzafin 
(marginalized group) and dhuaafaa (the powerless and poor) (Rais, 1998; Saleh, 2001: 181; 
Suwarno, 2002: 85, 92-93).  
Muslims, according to Rais, find it difficult to implement the Islamic tenets of social 
justice into reality, though they do not have any problem with the implementation of other 
Islamic tenets such as not drinking alcohol, women wearing the head-scarf, consuming halal 
food, following ritual devotion like worship, fasting, participating in pilgrimage and the like. 
So does M, according to Rais, have to struggle with its efforts to manifest the tenets of Islam 
regarding justice, human rights, the abolishment of social injustice and the like (Rais, 1998: 
112-113; Rais, 2004: 77-78).  
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  The idea of high politics has been interpreted differently by M members. In reality it 
has been elaborated to political practice (“low politics”). In the Tanwir of Makasar and Bali, 
M issued a decree that M had to support its cadre to lead the continuation of Indonesian 
reformation (supporting a candidate for president). With respect to such a political stance, M 
members were divided into two groups: pro and con (ZQ). Another key informant (As) 
wondered whether or not M has played a role of high politics. For him, Rais has to be a guru 
bangsa (a leader who is not involved in the low politics) and M has to play a significant role 
in high politics. M has to control power and the implementation of the state public policies. 
In addition, M has to speak out for the aspirations of the Indonesian public and against any 
acts humiliating the rights of people. Nowadays, both M and NU are involved in an anti-
corruption movement, and this action manifests high politics.  M has to support a peace 
movement mediating conflicts occurring in a community and pomote small scale enterprises 
(“people economy”). These examples demonstrate the dimensions of high politics. Issuing a 
decree to support Amin Rais as a candidate for president will push M to get involved in the 
scenario of some M people who wish to attain the so-called shahwat politics (political desire 
=a short term objective, i.e., getting positions in government).   
The M younger generation, especially a critical group, according to ZQ, says that such 
a political stance has indicated that M is coming into the area of low politics.  Tantowi 
(2004), a Muhammadiyah’s activist, says that M has proved itself sustainable for 90 years. It 
would be wasteful if M was directly involved in the political arena. M has to promote a 
political agenda, but M does not need to be apolitical and to be trapped in the political 
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 competition, which would generate a short term benefit. ZQ worried M political stance 
represents the interpretation of high politics. But he cannot do anything since every member 
has a right to interpret that decree.   
The older generations and the younger generation of M who supports the status quo, 
according to ZQ, would say that M’s political stance (the Tanwir decree) was derived from 
the idea of high politics. In daily life, M gets in touch either directly or indirectly with the 
issue of politics (power, policy and the like). The critical members of the M younger 
generation assume that the proponent of the Tanwir decree would argue that M needs to be 
involved directly in the political arena rather than being an observer. By direct involvement 
in the political arena, M will get familiar with real politics. There are many societal problems 
that M will have difficulty resolving if M is out of the cycle of power.  In addition, M has a 
large members having affiliated with various political parties.  By direct involvement in the 
political arena, M can establish moral and ethical principles in the political sphere and can 
control the practice of immoral politicians, especially M politicians. This is, according to ZQ, 
the logic underlying support of the Tanwir decree. As the opponent of the Tanwir decree, 
ZQ wondered whether or not M would be able to transform the political life and to endorse 
ethical and moral values within the political arena. Politics is not always dirty, but it is not 
honest in reality since politics is power sharing and there is a lot of temptation. ZQ was not 
sure whether or not M politicians would consistently uphold ethical and moral values; they 
cannot be tempted by political corruption, the crony system, etc.    For ZQ, let Amin Rais be 
a leader of Indonesia without getting involved in political arena. Let M play a significant role 
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 and become vocal to speak out about the critical issues without its involvement in electoral 
politics. That is “my opinion’, according to ZQ; however, everyone in M has freedom of 
speech and opinion, so no one shall devalue the idea of another. 
4.1.2. Role of Muhammadiyah in promoting democracy  
This subsection describes the role of M in promoting values of democracy to its 
members and the community at large. According to BC, M has a principle of amr ma’ruf and 
nahyi munkar, which is derived from the Qur’an. When this principle can be manifested 
among elites, bureaucrats, and opinion leaders, a democratic society can be established.  M 
has elaborated the principle of amar ma’ruf nahyi munkar (enjoining good deeds and 
forbidding wrongdoing) in its amal usaha (practical deeds) such as religious forums, schools, 
universities, clinics and hospitals, banks, cooperatives and the like. However, M has to 
extend the elaboration of its principle into the areas wherein NGOs are involved 
(empowering the powerless).  The M younger generation wants M to get involved more 
intensely in defending the rights of marginalized groups (al-mustad’affun) of society. Getting 
involved in this area, they argue, enables M to be in line with the spirits of ijtihad and tajdid 
(reformism), as laid down by its founding fathers. In the current situation, according to the 
M younger generation, M has to return to its role as “civil Islam”, upholding justice amidst 
society (ar-rujuu ilaa civil society) as the realization of an Islamic tenet of “am  ma’ruf nahyi 
munkar” (As). 
r
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 M, according to HN, has upheld the culture of modernity, even according to several 
writers such as Azra (1997) and Fealy (2003), the modernity43 and traditionality are subject to 
debate in a current situation.  By modernity, HR refers to the open-mindedness in response 
to modern ideas. M, for instance, has implemented the principles of democracy in day-to-day 
activities (decision making). M does not establish hierarchical relationships between M 
clerics and members, or boards and other members. It does not establish the tradition of 
shura council (positioning the clerics or ulama in the privileged position). All amal usaha 
(practical deeds), such schools, universities, clinics, hospitals, banks, orphan care, 
cooperatives and other businesses belong to the association. These kinds of businesses have to 
be managed accountably and transparently.  M board selection is done through various 
stages44. In M, both males and females are involved together in discussing any issue. Such 
                                                 
43 It was Deliar Noer who advocated the idea of “traditionality–modernity” to study the Islam 
movement in Indonesia. NU is traditional while Muhammadiyah, Persis, al-Irsyad and the like being 
to the modernists group. Although traditionalist in its commitment to the school of Islamic law 
(mazhab fiqhiyyah), NU had long undergone a reformation of its own and eagerly embraced the 
ideals of Indonesian nationalism (Hefner, 2003). Azra argues NU has done with reinterpreting the 
classical ideas of fiqh with respect, for instance, to social and economic spheres of life such as bank 
interests and economic cooperation with the non-Muslims manifested through, for example, the 
establishment of Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (BPR) NU-Summa. M is also adaptive and accommodative 
to modern institution, however it is conservative (revivalist) with respect to the religious ideology 
(Puritanism) advocating the idea ar-ruju ilaa al-Qur’an wa as-Sunnah (calling for a return to the 
pristine ways of scripture and the recorded example of the Prophet Muhammad). The dichotomous 
perspective, putting M into a modern group and NU into a traditional group, needs to be reviewed 
since each side (M or NU) has liberal, moderate and orthodoxical groups (Azra, 1997: 225). 
44 M has a bylaw about the mechanism such as Muktamar (five yearly Congress), Tanwir (annual 
meeting); muswil (provincial level), musda (district), muscab (sub-district level), and musran (unit of 
sub-district). Members of Tanwir are selected from M board or members from district and provincial 
levels through member-board meetings. Its tasks are to assess the policy, program, and 
implementation per annum, to recruit candidates of the M national board. Voting is a means used in 
leadership election (bylaw).   
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 cross-gender interaction occurs in M schools (RH). Therefore, when the issues of   civil 
society and democracy are introduced to the M members, M, according to HN, does not have  
a serious problem with them.   In contrast, HN argues that NU members have demonstrated a 
drastic change in response to the issues of civil society and democratization because NU 
(especially the conservative group) tends to continue its hirarchial tradition.  If we look at it 
carefully, we will find that M has contributed to the development of civil society and 
democracy through its human resources development programs.  M has contributed 10% of 
total schools and 169 universities in Indonesia. Through its schools and universities, M has 
produced well educated people who, in turn, can develop the principles of democracy (civic 
values) to the community at large (RH). At the grass roots level, the M board in the sub-
district and village gives guidance to the community through religious forums and other 
means. These activities promote the idea of empowering and enlightening people at low level 
of social and economical status (Mar).  
Informants stated that M promoted democracy (creating democratic atmosphere) in 
several ways. First, M has also succeeded in eradicating feudal mentality and constructing a 
democratic attitude. M has succeeded in establishing egalitarian relationships, i.e.,  all people 
in M have the same potential, that is they have to rely on themselves and not necessarily be 
dependent upon the elite group (clerics). This is the greatest contribution of M in 
establishing a fundamental basis for democracy and civil society.  
Second, M has established a willingness to help others as a tradition among its 
members and a basic principle for its autonomous associations (infrastructure). Such 
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 awareness is a fundamental basis for creating a social and economic infrastructure, which, in 
turn, will support the development of democracy and civil society.  
Third, M could maintain equal relationship with the government. The government 
could not force the M board to mobilize its members in the pursuit of the regime’s interests 
(e.g., in electoral voting) because M does not maintain patrimonialism.   
Third, through its educational institution, M might have developed a societal 
awareness of its members and the community at large.  Those institutions are established to 
anticipate or respond to societal dynamics.  
Fourth, M has been developing a theology for the environment, which is derived 
from the concept of forbidding fasad (acting corruptly) in relation to environmental issues 
(HN, As; and see also Berton, 1995).  
Furthermore these key informants add significant points such as: fifth, M is the first 
Islamic association that initiated the establishment of a women’s association (the so-called 
Aisyiah) in 1918, which serves to develop the potential of females and to give more room for 
females to articulate their own aspirations (gender issue). With respect to a gender equality 
issues nowadays, M issued a decree about the female leadership.   The Tanwir allowed a 
radical change wherein M has given more room for females to charge the M leadership (the 
M board). This decree has moved ahead of Islamic discourses in Middle East countries with 
respect to females in public spheres (BS, INA, and MM; and see also Berton, 1995).  However, 
ZQ, AH, and As wondered whether or not the practice of this issue is   without any 
resistance.  
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 Sixth, M has succeeded in constructing a more rational attitude, decreasing 
superstitious influence, and increasing critical thinking and freedom of opinion. A key 
informant (BS) offered an example. Once the M board was busy with organizing the amal 
usaha (pratical deeds) and other programs such as education, and proselytization were left 
behind, Ahmad Dahlan was criticized and accused. However, those who criticized the M 
board did not take over the leadership, but they encouraged a forum to make a decision.   
 Seventh, M members were involved in the issues of the nation state. For instance, K 
Bagus Hadikusuma was a member of the ad hoc committee for the 1945 Constitution. More 
recently, M issued a decree that M members should commit to the national agreement about 
the results of the 2004 general election (BS, INA &MM; see also Berton, 1995).   
 However, according to HN, M does not have a specific discourse to explain to the 
public especially academic society at large that M has done with the issues of democracy and 
civil society.  Some M critics say that M became stagnant and lost its own spirit of reformism 
(Mulkhan, 1996; Rais, 2004), especially during the era of the New Order. According to BC, M 
tends to be bureaucratic. The corporate culture of M is different from the virtue of its 
universities’.  Within M universities, individual independence or autonomy is strongly 
encouraged to develop. UMY (the University of Muhammadiyyah of Yogjakarta) has made 
progress 23 years ahead of the Islamic University of Indonesia, the oldest private university 
in Indonesia. The M University of Malang (East Java) has moved faster than UMY. BC argued 
that making a radical change is difficult within M, since it is embedded in organizational 
regulations and interests of each group. In M universities, the leadership can be changed in 
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 accordance with needs (for the sake of progress). M leadership (board membership) shall be 
determined by certain criteria, of which the seniority (locally called urut kacang) is often a 
predominant factor (BC).   BC explains  a negative phenomenon regarding the way a person 
tends to approach the M board (tampil bergandengan dengan pimpinan atau pimpinan pusat 
Muhammadiyah or escorting the central board of M) in order to be publicly known.  Such 
people have done nothing to produce any attainment. Without the demonstration “escorting 
the M national board”, the faculty members of UMY are able to produce productive works 
such as writing articles and the like which can promote the M name (image).  In contrast, on 
the M campuses, faculty members are encouraged to produce work (prestasi).   
4.2. NU and the process of Democratization 
This subsection discusses about significant role NU played in creating a democratic 
atmosphere within itself and the community at large. It presents the NU political stance in 
relation to the Old and New orders and its efforts to create a democratic atmosphere. 
4.2.1. NU in relation to the state 
NU upholds the principles of Sunni ideology (ahlussunnah wal jamaah) as the basis of 
its political culture (see Chapter 6). Cooperation or collaboration with those holding power 
(the state regime) is a characteristic of the Sunni ideology (Azra, 1997). NU developed such 
principles as tawassuth (moderate), i’tidal (upholding justice), tawazun (creating 
equilibrium), and tasamuh (tolerance); thus, NU rejects any extreme acts and thoughts 
contradicting the Islamic tenets.  These principles are established as the sole of the NU 
 80
 political culture (Qomar, 2002: 65, 71). In addition, as stated earlier NU establishes fiqh as a 
tradition serving as the sole of an Islamic knowledge. Fiqh is considered as a guide for the 
acts and attitudes of the NU umma as well as in decision making for various spheres of life, 
including politics. NU members would rather follow the ideas or stance of its clerics. The NU 
clerics assert that calling for a return to the pristine ways of the scripture and the recorded 
example of the Prophet Muhammad (ar-rujuu ilaa al-qur’an and as-sunnah), as advocated by 
the “modernist group”, will allow an individual to go astray. Therefore, Muslims have to 
follow conscientiously the ijtihad products of four fiqh schools of thought of Sunni, i.e., 
Hanafism, Syafiism, Malikism, and Hambalism (Azra, 1997:228; Qomar, 2002: 65, 71).  
  Some fiqh principles used by NU in determining its political stance include: a) al-
muhaafadzatu ala al-qadim wa al-akhudzu bi aljadidd al-ashlah (Defending what has been 
working well (relevant) and seeking or taking a new idea or perspective that is better); b) Al-
ashlu baqa’una ma kaana ‘alaa makaana (so far there are no changes; any regulation or 
principle has to be defended); c)maala yudraaku kulluhu laa yutraak ba’duhu (we have to 
appreciate or take what we have attained into consideration, though such attainment remain 
beyond our expectation); d) Sulthonun zholim khairun min fitnathim tadum (The 
established rulers (even acting corruptly) who can guarantee the stability of state/society are 
better than continual anarchy); e) Daarul mafasid muqaddamun ala jalbil mashaalih 
(Forbidding deprivation is a higher priority than taking benefits); and f) Tasharruf al-imaam 
‘ala ar-raaiyyah manuthun bi al-mashlaah (The policies and acts of the ruler must be in 
accord with the public interest).   
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 NU refers to the first principle of maintaining local tradition. Keeping the first 
principle, NU appreciates and adopts local tradition as a means to motivate the NU members 
to perform good deeds. NU also uses the first principle to respond to contemporary issues. 
Both the NU board and members claim that the first principle enables the NU members to be 
responsive to and appreciative of plurality. NU used to employ the principles (b, c, d, and e), 
during the Old Order, to justify its cooperation with the Soekarno regime. Soekarno imposed 
the Guided Democracy and forced trilogy power of Indonesia (NASAKOM = Nationalist, 
Religious and Communism) tended to be authoritarian, and backed up the Indonesian 
communist party. The NU involvement in the Old Order regime and allegiance (NASAKOM) 
was to defend umma interests. The NU employed this principle to support the government in 
defending the nation-state (the Unified Indonesian Republic) within a situation where 
revolts broke out in various provinces and the state was newly declared politically and 
economically weak.  NU also uses these principles to demonstrate that NU will not commit 
to radical or coerceive action but will commit instead to gradual changes.  The (f) principle is 
used to assess the policy and its implementation of the state (government) (Abdillah, 2001; 
Falah, 1998; Hadzik & Asnafi, 1996; Umam, 1996).  
4.2.1.1. NU and the Old Order of Soekarno 
 
    As stated earlier NU ended its involvement in Masyumi earlier than M did; later in 
May of 1952, NU became an independent political party. NU resigned from the Masyumi’s 
membership because it was disappointed with the dominant roles of the modernist group in 
 82
 that political party. In 1952, there was a transformation of political leadership from Sukiman 
Wirjosandjojo to Mohammad Natsir. Sukirman was well known as an accommodative leader 
who gave more room for the pesantren (NU) group than Natsir (from Persis who was 
involved in the debate about furuiyah issues with the NU people before World War II). NU 
was granted a membership position in the Shura Council of this party, such a position, 
according to NU, did not match  the numbers of the NU umma, and was less significant in 
the political process (the decision making) (Ma’arif, 1998).  
 NU demonstrated its accommodative stance to the Soekarno regime (Sunni ideology).  
Modernists felt hurt because of the NU political stance. Masyumi opposed the Soekarno 
regime policy about NASAKOM and Guided Democracy, but NU did not45. The regime of 
Sukarno allowed NU to become one element of the national political powers (trilogy pillars 
of Indonesian politics), known as Nasakom (Nationalists, religious groups and communists) 
by the end of 1960.  Such a NU political stance drew other Muslim groups to the opinion that 
NU was very opportunistic, inconsistent or seeking safety for itself (in the pursuit for its 
poitical interests).   NU did not demonstrate a clear political stance, at least at the first stage, 
against the Indonesian communism party that was backed up by the Sukarno regime. Leaders 
and all members of NU argued that the guided democracy of the Soekarno regime was in line 
                                                 
45 NU had pro (accomodationist) and con (rejectionist) groups regarding to its political stance.  The 
acccomodationist argued that the involvement of NU members in the Old Order regime was to 
defend public interest. In contrast, its rejectinists considered their involvement as human rights 
violation since Soekarno’ acted in opposition to the rules of law [became an authoritarian] (Azra, 
1997: 222). 
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 with the basic principles of NU (NU organizational culture). The guided democracy matched 
the values of Islam that pesantren advocated, including the concept of taqlid (being obedient 
without reserve). PSII and Perti had similar political stances with the NU. The NU political 
stance demonstrated its moderation and concern about defending the principle of public 
interest (mashalihu ummah principle). At that time, the regime, according to NU, was not 
able to fulfill all of demands of the “Islam groups”; NU had to accept such political treatment. 
Moreover, NU decided its political stance based on a principle of kaidah fiqh (fiqh guide) 
taught in pesantren, saying “maa laa yudraaku kulluhu laa yutraaku ba’duhu (whenever we 
cannot achieve 100 % of the target, we do not need to leave what we have gained) (MM &M, 
see also Maarif, 1988).  
 In contrast, Masyumi, which was supported by Muslim scholars who had been 
educated in the West46, argued that President Sukarno sought to establish himself as the 
repository of all power, exercising control over the country, providing guidance, and creating 
the ideological and institutional bases of the system (Vasil, 1997, p. 44), in opposition to the 
principles of democracy (Hafis, 1996).  
4.2.1.2. NU and the New Order of Suharto    
It is common knowledge that the New Order regime of Suharto demonstrated an 
unaccommodative stance toward “Islam” from 1967-1985.  Prior to the 1990’s, the regime of 
Suharto demonstrated its willingness to accommodate “Islam”.  However, the relationship 
                                                 
46 Politically this (modernist) group advocated the Western ideas such as democracy, nationalism, 
popular sovereignty, and individual freedoms etc. (Azra, 1997: 231). 
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 between NU and the state (the New Order regime) was not harmonious. The NU alienation 
was demonstrated by the unwillingness of the New Order regime to involve NU as a partner 
in the process of development, though NU, together with M, contributed to restore the New 
Order and to tear down the Indonesian communism.47 Examples of the unaccommodative 
stance  of the New Order  regime includes: a) The NU leaders found it difficult to gain access  
to positions in  executive offices (bureaucracy),  especially  taking charge of religious affairs 
(the Ministry of Religious Affairs of Indonesia); b) the New Order regime did not give room 
for the NU leaders (politicians) to hold leadership positions in the political party (PPP or 
United Development Party);  c) the New Order regime restricted intellectual activists and the 
NU leaders who were involved in Pesantren, madrasah and NGOs to activate their mission in 
those fields; d) NU has a large number of its members (approximately 30 million), but only 
few members of NU are represented in the parliament; and e) NU was not involved in the 
establishment of ICMI (The Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals).  The conflict 
between the New Order regime and NU was exacerbated because the New Order regime 
involved the modernist group, as a partner in the development process (Prasetyo & 
Munhanif, 2003: 209). 
There are some reasons why the New Order regime did not demonstrate an 
accommodative stance to NU. According to Ida (2004), the regime did not believe that NU’s 
members were highly educated to take on technocratic positions in the fields of economy, 
                                                 
47 From 1965-1966, both NU  and M supported the estalishement of the New Order, nominated 
Suharto for presidency, fought against Indonesian communist party (PKI) (Azra, 1997).      
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 politics, and technology. On the other hand, the Islamic modernist group such as M has had 
more highly educated members than NU has since the colonial period. Therefore, M was 
considered ready to take on technocratic positions in various fields (Ida, 2004). The 
modernist group took benefit from the accommodative stance of the New Order, but NU did 
not. Even, according to Hefner (2003), several leaders of the modernist group supported 
highly Suharto regime.    
NU leaders and members argue that the Suhato’s opinion was true that NU did not 
have highly educated members within the colonial period and the Old Order era.  However, 
since NU restated its 1926 spirit and withdrew from political arena in 1984, it has many 
highly educated members who are ready to take on technocratic positions (Vasil, 1997: 115).   
Unfortunately, the New Order regime did not pay much attention to NU. In addition, 
Suharto disliked the critical stance of Gus Dur (the NU president), which was demonstrated 
by his advocacy and demand about respecting human rights that include individual freedoms 
(Ida, 2004: 362-365)48. Therefore, the accommodative stance of the New Order regime, 
which was initially demonstrated in 1990s, did not have a significant meaning with respect 
to NU and the regime’s relationship.   
                                                 
48 The unharmonious relationship between NU and the New Order regime occurred, according to 
Azra (1997), because the Suharto regime concealed the first electoral voting ( from 1967 to 1968), 
enacted the Presidential Decree about prohibiting the involvement of  senior officials of service 
servant in a political party, did not allow the Ministry of Religious Affairs to hold a mission to 
elaborate and promote the principles of Jakarta charter as the pressure of the Catholic young 
generation, and  did not give room for NU leader to charge the Ministry of religious Affairs (MORA). 
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 However, 1996 showed a new era for the relation between the NU (Abdurahman 
Wahid) and the New Order regime (Suharto). Both Abdurahman Wahid and Suharto met in 
the national conference (Muktamar) of Rabitah Ma’hadil Islamyah (RMI)49 and shook hands. 
This signaled reconciliation between the two leaders and an end to the unharmonious 
relationships between NU and the New Order regime. The NU political stance 
(Abdurahman) was not in opposition to the regime of the New Order (Suharto), but on the 
contrary, Abdurahman Wahid together with Muslim elites such as Hasan Basri (the 
Indonesian Cleric Council), Lukman Harun, Projokusumo and Dien Syamsuddin 
(Muhammadiyah), supported Suharto to lead Indonesia for the period of 1997-2005. 
Abdurahman Wahid demonstrated his close relationships with the daughter of Suharto prior 
to the 1997 electoral vote50  (Suwarno, 2002: 96, 137).     
4.2.2. NU role in promoting democracy  
I noted two significant role of NU in creating democratic atmosphere within the 
Indonesian society: self-tranformation and promoting civil society society movement. NU 
                                                 
49 It was KH Ahmad Syaikhu, Chair 1 of NU, who advocated the idea of RMI because he observed the 
development of pesantren [indigenous Islamic boarding schools] being led into a stagnant condition. 
His idea was concerning how all pesantren should become more effective in producing Islamic 
thought and independent from political intervention. In the 22nd NU Congress (Muktamar), held in 
Surabaya in 1954, the idea of RMI was introduced to the NU congress participants. Several NU clerics 
such as KH Ahmad Siddiq (Jember), KH Machrus Ali (Kediri), KH Najib Wahad (Jombang), and KH 
Hasan Saifurrizal (Probolinggo) were welcome; at the same time RMI (the Pesantren Council) was 
established. RMI is the association of pesantren affiliated with NU. It was KH Ahmad Syaikhu who 
led the first leadership of this council (Kompas, 1999).  
50 In May 1998, Abdurahman was among the Muslim leaders invited by President Suharto in relation 
to the cabinet reshuffling. Suharto’s act was to maintain his status quo 
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 has transformed its orthodox understanding of Aswaja and fiqh. The younger generation of 
NU claims that transforming orthodoxical understanding about the NU ideology and fiqh 
tradition enables NU to develop criticism and open-mindednes to contemporary issues (this 
will be discussed later).  
NU sought to revitalize or reinterpret its ideology, ahlus sunnah wal jamaah, into the 
conceptualization of al-adalah (justice), musawah (equality), at-tawazun 
(balance/moderation) and al’itidal. Khitah 1926 declared that NU was dedicated to moderate 
Islam, tolerance, tawazun and the like; and to advocate progressive perspectives about Islam 
as well as critical or liberal ideas.  NU asserts that everyone has rights and none shall devalue 
the ideas of other. Such conditions have given more room for the NU younger generation to 
be involved and develop Islamic discourses in relation to the Indonesian politics and 
democratization. The NU younger generation demonstrated critical ideas and stance toward 
the hegemony of the New Order regime (organic intellectuals). They have good backgrounds 
in Islamic classical studies (pesantren), but they are open-minded for new approaches 
(integrating classical studies into modern approaches).  
NU appreciates such local traditions as societal inheritance. Such appreciation gives 
more room for local tradition to grow amidst religious practices. In order to put the idea of 
cultural movements into practice, NU has implemented programs that promote the 
intellectual capacity of the NU ummah, especially the NU younger generations, through 
intensive discourses about Islam and such contemporary issues as Islamic politics, pluralism 
and gender equality. They have been doing analytical studies on the Islamic classical works 
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 as references (kutub al-maraji’) of al–Ghazaly (nashihatu al-muluuk or advices for the rulers), 
al-Baqillani, and Ibnu Taimiyyah for Islamic politics; as well as fiqh al-Nisa (Islamic 
jurisprudence on gender) in relation to the issue of “Islam and women’s reproduction right 
(will be discussed in the Chapter 6).”    
The second role NU played in promoting civil society movement was manifested 
through several efforts:  
1) NU, especially its young generation, has developed a critical tradition among the 
NU umma.  These efforts were manifested into the NU cultural movement, which cannot be 
separated from the spirits and mission of the so-called “calling for a return to khitah 1926”. 
According to IR, “calling for a return to khitah 1926” contains in itself five grand agendas 
generating the NU self-transformation. NU was called to return to its original mission as a 
social and religious body (Jam’iyyah) dedicated to development of education, proselyzation 
and other social activities than to electoral politics.  Pesantren, madrasah and the economic 
program of NU were stagnant because of the excessive involvement of NU in political 
practices;  
2) NU declares that Pancasila is a common platform or state philosophy. So, NU has 
resolved the conflicting issues with respect to Pancasila and Islam. NU is of the opinion that 
Islam and Pancasila are incomparable. Islam (shari’ah) serves as a religious guide, while 
Pancasila is the state ideology.  The NU congress (Muktamar) in 1984 stated that the Unified 
Indonesian Republic (NKRI) is a nation state with Pancasila as its ideology. NU is an Islamic 
organization which accepted Pancasila;  
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 3) NU has developed political awareness among its members and to some extent 
among the community at large. For instance, Abdurrahman Wahid has promoted political 
awareness among Muslims, especially “civil Islam”. His objectives are to uphold the 
principles of democracy as the basis of the Indonesian political system with respect to the 
rights of individuals (e.g., freedom of speech, freedom of mind, freedom of association, and 
equality of rights).  The central goal of NU movement was not to establish or restore an 
“Islamic state,” but to create a Muslim society dedicated to the ideals of justice, freedom, and 
pluralistic diffusion of social power throughout society (Hefner, 2003; Prasetyo & Munhanif, 
2003);  
4) The NU younger generation has developed programs to strengthen civil society 
movement through the NU’s NGOs and autonomous bodies. In the 1980s and 1990s, NU 
added new elements to its organizational base (Hefner, 2000: Ariev, 1999). NU affiliated 
Muslim-non organizations (NGOs) emerged, dedicated to democratizing and pluralizing 
NU’s political culture by disseminating critical ideas to the community at large;  
5) NU, especially Abdurrahman Wahid, succeeded in building a public opinion and a 
network among those who were concerned with the Indonesian transformation 
(democratization) to advocate his ideas about democracy and “civil religion” (Arifin, 1996).   
Gus Dur, with his colleagues, established a forum for democracy (FORDEM) to advocate 
critical ideas with respect to democracy and democratization in Indonesia.  The forum’s 
strategy emphasizes the promotion of democratic ideas, particularly the ideas of religious 
tolerance.  To achieve political democracy, according to Abdurrahman Wahid, Pancasila has 
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 to be upheld by religious organizations such as NU, M and the like as the sole principle (in 
order to prevent sectarianism). The development of genuine democracy in Indonesia needs 
three basic conditions: a) a separation of the state and civil domain; second, b) a separation 
between civil society and government, and c) a separation of power within government: that 
is a system of checks and balances (Ramavage, 1995: 166-167);   
6) NU has succeeded in building its independent political stance in relation to the 
state (the New Order regime). NU proved its stance from the days of the New Order 
establishment until 1995.  Vatikiotis (1998) expresses that NU is free to pursue its activities 
without government interference because NU has publications, an internal newspaper, 
public meetings and oral instruction.  When NU was marginalized by the New Order regime, 
NU sought to maximize the role of civil society to articulate the NU political concerns. NU 
has attempted to promote the socio-political awareness of its members and the community at 
large in relation to the New Order regime without confrontation (cultural movement).   
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5. CASE 1: MUHAMMADIYAH’S IDEAS AND PRACTICES ON DEMOCRACY AND 
EDUCATING FOR DEMOCRACY  
 This chapter explores the understanding (perception) of M members and M’s experiences 
with respect to the issues of democracy and educating for democracy.  The chapter discusses 
a) democracy, democratic society, which encompasses such issues as M members’ 
understandings of democracy, compatibility or incompatibility of Islam with the Western 
democracy; their responses to democracy; the characteristics of a democratic society, as well 
as M members’ understanding of each characteristics; citizenship, the concept of rights and 
responsibility as well as commitment; and b) educating for democracy, which describes the 
concept and its implementation.   
5.1. Democracy  
5.1.1. How do Muhammadiyah’s people perceive democracy? 
To date, M, like other Islamic civil associations, does not have a particular conception 
of democracy and holds the ideas of procedural and substantive democracies, though 
institutionally M perceives that Islam has values congruent with the principles of democracy. 
However, personally each M board or member might have a different point of view from one 
to another. Some M people reject pluralism; an idea has a connection with democracy. 
Another group holds to the idea of theodemocracy advocated by Abu A’la Maududi.  Such 
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 various perspectives are assumed to have a connection with several factors, such as 
interpretation of scriptural texts, personal experiences, and interaction with a variety of 
groups and perspectives and the double standard of countries that advocate democracy 
toward developing countries (world justice) (As).     
Their opinions are categorized into two models of democracy: substantive and 
procedural. The detailed description of their opinions is as foolows: 
5.1.1.1. Substantive democracy    
These key informants (AH, GL, HPPA, RH & ZQ) refer to substantive democracy to 
democratic attitudes and aptitudes, wherein respect for differences and plurality, as well as  
individual freedoms, including freedom of mind and expression, equality of rights and justice 
are upheld in various spheres of life. RH argues that justice does mean that, because everyone 
has equal rights, an individual as a member of society or citizen has to be equally or justly 
treated before the law regardless of his or her background.  Equality of right, according to 
GL, implies the idea that no one is allowed to enforce his or her wishes while violating the 
rights of others. Any acts or attitudes that violate the rights of others contradict democracy.  
AH suggests that equal rights assume involvement (participation) of people who are making 
and whom will be affected by decisions.  Deliberation and dialogue may be used as a means 
to promote people’s participation.  
 Democratic relationship, according to AH and MA, is characterized by respect for 
equality, which means that any discrimination by ethnicity, gender, and religious affiliation 
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 shall be prevented from various spheres of life;  willingness of individuals to be open-minded 
and to acknowledge an equal position with people of diverse backgrounds; mutual 
relationship, which means that paternalistic (patron-client) relationships shall be avoided; 
and giving  more room for members to express their aspirations and critiques.  
BC argues that freedom is fit ah (innate potential) for everybody that God granted 
when he or she was born. Everyone is commanded by God to use his or her rationality or 
intellect to think about the mystery of the universe as stated in the Qur’an “Tatafakarun, 
yaqiluun or ta’qiluun (to use intellect for thinking).” By freedom, according to BC, an 
individual shall become independent and his or her independence constitutes a democratic 
life. Therefore, M has to make every effort to make individuals independent.  M members, 
according to INA, have to respect and commit to the freedoms of individuals, in keeping 
with the principle of Islam, the state ideology, and the rule of law of this country (see 
educating for democracy).   
r
5.1.1.2. Procedural Democracy   
The second group (As, BS, HN, Mar, ST, YS and ZQ) looks at democracy from the 
context of power or a political system. Democracy refers to people’s sovereignty or power 
sharing. From the Islamic perspective, they believe that shura or musyawarah, which has 
various meanings (discussed earlier), is congruent with the principles of democracy. Shura 
assumes that every person has an equal position (no privileged positions). However, many 
people (Muslim), according ST, pay less attention to this command (shura). Such Muslim’s 
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 attitude contradict the prophet who was guided by the revelation of God always did shura 
(deliberation and dialogue) in making decisions for the public interest (masalihu li al- 
umma).       
ST adds that from the perspective of the history of Islam, it is apparent that the 
Prophet also applied the representation system in the process of decision making for public 
interests. This representation system was put into practice, especially when the number of 
Muslim (jamaah) increased to the point where direct participation (one person one vote) 
could not be well implemented. Some M members are questioning (rejecting) the concept of 
popular or individual sovereignty, since they claim that Islam acknowledges merely the 
concept of sovereignty of God (no individual sovereignty). This opinion was argued by ST, 
saying that the concept of God’s sovereignty needs to be elaborated in actual settings. If the 
concept of people’s sovereignty had been translated into actions such as the benefits of power 
for the public interests (mashaalihu li al-umma), like enjoining justice and forbidding the 
abuse of power, the manifestation of individual sovereignty might have represented the 
sovereignty of God. Why? God commanded us to uphold justice and prohibit injustice or 
abuse of power (like personal interest). Some people tend to see literally and like to 
contradict one another. It is common knowledge that any system, including democracy, 
contains weaknesses. ST adds that democracy implies principles that can accommodate the 
concept of democracy in Islam (shura).       
  M uses shura (deliberation and dialogue) to make decisions for both organizational 
and public interests, as well as board recruitment. M has bylaw about a democratic 
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 mechanism for making decisions and electing its leaders at various levels (e.g., Muktamar and 
Tanwir (national); muswil (provincial level), musda (district), muscab (sub-district level), and 
musran (unit of sub-district)). Muktamar is a national congress carried out once for five years 
and Tanwir is a national meeting executed per annum. Tanwir serves a counsel whose 
membership represents from M at provincial and disctrict levels51  with its task to assess the 
policy, program and implementation per annum, and to recruit candidates of the M national 
board. 
5.1.2. Compatibility and incompatibility of Islam with democracy  
With respect to the issue of the compatibility or incompatibility of Islam with 
democracy, M members are divided into rejectionist, accomodationist, and those in between.  
Some M members advocate the idea of an Islamic state but some other, maybe the majority, 
do not (ZQ). The detailed opinions of M members are as follows:  
5.1.2.1. Islam is compatible with democracy 
 For accomodationists (modernists or reformist), democracy does not contradict Islam. 
For example, As says that Islam advocated the concept of bai’ah in selecting a leader while 
the kingdom system was applied during that time. At that time, As adds, this system was 
more progressive than any other system.  When the Prophet did not leave any decree 
concerning who would be his successor, or let the umma make a decision, the Prophet’s 
decision demonstrated the contemporary principles of democracy. The successor, Abu Bakar, 
                                                 
51 TheTanwir’s members are selected through board-member meeting in the provincial and district 
levels. 
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 was elected by bai’ah. Before he died, he gave a mandate about leadership to Umar (not to his 
son or family). Later, Umar was appointed by bai’at. Though the process of selecting a leader 
was traditional, that system might have reflected the principles of democracy in the modern 
era.  Nowadays, baiat reflects to a social and political contract between a leader and umma by 
which a leader politically deserves to organize and handle ummah.  Should a leader abuse 
power, the umma has the right to overthrow him and to elect a new leader.  Does it mean a 
model of governance was practiced at that time? As said that he does not know exactly. 
However, this system demonstrates a model of organizing society. Politically bai’ah indicates 
the process of organizing society.  
M’s leaders, like Syaifii Ma’arif and Amin Rais, advocate the compatibility of Islam 
with democracy, saying that the values of democracy are congruent with the Islamic tenet 
(shura).   Syafii suggests that the Islamic tenets encourage the umma to be rational and 
critical and that these cannot be separated from democracy. Amin insists that the minority 
group should not be alienated by the majority group within a society or state. As the citizens 
of a state, the minority group has similar rights to the majority group. Democracy is 
demonstrated by the equality of rights, access to lives socially and economically, and to 
justice. Such principles are congruent with the moral and ethical principles of Islam (Rais, 
1996).    
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 5.1.2.2. Islam is Incompatible with democracy 
 Some M members argue that Islam is incompatible with democracy because democracy 
is not recognized within the Islamic tradition. Like other religions, Islam does not contain a 
concept of freedom.  For instance, Mar says that the Qur’an or Sunnah does not contain in 
itself the idea of democracy. For him, shura is incompatible with the Western ideas of 
democracy for several reasons. In Islam, the ultimate sovereignty belongs to God; God 
mandates to human beings temporary sovereignty to develop the universe for the benefit of 
all human beings. In democracy, a leader is elected through voting (majority system). 
However, the concept of majority, according to Mar, is not representing genuine interests of 
the majority. Mar, for instance, explains that a politician or political party that owns large 
financial resources can buy votes from voters in electoral voting. Bribery or money politics, 
which is very often practiced by politicians (see Harris, 2003), contradicts the tenets of Islam.   
Another key informant, BS, explains that Islam commands human beings, as the 
vicegerency on the earth (temporary sovereignty), to set up and regulate the universe in 
order. In addition, the concept of leadership (khalifah) constitutes the leadership for both 
religious and secular spheres of life (state).52 This model was originally founded by the 
Prophet. That model, according to Mar, was developed into an electoral system after the 
death of the Prophet.  Mar was questioning the effectiveness of a western system of 
democracy because (a) it take a lot of time to make a decision, and (b) the voting system (or 
the majority of votes) tends to ignore the aspect of quality in a community where the 
                                                 
52  According to Mar, there is no separation between religion and public sphere in Islam. 
 98
 majority of people have a low educational background and the law enforcement is not 
working effectively (see money politics).  
Who rejects the idea of compatibility Islam with democracy? They are literalists who  
advocate the idea that the sacred text cannot be subject to interpretation,  reject the ideas or 
interpretation from classical clerics  of  the medieval age and any ideas from the West, follow 
the ideas and practices of righteous ancestor (al-salaf al-salih), and promote the idea of God’s 
sovereignty (al-hakimiyah Allah) (see Maududi’s concept about theodemocracy).   
5.1.2.3. Islam is not comparable to or distinguishable from democracy  
 According to this group, democracy is not identical with “liberal perspective.” Islam 
grants mankind freedom, for example, to seek knowledge, or embrace and practice his or her 
belief.   In practice, democracy makes up various forms, (e.g., in America, England, and 
Japan).  The American model of democracy is based upon the philosophy of individual 
happiness to which individualism and material happiness serve as the basic foundation.  In 
contrast to Islam, Western society defines happiness as material happiness and the individual 
freedom and desire to seek unlimited material attainment (hubud dunya). Islam advocates 
happiness in the present world and hereafter. The goal of political democracy is to achieve 
material happiness, which many Muslim do not realize. Therefore, for BC, M board and 
members have to establish democracy according to the Islamic frame of minds. The USA 
greatly respects the rights of its citizens, but it ignores the rights of citizens of other countries 
(like double standard of America toward developing countries, especially Muslim countries). 
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 Such a double standard of the American policy and attitude demonstrates the weakness of 
American democracy (BC).  Therefore, M board and members have to be critical of the 
procedural democracy that is advocated today. Practically the principle of majority, 
according to N and GL, ignores the ethical and moral values. In Islam, ethical and moral 
values should be the fundamental principles that have to be applied to governance or 
leadership. Ignoring the ethical and moral values will mislead the implementation of 
democracy (for instance, money politics and bribery).  
  MM says that as far as he knows that two groups, (i.e., literalists and scholastic 
traditionalists) reject the ideas of contemporacy issues including democracy. Literalists reject 
the ideas of democracy because it is not stated in the sacred text and coming from the West.  
The Scholastic group upholds blindly the ideas (interpretation) of clerics of the medieval 
ages, which is very literal and verbal, and out of reach with daily human problems. In 
contrast, MM argues that several tenets of Islam as stated earlier advocates ideas of, for 
instance, respect for plurality, the right of others, tolerance and the like.  Therefore, for him, 
how can Muslims match Islamic tenets with the principle of democracy?   
Islam advocates the concept of shura, which implies deliberation, dialogue, and 
commitment to agreement among those who are involved in making decisions. As stated 
earlier Islam contains in itself tenets congruent with democracy like respect rule of law,53 
transparency and participation,54  human rights (right to live),55  property rights and right to 
                                                 
53 See al-Qur’an surah An-Nisaa 4: 58, 105, 135; al-Maidah 5: 6. 
54 See al-Qur’an surahs Ash-Shura 26: 50-52; An-Nisaa 4: 59. 
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 earn income,56 right of equality before the law57).   However, in regard to the concept of 
authority, Islam constitutes principles distinguishable from the principles of Western 
democracy. First, Islam establishes wahyu (the scriptural text) as the primary authority, since 
wahyu is the speech of God. This principle differs from the democracy of the West, which 
advocates people’s (individual’s) sovereignty. Second, power or authority should be 
embodied by the law, i.e., the law must be derived from wahyu (the scriptural text). Third, 
democracy advocates and respects individual freedoms. Islam grants individual’s freedom; 
however the individual’s freedoms must not contradict the wahyu. By democracy, a leader 
elect has to struggle to create prosperity for people in the present world. Islam teaches that a 
leader has to be responsible for the prosperity of people (masaalihu umma) at the present 
world and hereafter. Fifth, a leader has to be responsible before the public according to 
democracy, while, according to Islam, a leader has to be responsible before the public in the 
present world and before God in the hereafter (Fanani, 2002).  
5.1.3. Muhammadiyah’s Members views about western ideas of democracy 
For some groups, the discourse on the issue of compatibility or incompatibility of 
Islam with democracy has drawn people to advocate the idea of the Islamic state or shari’a 
state.  Those who advocate the idea of the Islamic state are keenly involved in discussing the 
issue such as “Does Islam need to be involved in political arena? According to ZQ, within 
civil Islam there are several groups. The first group wants to establish Islam as moral or 
                                                                                                                                                             
55 See al-Qur’an surah al-Isra 17: 33. 
56 See al-Qur’an surahs al-Baqarah 2: 188, and An-Nisaa 4: 29, 32. 
57 See al-Qur’an surahs an-Nisaa 4: 58 and Ash-Shura 42: 41. 
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 ethical basis per se for society and has to be put aside from state (secularist or rejectionists). 
The second group advocates and struggles to establish an Islamic or shari’ah state.  The third 
group does not advocate an Islamic state, but wants “civil Islam” involved in the political 
practice (like a political party). The fourth group wants civil Islam to keep its mission 
consistently as a cultural movement. The third and fourth groups are still involved in debate 
regarding several questions: “Does civil Islam need to be a political party?’ or “does “civil 
Islam” need to be the advocate of a particular political party? Such a debate becomes heated 
prior to elections when people in political parties compete to reach many more seats in 
parliament or to gain the presidential position (see also Effendy, 2004).    
The fourth group, according to ZQ, advocates that Islam has relationships with 
democracy or the state; however both of them can be distinguishable in each magnitude, i.e., 
Islam as a religion and democracy as a system of a modern state. This group suggests that the 
most important point is concerned with how the values of Islam are adopted by the state and 
serve as the moral control over power (state). This idea is currently advocated by 
theoreticians of Islamic politics or theoreticians of Islamic politicians in Indonesia. Those 
advocates of this idea are   Nurchalis Madjid, Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL= Network of Liberal 
Islam), and JIMM (Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah =Network of M Younger 
Intellectuals). This group is considered by the older generation and literalists to be secular 
and the agent of America, CIA, or International church organizations.  
ZQ argues that M has a half-hearted stance, i.e. acknowledging the ideas of 
democracy but “civil Islam” needs not be involved in the political arena. The debate about 
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 this issue keeps on going. Currently, Amin Rais, the former president of M, founded a 
political party (Mandate Party= PAN) but organizationally M did not recognize PAN 
(National Mandate Party) as the M party. However, in 2000 M Congress and Tanwir M 
released a decree to support its cadre to be a candidate for the president.   This statement is, 
according to ZQ, half-hearted recognition. Unlike NU, NU was involved in a political party 
from   1955 until 1972.  In 1999, NU was involved in the political arena by establishing a 
political party, i.e., PKB. 
Aside from this debate, Muslims in Indonesia are faced with pre-emptive ideological 
suspicion while studying democracy. N says those faculty members are likely pushed to 
objectify and rationalize the idea of democracy, i.e., treat all religions fairly (in justice) and at 
the same time they have also to be inclined to one religion (personal preference).  On the 
other hand, he said that they only know democracy from the text telling us that America is 
democratic; they do not know how democracy (procedural and substantive) is put into 
practice.  Faculty members of UMY are frustrated by the contradiction between the ideas of 
democracy from academe (like respect for freedom and human dignity) and the attitude and 
action of political elites of developed countries toward developing countries.  The students 
can see how arrogant the political elites of developed countries are in many cases:  for 
instance, Iraqi occupation and inhuman interrogation of war prisoners (contradicting Geneva 
agreement) in Al-Gharib and Afghanistan. Such cases make it difficult for his students and 
himself to believe that democracy is pro human rights. N and Mar further said that the 
political elites of developed countries strive for their own personal desires (interests) in the 
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 name of democracy. In fact, they pretend to advocate democracy and democratization in 
developing countries while violating the rights of people in developing countries. It seems to 
those key informants their actions (human rights violation) are justified as long as it is for 
their own interests.  
5.2. Democratic Society  
5.2.1. Conceptualization  
The second issue concerns how M members conceive of democratic society and the 
characteristics of democratic society. Principly all key informants of M define democratic 
society as a society wherein its members uphold democractic principles such as freedom, 
respect for plurality, tolerance, justice, open-mindedeness and the  like in various spheres of 
life, though they placed different emphasis. For instance, this key actor (As) defines 
democratic society as pluralistic society wherein members of society respect plurality.   
According to him, M via its universities (the University of M Yogjakarta, for example) has 
formulated the concept of pluralism as stated in a textbook of Civic Education for university 
students.  Democratic society, according to As, is also a participatory society wherein all 
members of society are encouraged to take part at various levels such as local, national and 
global58. At the local level, according to N, democratic society demonstrates the active 
                                                 
58 Why is this concept advocated? As and other writers observe that many Muslims perceive that the 
global civilization does not constitute Muslims’ civilization. Such perception could stimulate people 
to get involved in radicalism.  Therefore, a participatory society for Muslims, according to them, 
means that Muslims have to respond and contribute to development of humane civilization. 
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 participation of those people who are involved in decision making for the public interests   
(creating prosperity).     
For BC, democratic society is an open society, which derives from the concept of 
human being as ahsanu taqwim (human being in the very best of moulds), relying upon to 
the concept of human being and the concept of vicegerency—that God gives a mandate to 
human beings to organize the world for the prosperity of all creatures in the universe.  
However, human being tends to be untrustworthy, so God has granted humans the capacity 
and freedom to be independent.  Democratic society is a society wherein its members respect 
and appreciate mandate or trustworthiness (amanah) and justice (adil). Amanah means to be 
trustful or being trusted. Trustworthy people keeps tightly mandate and avoid abusing power 
for self or group interests.  Any attitude or action that contradicts amanah such as abuse of 
power is illegitimate. Therefore, freedom, open mindedness, and amanah are needed to 
create a democratic society. Abuse of power, corruption, manipulation, and the like can 
occur in society whenever people don’t keep amanah.   
According to Mar, when people have sovereignty, a democratic society exists. In 
Islam, God has the ultimate sovereignty and God grants human being freedom and 
sovereignty according to God’s will (iradah). Human beings have to cooperate in enjoining 
good deed and prohibiting evil or wrongdoing (ta’aawanu ala al-birri wa at-taqwa walaa 
ta’aawanu ala al-ithni wa al-‘udwaan). Islam advocates the idea of shura as stated earlier. 
However, the Qur’an contains in itself doctrine (qati) by which there is no room for a person 
to make a choice. For instance, Islam prohibits (haram) killing a person or committing 
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 suicide (considered as a great evil). The exception would be a pregnant woman. If by 
delivering a baby, she and/or her baby could die, Islam allows the mother to have an 
abortion in such circumtances. 
 In a democratic society, people (citizens), according to ST and ZQ, are to be 
committed with the rule of law and upholding justice so that all members feel equality of 
rights in various spheres of life. Members of society respect the equality of rights, differences 
or plurality and they are granted the freedom to speak, so they need not be worried about 
different opinions. If these attitudes are, according to ZQ, well established in a community, 
people will tolerate different political ideology among themselves. However, in the political 
arena, every one will be faced with a problem (e.g., bargaining position and power sharing, 
by which everybody has to calculate the benefits or advantages that he or she will gain)59.   
Respect for differences or plurality can be a means of establishing “mature” (mutual) 
relationships among people who have different ideological backgrounds, and of making 
people aware of different agendas that people with different political ideology fight for. 
In a democratic society, people, according to AH and INA, respect the rights of 
women (gender equality), which is manifested through the involvement of women in the 
public sphere, such as taking leadership (will be discussed later). Is argues that democratic 
society is characterized by mutual (balanced) relationships between the state and citizens. 
                                                 
59 According to ZQ, people are demanded to be more pragmatic—relying too much upon the 
calculation of benefits or advantages than ideology or values. It becomes problematique whenever a 
person demands much more from another person, while he or she ignores the rights of others 
(imbalance).   
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 The state or government has to respect the rights of its citizens; on the other hand citizens 
have access to, and responsibility to participate in and to control delovelopment and the 
implementation of state policy. In a democratic society, according to AR, a decision has to be 
made through the process of voting60. Though the majority group has a determinant role in 
making a decision, the majority group is not allowed to abuse power by, for instance, 
alienating or neglecting the rights of minority group.   
Democratic society demonstrates open and egalitarian relationships among the 
members of society. To this point, M, according to ST and BSt, advocates openness and has 
loosely hierarchical relationships. Everyone can speak what he or she wishes about the board 
or the president of M. For instance, in M there is no tradition for members to do cium tangan 
(to kiss the hand) of those who socially have high position such as clerics for respecting the 
respected people, 61 criticism against leaders and clerics is very common,62  and giving room 
for those who advocate (contexltualists) and those who reject (literalists) contemporary 
issues such as democracy, pluralism and gender equqality.  
 
 
 
                                                 
60 According to ST, BSt, and HN, the founding father of M laid down the principals of democracy 
such as a voting system in making decisions (stated by law) for either public interest or organizational 
issues, in which this system has been practiced since the days of M establishment.   
61 This tradition is established within the NU members. 
62 The extreme example demonstrated the accusation of disbelief (kafer) to KH Ahmad Dahlan by 
those who were not in agreement with his ideas. 
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 5.2.2. Description of the characteristics of democratic society 
5.2.1.1. Individual freedom  
 In general, M members are of the opinion that Islam not only advocates individual 
freedoms, but also gives guidance. What limits individual freedoms?  According to GL and 
Mar, freedom does not mean liberalism, i.e., people being free to do what they wish. With 
respect to freedom of religion or faith, Mar says that Islam teaches Muslims the principles 
concerning how they have to respect the other religious groups. The Qur’an states “lakum 
dinukum waliyadin (To you is your religion, and to me is mine).” Every person has the right 
of religion (freedom of belief), however he or she does not have the right to force other 
people to convert (embrace) his or her religion. Mar says that Islam teaches us that every 
person has been granted freedom, but he or she doe not  have to abuse his or her freedom, 
i.e., violating the rights of others or devastating the life of a human being. For example, if a 
doctor has done the maximum for a patient and the doctor understands that his or her 
patient will never get well; according to Islam the doctor is not allowed to take a short cut 
(to cause the patient to die).   
 According to N and ST, an individual has freedoms but his or her freedoms have to 
be limited. N argues that an individual has to hold fundamental and instrumental principles 
of law. Fundamental law refers to religious values (Islamic tenets). Social relation has to be 
embedded in the religious tenets. Religion (Islam) teaches Muslims how to respect the equal 
right of a human being; since the noblest people in the eye of God are those who are pious 
 108
 (have equal rights/position).  The instrument of law means an accord or agreement that avails 
in a certain society, group, or country, such as political system of Indonesia, which may be 
differently applied from one group to another.  
 In M, individual freedom, as I observed, appears in the decision making for the 
interests of both the organization and the community at large through mushawarah 
(deliberation and dialogue) and voting mechanisms at various levels (stated earlier). With 
regard to the relationship between board and members, M gives room for members to speak 
their own ideas, aspiration or rights (e.g., everyone can speak what he or she wishes about 
the board or the president of the board or criticizing). As far as I know there is no privileged 
position for clerics.63  In addition, M gives room for liberal or reformist and literalist groups 
to coexist and facilitates both parties to communicate through various forums, which are 
available within M.   
5.2.1.2. Pluralism  
Plurality within various spheres of life is assumed to raise  a dilemma, i.e., (a) plurality 
can enrich cultural heritage and enable diverse groups to cooperate, but (b) can create a 
                                                 
63  M does not have shura council wherein its clerics hold privileged positions and tradition 
to do “cium tangan “: i.e., to kiss the hand of those who have a socially low position such as a 
member to those who socially have high position such as the board, and clerics for 
appreciation. ST took an extreme example (e.g., demonstrating the accusation of disbelief (kafer) to 
KH Ahmad Dahlan by those who were not in agreement with his ideas. did not release a fatwa 
considering the liberal group as kafer (disbelievers), and did not respond to the demands of 
the literalist group to pull out a book “The thematic interpretation of Qur’an (this will be 
discussed in pluralism). 
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 conflict among those believers. In response to such a condition, Abdullah says Islam has laid 
down such principles as taarafu (mutual understanding, cooperation), jaadilhum bilati hiya 
ahsan (dialogue) and laa ikraaha fid-diin (no compulsion to embrace a religion) as stated in 
verses of “Islamic inclusivism”. Islam teaches its believers to respect the other believers and 
its tenets imply mutual respect and cooperation as stated in the surah al-Hujurat 49: 13 
(Abdullah, 1997; Aslan, 2001). This ayah (verse), according to Barlas (2002), also entails the 
concept of anti-racism based on ethnicity and gender bias (Barlas, 2002). The primary 
mission of this ayah is to encourage Muslims to abolish discrimination (Aslan, 1998: 188-
190): 
Plurality is accepted as a natural phenomenon as stated in the Quran, surah al-Hujurat 
49: 13. One of the prime tasks of Islam is to eliminate discrimination based upon race or 
color by proposing a single Islamic brotherhood which aims to unite all the different 
people under one faith. According to the Qur’an, Islam is not a name only given to a 
system of faith or religion, but it is also the name of an act of surrendering to the will of 
God. Anything which bows to God’s will voluntarily or even involuntarily is qualified as 
Muslim.  
 
There are some examples of the verses of “Islamic inclusivism.” Al-Baqarah 2: 115 
explains the concept of God, which connotes God for all human being.  Aslan (1998: 187) 
says that a Muslim has to be able to accommodate the tradition or belief of believers of other 
religions: 
Islam explicitly endorses the universality of God’s revelation, which plays a significant 
part in the Islamic understanding of other religions. The God of the Qur’an is not only 
the God of the Muslim people but the God of all humankind (see al-Baqarh 2: 115). 
….Therefore in Islam the notion of universality of God’s revelations has always played a 
key role in constituting an Islamic theology of religions. As a result of adopting this 
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 belief, Muslims are able to participate in the essence and the ‘religious proximity’ of other 
traditions.  
 
It is hard for Muslims and other religious groups to accept Hick’s idea about pluralism for 
two reasons: a) anybody embraces a religion because he or she sees that his or her religion 
has advantages or truth over other religions (personal pride and dogma), and b) every 
religion has exclusivist tenets. Similar to other religions,64 Islam constitutes a “religious 
exclusivisme or truth claim” stated in the Qur’an surah Ali Imran 3: 19 and 85.  However, 
Aslan (1998: 192) argues that these verses are indefinite and open to interpretation. The 
verses can be interpreted from the concept of Islam, i.e., Islam means istislam, which means 
submission to the Will of Allah or surrender, obedience (taa’at), and iman (religious belief in 
general). The verses of “Islamic exclusivism” contain more room to be inclusive. At the same 
time, Islam advocates respect for the believers of other religions such as Judaism and 
Christianity (people of the book). Sachedina (2001) argues that Qur’anic pluralism was 
founded on the ethical principles of doing good work (khair, ma’ruf). Its conception of 
universal moral order was grounded in the recognition of a nature common to all humans. 
                                                 
i
64 The Roman Catholic teachings, for instance, on this issue can be summed up in the doctrinal 
statements, extra ecclessiam nulla salus, outside the church there is no salvation (Aslan, 1998: 104; 
Hick, 1985: 51). Judaism advocates the doctrine of “the chosen  people (fadlaltukum ala al-a’alami n) ” 
and Islam contains in itself  a tenet saying “inna ad-diina ‘inda Allah al-Islam (Truly in the eyes of 
God, religion is submission to His law and sincere obedience to His commands (Islam) (Qur’an surah 
Ali Imran 3: 19)  and   “Whoever searches for a religion other than the religion of complete 
submission and contentment (Islam), with a prophet who he can elevate above other  prophets, and a 
Book which he can deem to be more exalted than other  books, considering himself free to accept or 
reject this new decree and this new prophet—this religion will not be accepted, and on the Last Day 
his loss will become manifest (Qur’an surah Ali Imran 3: 85) (Toha, 2004: 16).” 
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 Islam viewed this common nature as endowed with ethical cognition and the capacity to 
reason morally in order to do good deeds (Schadena, 2001: 69). Therefore, the Islamic 
pluralism must be distinguished from the Hick’s65.   
Muhammadiyah and pluralism   
 
The founding fathers of M such as KH Ahmad Dahlan, demonstrated inclusiveness 
(and he was respected by various groups of society). According to ST, KH Dahlan promoted 
respect for various religious groups; he was known as a friend among the priests of 
Christianity and Catholicism. Jaenuri (2002) noted that KH Ahmad Dahlan did not feel 
uneasy about attending churches for dialogue while wearing haj clothes. KH Dahlan was 
involved in Budi   Utomo, a secular association. He allowed Darsono and Semaun, the leaders 
of ISDV (Indisch Sociaal Demoratische Partij) to speak about their points of view and ideas 
countering the attack to the policies on Dutch colonial authorities and to campaign their 
ideas about socialism in a forum held by Aisyiah. Two cases mentioned earlier demonstrate 
the inclusiveness of the M founding fathers in relation to other groups who had a different 
political ideology (political pluralism).  
What created “inclusivism” among the M proponents in the first period of the 20th 
century?  Jaenuri (2002:  112-127) noted some important points as follows: First, the 
proponents of M contended seriously that the scriptural text (the Qur’an and Sunnah) are the 
                                                 
65 Hick (1985: 92-93, 95) defines religious pluralism as the view that the transformation of human 
existence fom self-centredness to reality-centredness is taken place in different ways. It is thus 
defined as the theological view that there is ruth in very religion. 
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 absolute truth. What Muslims have understood, according to the M founding fathers, 
constitutes the interpretation of the absolute values, and that interpretation varies from one 
to another. Muslims have, according to them, to respect the diversity of interpretation. Those 
who claim that their or his (her) group’s ideas alone are the truest, while ignoring the 
perception of the other group, could be misled.  People may have a different perception 
relying upon space or environment, time, and an intellectual capacity toward understanding 
the tenets of Islam. The interpretation of an individual or group can only be valid within 
his/her own social setting and may not be valid for another setting (not absolute or principle 
of relativism).  Having an understanding about the principles of relativism, the proponents of 
M became inclusive. They contended very much that each individual could not reach a 
perfect understanding of the scriptural text, since an individual had limited knowledge. The 
principle of relativism makes people open to new ideas. Understanding the principle of 
relativism, the proponents of M became inclusive Muslim (Jaenuri, 2002: 117-126).  
How do M members perceive pluralism within the 21st century?  M members do not 
have a problem with political pluralism, since many M activists are involved in diverse 
political parties. Similarly, they do not have a problem with cultural pluralism, since M has a 
range of network spreading over all Indonesian provinces. However, when M members come 
into contact with religious pluralism, they do not automatically approve or demonstrate 
“inclusiveness.”   
With respect to the ideas of pluralism, according to ZQ, there are diverse 
perspectives. Pluralism refers to a model of society wherein the Prophet led all tribes with 
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 different religious backgrounds such as Jews and Christians who were brought together by 
the Medina charter. The Medina charter66 served as a guide to establish a pluralistic society 
where umma, constituting Muslim and non-Muslim groups, upholds the freedom and dignity 
of each group (AH).  
According to As, pluralism connotes the enforcement of the wishes of the majority 
group over the minority group in the name of democracy.  This idea is not well accepted 
among the M boards of old generation and literalists. Taking the course of “ke-
Muhammadiyahan and al-Islam” as an example, the key actor wants to demonstrate how 
pluralism is practiced in the M schools or colleges/universities. He found three categories 
(groups). The first group (pluralist) appreciates or respects the rights of minority groups 
(Christian, Hindus, Buddhists and the like), and allows these groups to organize their own 
religious education to students who are member of these groups. The second group 
(instrumentalist) argues that “ke-Muhammadiyahan and al-Islam” is obligatory, and thus, 
every student, regardless of their religious backgrounds, must take this course of studies and 
pass the exam. The third group (ideologists), according to (As), use the 1970 and 1980 
perspective, i.e., advocating the idea against the missionary movement (Christianization)67.  
For As, Alwi’s finding could be true at one side and might be not true on the other side. Both 
parties, Muslims and Christians, have their nuances, and their understandings have been 
developed along with the societal dynamics and the access of information. There are some M 
                                                 
66 See Rippin & Knappert (1990: 80-81). 
67 This group has confirmed the findings of Alwi Shihab’s dissertation telling us that the primary 
motive of founding M was to counterattack the missionary movement. 
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 members who hold an ideological perspective in line with Alwi’s, but there are many M 
people who have gotten in touch with diverse believers and contemporary issues such as 
pluralism, gender equality, and civil society. There are Christians, including Catholics, who 
have established a close relationship with Muslims including members of M. Nowadays, 
there is more room to establish a dialogue among believers. Both parties are struggling to 
establish a close contact, though dialogue remains most precious (elitist).  
According to BC, pluralism is built in the creation of the universe. This universe is 
created by God and inhibited by human beings who have diverse backgrounds, i.e. ethnicity, 
ideology, and religion. The Qur’an states that human beings are created in diversity. So we, 
Muslims, have to start our understanding from this point of view in order that we can live in 
a pluralistic society. The problem is the majority of Indonesian Muslims have a one-sided 
understanding (superficial) with respect to Islam and they tend to understand Islam 
parochially.  
Islam appreciates pluralism, according to MA as stated in the Qur’an surah al-Hujurat 
49: 13,68 a human being is created in diversity and such diversity is not to alienate one group 
                                                 
68 Surah Al-Hujurat 49: 13 “O Mankind! We have created you all from one man and one woman, and 
We have made you, throughout the centuries, into families and tribes so that you might come to 
know your place and position in the human race. Your heritage—that which you inherit from your 
forbears—may prompt you to enquire into the history of different cultures, the sciences of genetics, 
and the study of  racial characteristics, the handing down of knowledge and the growth of various 
civilization- but it should not lead to pride and bigotry. Nothing is a source of pride and honor unless 
God has deemed it so. The most honored among you in the sight of God is he who is the most God-
fearing; God knows who fears Him, and to what degree, for He has absolute knowledge of all things” 
[Behbudi, 1997]. 
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 to another.  Ridiculing or looking down is not allowed as stated in the same surah verse 1269 . 
Pluralism is a fact that every person has to respect as stated in the surah al-Hujurat 49: 13 
“lita’arafu (to build mutual understanding one to another).” Islam teaches its believers to 
respect the right of the life of the individual.70 His understanding about the concept of 
religious tolerance (tasamuh) is derived from this verse.   
 With respect to pluralism (religious pluralism), according to ZQ, M members are 
divided into two groups. The first group perceives religious pluralism as a reality, and M 
members have to respect plurality. M members have to acknowledge that other religions 
(besides Islam) contain truth aside from Islam. The second group conceives of the idea of 
religious pluralism as syncreticism or heterodoxy (mixing various faiths, i.e., Islam and non 
Islam). From the second group’s perspective, those who acknowledge that other religions 
have truth have deviated from the Islamic faiths (aqidah I lam) and those who hold the ideas s
                                                 
69 Surah Al-Hujurat 49: 12 “O you who believe! Do not let men of one tribe (or community) mock or 
ridicule the men of another; it may be that the belief of the later is stronger than of the former. And 
do not let the women of one tribe mock or ridicule the women of another; it may be that belief of the 
latter stronger than that of the former. Do not malign others or call them by offensive and 
humiliating names. Once a person has come to believe, he ought to realize that to speak ill of 
others—be it through defamation or the use of offensive nick-name—is a sin; those who persist in 
this sin, which is a legacy from the age of ignorance, will be counted among the oppressors, those 
black of heart and deed” (Behbudi, 1997). 
70 Stated in the surah al-Maidah 5:33 “It was on account of this that We ordained for the children of 
Israel that if anyone killed a believer—unless it be retaliation for murder, or arson and plunder, or for 
spreading corruption through the land – it would be as though he had killed all of mankind; and if 
anyone saved the life of a believer, it would be as though he had saved the life of all the lives of all 
mankind. Our prophets came to the Children of Israel with clear proofs, and continued to transgress 
and shed blood to excess throughout the land “(Behbudi, 1997). 
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 of religious pluralism are considered unbelievers (kafer). The second group, according to ZQ, 
has few people but they are vocal (keep on advocating anti pluralism).  
In M, the ideas of (religious) pluralism remains new and less developed. According to 
As and ZQ, pluralism was introduced by M members or board who have obtained education 
from Westerns countries such as America, Canada and Europe. Pluralism was firstly 
introduced to the M younger generation by Muslim Abd. Rahman. The proponents of 
pluralism are Syafii Maarif, Munir Mulkhan, and Munir Ilyas. The advocates of pluralism 
have multipronged methodologies toward understanding Islam (from various dimensions).  
They have different areas of works.  Amin Abdullah and Munir Mulkhan put emphasis on 
promoting the academic discourse about pluralism.  Munir Ilyas specializes in promoting the 
theology of pluralism. The M younger generations who have organized themselves within 
JIMM (Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah), have a concern similar to Amin and 
Mulkhan in developing intellectual discourses.  
Reaction to M’s people who advocate pluralism 
 
  According to ZQ, the ideas of pluralism remain debatable within the M association. 
Institutionally, M has not advocated the ideas of pluralism, and those who advocate pluralism 
are personal. HN argues that M is getting immersed in academic discourse about pluralism so 
that M can decide which aspects of religion (Islam)—faith and ritual (aqidah and ubudiyah) 
and social interaction (hablum minanaas) that M members may advocate the ideas of 
pluralism. M published a book entitled “Thematic Interpretation of al-Qur’an” because M 
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 does not have a detailed Qur’anic commentary about the relationship between religion and 
pluralism within Islam. The “Thematic Interpretation of al-Qur’an” contains,  a) the 
principles of relationships among religious believers including the issues of 
acknowledgement  of plurality, competition for good deed, coexistence, and peace among 
religious believers, justice,  and equality, b) sustaining good or harmonious relationships 
among religious believers and mutual cooperation among them, c) definition or description 
of  people of the Book (ahli kitab), and d) intermarriages among religious believers from the 
al-Qur’anic perspective (Majlis Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam, 2000).  
Some M reformist or moderate members have expanded the idea of ahlu kitab, which 
constitutes Confucianism. This ide, according to MM, is discovered from semi-scientific 
writing from the classical book of Islam. MM adds that M introduced the idea of dakwah 
kultural71 (proselytizaton based on cultural approach), which is based on the spirits of 
respecting multiculturalism and responding to societal dynamics. Becoming a Muslim, 
according to MM, a person cannot be separated from his sor her socio-cultural setting as well 
as societal dynamics to which M has to pay much more attention. M, therefore, has to 
rransform its orthodox understanding about heterodoxy into a more progressive notion: i.e. 
acts devastate human life such as corruption, collusion, nepotism, injustice and the like. M 
member would be better involded in these issues than in the long lasting debate about 
                                                 
li
71 Cultural approach in proselityzation (dakwah cultural) is based on the concept as stated in the 
Qur’an surah Ibrahim 14:4 “bi saani qaumihi,” which means an effort to deliver, translate, and to 
interprete Islamic tenets by recognizing and appreciating psychological, social, economic, 
demographic dimensions of the target groups (PP. Muhammadiyah, 2003: 58).  
 118
 furuiyah (already discussed). To me, their involvement in the furuiyah debate wil draw M 
into stagnancy (contrary to the spiritf of tajdid) and being trapped in peripheral issues of the 
Muslim umma.  At the same time M had better appreciate local culture such as salawatan, 
selamaten and the like rather than being intollerant, and see its positive side in a wise and 
critical way in terms of  the promotion of societal cohesiveness (Muslim brotherhood), the 
Islamic understandings to the community at large and M’s proselytization approaches.   
 I believe there are still many M members questioning whether Christians and Jews 
are ahlu kitab (people of the books). For example, Mar and Maz argue that both Christians 
and Jews deviated from the concept of tawheed (the unity of God) and were no longer ahlu 
al-kitab. Maz is one of M members who strongly rejected the expanded concept of ahlu 
kitab, insisting that “revealed religion” (samawi) such as Islam be different from “worldly 
religions” like Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. The “revealed religion” is the truth 
from God while worldly religions are created from tradition and developed by human beings.  
Mar, Maz and other M members who have similar opinition to them cannot be separated 
from the Qur’anic interpration of several Clerics of the medieval age. Based on this idea, Mar, 
Maz and other M literalists have the opinion that a male Muslim is allowed to marry a female 
of ahlu al-kitaab. I am holding an opinion similar to those who argue that the Qur’an refers 
to ahlu kitab the Christians and Jews; though at the same time the Qur’an acknowledged that 
the majority of both groups deviated72 from concept of tawheed.  I also observed that many 
                                                 
72My opinion is based on the history of declaration of the doctrine of the Trinity.  Rahim (1991:40) 
explain s that in 325 A.D., the famous Council of Nicea was held. The doctrine of the Trinity was 
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 more M members (the majority) rejected the expanded concept of ahlu al-kitab, which was 
advocated by the moderate or reformist group. With respect to intermarriage, I would rather 
hold the opinion of Taba’tabai73 that a male Muslim is allowed to marry a Christian or Jew 
female. 
According to ST, in general M umma recognize plurality, but some of them do not 
want to make a reinterpretation to religious tenets. To me, ST’s statement is subject to debate 
since other key informants such as As argues that M still has many members who reject the 
ideas of pluralism though he does not have statistical data. As’ opinion is based on his 
impression during field research and establishing dialogue between pro and con groups. ZQ 
confirms the opinion of As, saying that M has many members demanding those M board who 
institutionally advocates pluralism to be retired from the position of board member. They 
also consider the publication of the thematic commentary of the Qur’an illegal and this book 
has to be pulled off the market, but the central board of M did not do so. The literalist group 
released special issues through the journal of Majlis Tabligh and Dakwah Khusus or Council 
                                                                                                                                                             
declared to be the official doctrine of the Pauline Church, and one of the consequences of this 
decision was that out of the three hundred or so Gospels extant at the time, four were chosen as the 
official Gospels of the Church. The remaining Gospels, including the Gospel of Barnabas, were 
ordered to be destroyed completely. This was the first well-organized attempt to remove all the 
records of Jesus’ original teaching…. 
73 Taba’tabai (1982: 299) argues that the Qur’an Maidah 5:6 allows a male Muslim to marry a female of 
ahlu al-kitaab (people of the book). The Qur’an  60:10 which is used by another Muslim group to 
proghibit marriage with a female of people of the book speaks about a man who accepts Islam and his 
wife remains a disbeliever, then he is  forbidden to hold intact the marriage-tie with that women, 
while Maaidah 5: 6 speaks about performing a new marriage with a woman from the people of the 
book. The Quran Baqarah 2: 221 and 60: 10 cannot abrogate the verse 5:6. 
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 for Proselytization and Special Islamic Calls (MTDK)74  in order to counter attack against 
those who advocate pluralism. This literalist group considers those who advocate pluralism, 
inclusivism and liberal Islam disbliever (kafer), though this group did not release fatwa.  
To me, those articles could be interpreted as ‘psycho war’ between those who are for 
and against pluralism. To lessen the tension between two groups within M younger 
generations, As, as the chair of Center for Muhammadiyah Studies, facilitated a dialogue 
through a serial program entitled “Dialectics among M Younger Generations.” This theme is 
broken down into several issues: i.e., theology of pluralism pertaining to the truth claims of 
Religions, Muhammadiyah’s Perspective, Majlis Tarjih’s Methodology in adopting Critical 
Perspectives of al-Jadiri (Arabian literature critic) and irfani (sufistic) methodology. Majlis 
Tarjih developed three methodologies in relation to promoting the Islamic thoughts: i.e., 
Manhaj bayani (literalist; textual analysis or perspective), manhaj bayani ra’yi (rational or 
philosophical perspective and contextual analysis: historical, socio-anthropological and 
political ideology), social analysis, and irfani or spiritual or sufistic approaches (two 
approaches are developed by the M younger generation). For M’s younger generation, irfani 
approach (sufistic or esoteric) might function to abridge pluralism (also see Riyadi, 2003). 
However, the old generation of M rejected that idea and considers it to be a form of 
                                                 
74 I was impressed that the council membership is dominated by the literalist groups. For instance, 
Kamal (2004) says that the ideas of religious pluralism were advocated by Christianity and have been 
disseminated into Muslim society.Those (Muslims) who advocate the ideas of religious pluralism have 
been in doubt of Islam as the absolute truth of God. Toha (2004) argues that claim of “universal truth” 
(other religions are equally valid ways to the same truth) is problematic and might have thwarted the 
religious and spiritual life of human being.  
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 heterodoxy (bid’ah).  In order to make students of MUY appreciate pluralism, AH asked her 
students to discuss the issue concerning “how non-Muslims (Christian and Chinese groups) 
feel about the treatment of the majority group (Muslims)”. Also she asked her students to 
observe the non-Muslims with respect to Muslim treatment over them.    
 It is assumed that the decree of M Tanwir has stimulated M members, especially M’s 
younger generation, to develop the ideas of pluralism. Those members or board were 
involved in forums for interfaith dialogue advocating pluralism and attempting an action 
program.  Pak Syafii Maarif, according to As, has been involved in initiating a dialogue 
among believers. Also, he, together with KH Muzaddi (the NU President), initiated a 
coalition among believers to educate members for the anti-corruption movement.  
 M, together with NU, was involved in discussing the bill of Harmony among believers 
RUU KUB (Kerukunan Umat Beragama), and this forum was conducted by a joint committee 
of M and NU. This bill is to regulate harmonoious cooperation and coexistence among 
religious believers in Indonesia. All key informants say that M involvement in this matter 
demonstrates its willingness to manifest the Tanwir mandate (e.g. to establish intensive 
interaction with Non-M groups including non-Muslims). 
 Why are they reluctant to the idea of pluralism? 
Abdullah (1997) states that the historical context of mufasir (Qur’an’ic exoteric 
commentators) while interpreting the scriptural text is assumed to make a contribution to 
the rejection of pluralism. The capability of many Muslims in understanding the religious 
tenets can be supportive for such a stance. Economic and political interests are often used to 
 122
 reject any contemporary ideas such as pluralism. Muslim clerics are worried about   the 
implication of ideas of relativism with respect to religious interpretation—eroding the 
standard norms of faith (aqidah). They assume that relativism is identical with nihilism of 
moral values. By acknowledging that idea of pluralism people will have opinion that all 
religions have equals values; people will have fallen into the ideas of nihilism.  Abdullah 
further argues that relativism is a methodology used to understand and interpret and give the 
text meaningful in relation to social dynamics.  
  ST says that in general M members have moderate perspectives pertaining to 
pluralism. This statement, to me, remains unclear; whether the majority does not have ideas 
or hold a position in between, since it is also stated by another  key informant, such as As, 
saying that many M members reject the idea of (religious) pluralism.  For instance, AH 
argues that the fiqh perspective (black and white way of looking) has dominated the way of 
thinking of her students and many M members. So when, she introduced pluralism they said 
it was American, and she was considered a person who was American minded.75 She 
encouraged her students to see the religious issues from the dimension of humanity in order 
to avoid being trapped in the conservatism. She said that human beings do not have the 
authority to make religious judgments over other people; only God has absolute authority to 
                                                 
75 According to AH, the M literalists including its young generation have a similar opinion to her 
students (against the Islamic values). 
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 make such a judgment.76 By humanity, she means how the religious tenets function in giving 
theological basis for enjoining good deeds and refraining wrongdoing such as corruption, 
injustice and the like for the benefits of all human beings.  
BC confirms the idea of AH saying that the majority of Indonesian Muslims have the 
narrow understanding of Islam (fiqh perspective).  For instance, many Indonesian Muslim 
students find it difficult to study abroad in Europe or America because of minor factors such 
as no calls for prayer and no general community participation in Ramadan.   In fact, while 
the Qur’an commands its believers to roam over the world in order to understand the 
universe. Indonesian Muslims tend to see religion in a parochial way.   Another factor is that 
Indonesian Muslims are more accustomed to living in a homogenous community. Therefore, 
it is understandable that they find it difficult to understand or accept pluralism.  
 N states that he does not agree with the idea of the liberal group that Islam, 
Christianity, and Judaism are similar, because each religion has different backgrounds and 
tenets. He contends very strongly that differences among those religions exist. However, he 
said that Muslims could establish agreements on social relations on the basis of those 
differences. In establishing cooperation among members of different religions, we (M 
members) encounter the concern that establishing social relationships with other religions 
(believers) will lessen one’s spirituality. He also disagrees with the Islamist group which 
advocates the idea that pluralism conceals a mission of the missionary movement 
                                                 
76 I often found a person or group who consider him(her) self or his/her group as a representation of 
God wanted humans to be like the ideal type, his (her) task then goes beyond the normal self-
understanding. 
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 (Christianization).  However, he wants to make a balance in understanding the issue of 
pluralism (willingness to reconcile between two conflicting groups).  For him, a formalist 
(“Islamist”) group considers the methodological aspects that are claimed by liberalists as 
substantive aspects of religion (aqidah). Therefore, the formalist group argues that liberalists 
have deviated from aqidah (kafer). The Islamic formalists consider the pluralist’s perspective 
with respect to pluralism as something coming across the area of aqidah (faith), while 
pluralists see the ideas of religious pluralism from phenomological, anthropological and 
sociological dimensions. The two perspectives, according to ZQ, contradict each other.  
 
5.2.1.3. Tolerance 
Religious tolerance can be seen from three dimensions: legality, social and 
intellectual.  a) Legal tolerance involves the de jure protection of the freedom of assembly, 
speech, religion, and any other (tolerance through law). b) Religious tolerance in the context 
of the social arena means treating with dignity and respect people with whom we differ 
religiously. c) Religious tolerance is the intellectual. This sphere deals not only with people’s 
actions but also with their religious belief. Genuine tolerance does not dispute the truth 
claims of others. The real tolerance of other religions involves the absence of any expression 
of dubiety or disagreement regarding religious assertations and belief (Stetson, 1994: 77).   
Tolerance does not mean merely the uncritical and unreflective embrace of any and every 
 125
 idea or supposition.  Respect for difference (plurality) or tolerance does not mean human 
beings have to tolerate any action that will devastate human life.  
Tolerance is not an absolute concept; it is not to be extended to every person, in every 
circumstance, regardless of the particular context. For example, an individual who, out 
of a strong desire to be tolerant and nonjudgmental, stands by and watches a heinous 
crime being committed—doing nothing to stop it when he or she has the ability to do 
so—could hardly be praised for being tolerant of the belief or actions of another (in this 
case, a criminal). Tolerance, rightly understood, essentially a conceptual device—
prescribing a certain mode of thought and action—that makes it possible for persons of 
diverse opinions to interact cognitively within a bond of civility. Being tolerant means 
that one accepts the presence of the belief and recognizes its holder’s right to it, while 
at the same time rejecting—not necessarily out of arrogance—the content of the belief. 
There is a clear distinction between accepting and acknowledging someone’s holding a 
certain belief, and accepting and embracing the substance of and warrant for that belief. 
If I were to beat them or imprison them personally because I disagree with their 
religious position, that would be intolerant and immoral (Stetson, 1994:  74-76). 
 
How do key actors conceive of tolerance77 especially religious tolerance? MA argues 
that Islam has laid down some principles similar to pluralism (stated earlier). Furthermore, 
any one has to respect different ideologies including religious affiliation without having 
attitude or effort to annihilate the existence of other religions.  Tolerance implies mutual 
                                                 
77 Ansari explores Islamic ethics with respect to the relation between Muslim and non-Muslim as 
follows: al-Qur’an permits the extension of social relation with non-Muslims in proportion to the 
affinity which they may have with the Qur’anic moral and spiritual values. Thus, it permits marriage 
with the women who follow some revealed religion (people of the book) stated on the surah al-
Maidah 5: 5. Qur’an prohibits Muslim to force the conversion of non-Muslims stated in the surah al-
Baqarah 2:256. Hurting the religious feelings through hurtful language even when it relates to pure 
and simple superstitions is prohibited. Absolute justice under all circumstances is enjoined as stated in 
surah al-Maidah 5:9. Fulfillment of pacts, contracts and treaties are enjoined stated in the surah al-
Maidah 5: 1. Forgiveness, in case of personal injuries from non-Muslim, is enjoined as stated in the 
surah Abraham 14: 14. Granting protection to non-Muslim, even from amongst enemies, if they so 
desire, is enjoined as stated in the surah at-Taubah 9: 6. Maintaining the attitude of readiness for 
making peace with the enemies of Islam in the interests of human welfare is enjoined stated in surah 
al-Anal 8: 61 and 62. Observing justice in all respects and in all dealings with the enemies of Islam is 
enjoined as bounden [obligatory] duty stated in al-Maidah 5:9 (Amstar, n.a.). 
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 understanding, which means that none is justified in enforcing other people to convert his or 
her religion, since Islam teaches its believers “no compulsion in religion”.   
For Mar, tolerance means opposition to hostilility and such unfriendly acts or 
attitudes (are not justified).  With respect to religious or theological issues, Muslims have to 
argue in a rational and wise way. Also, tolerance, according to Maz, means that Muslims 
have to respect the rights of Christians, whether Muslims like them or not, and that they are 
not allowed to cause his or her death.  
According to HN, M does not have a problem of social relation with other religious 
groups (believers) in the sphere of social relation. HN also confirms that there is competition 
between M and Christians in terms of maximizing its efforts to develop communities. M 
organizes its programs in various spheres of life such as education, proselytization, health 
care and the like in order to promote the quality life of Muslims. He also corroborates that 
there are some people (group) within M holding tightly the political ideology of the 1950th 
(advocating the creation of an Islamic state). Such a group competes negatively with other 
religious groups (advocating the issues of the missionary movement or Christianization 
movement) in Indonesia. M board does not have the right to limit the freedom of mind or 
expression of any body. 
Among the M younger generation and the foreign educated elites advocate a liberal 
idea about religious tolerance (e.g., getting immersed into the concept or tradition of other 
religions or learning other religions). That liberal idea was rejected by the majority of M 
members. Mar, Maz and N explains a special area wherein Muslims are not allowed to get in 
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 or have to limit themselves, i.e. aqidah (faith).  Aqidah (faith), according to N, is very 
intrinsic in which Muslims are prohibited to tolerate the belief of others at the expense of 
aqidah. Individual preferences over the political and economic spheres, for instance, make up 
extrinsic elements of life. In those spheres, Muslims are allowed to be more tolerant. Those 
key informants agree that Muslims can establish cooperation with non-Muslim as the 
manifestation of tolerance. However, regarding social relation such as saying “Merry 
Christmas” and “going to church for social relation or dialogue,” N reverses HN, Maz and 
Mar. N believes that saying “Merry Christmas” and “going to a church for social relation” 
have a connection with the extrinsic elements of religion. But these activities do not have a 
relationship with aqidah (faith) and do not imperil iman (faith). However, these issues 
remain very sensitive for Muslim society in Indonesia, at least for the time being. Probably 
the majority of Muslims will natter (chat) about those who are saying ‘Merry Christmas’. In 
contrast, HN, Mar and Maz argues that such activities may peril aqidah (faith).  
Overall, M gives room for “Islamist” or literalist and liberalist or moderate groups 
who were considered by the former group kafer. M board, according to ZQ, let two groups 
have their own religious understandings (interpretation).  M has councils for fatwa (Majli  
Tarjih), education (Majlis Pendidikan), and policies (Majlis Hikmah) that enable both groups 
to communicate or talk about critical issues such as pluralism. ZQ feels very sure that those 
who reject critical ideas, including democracy, pluralism, human rights, and gender equality 
will better understand (a matter of time).   
s
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 5.2.1.4. Gender equality 
  Like pluralism, gender equality remains very sensitive for M members. It is peculiar 
for them, probably for several reasons. There are some issues stated in the scriptural texts 
(the Qur’an and Sunnah) pertaining to gender that were misinterpreted. Barlas (2002: 7) 
argues that the Qur’anic interpretation of clerics of the medieval ages tended to male biased 
interests.  
Muslims read patriarchy and sexual inequality into the Qur’an on the basis of specific 
verses (Ayaat, s. ayah) and of the Qur’an’s different treatment of women and men with 
regard to such issues as marriage, divorce and inheritance. From these, they infer that 
men and women are not only biologically different but also unequal. On the readings of 
conservatives, male superiority is both ontological, since women are said to have been 
created from or after man and for his pleasure. God also is said to have given men a 
‘degree” above women and to have appointed them guardian over women.  
 
Many Muslims consider gender equality as the Western idea and those who advocate gender 
equality do not use local or “religious” terms in campaigning about gender issues. It could be 
that in M there is a rejectionist group (salafi literalist) (see Chapter 7) who resists any idea 
coming from the West. They reject gender equality for either socio-political motives or 
economic interests.  Possibly, there are many factors beyond the rejection of pluralism. To 
uncover the hidden motives I believe a special study is needed. This sub-section will explore 
the understandings and experiences of M in advocating or promoting the issue of gender 
equality.   
M, according to HN, ST, RN, and INA, does not have a problem with gender equality, 
since M has given more room for females to express their rights or aspiration in the public 
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 sphere.  Aisyiah, a female, autonomous organizational body of M, was founded in 1918 for 
the sake of this purpose. Since the days of its establishment, M adopted an educational 
system of the West, i.e. male and female students attending M schools together; and M 
schooling aims at giving more chances for females to have access to education. Do M 
members demonstrate moderation or inclusivism or open-mindedness in response to gender 
equality?    
M’s members react to the issues of gender equality 
 
AH, a faculty member of   UMY, explains that she teaches the concept of gender, how 
the gender concept is manifested in a society, what gender discrimination surfaces in daily 
life, and the implication of injustice pertaining to female and male relationships as well. She 
is attempting to establish connections between these ideas and those found in the scriptural 
text (the Qur’an and Sunnah) in teaching gender equality. She explains the Qur’anic verses 
with respect to gender equality from various dimensions, such as asbabun nuzul (the 
occasion of revelation) and  asbabul wurud for hadith or as-sunnah (occasion of hadith 
narration). GL says that looking at this verse of the Qur’an in depth “hunna libaasul lakum 
wa antum libasul lakum (… they are your garment, and you are their…),78 Muslims will find 
out the concept of equal relationships between male and female (equal degree), though both 
female and male have different functions. Equality, according to him, does not mean both 
sides have the same position in all aspects of humanity.  For him, there are some aspects 
                                                 
78 Stated in the Qur’an surah al-Baqarah 2: 188. 
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 (spheres) valid only for males or females for certain circumstances (nature).  For instance, a 
football game is only probable for males. However, in terms of seeking knowledge and 
earning money (economy), both males and females have equal rights.  In a public sphere like 
parliament, gender equality, according to HPPA, is demonstrated by female representation, 
which until today is not significant. 
According to MA, the Qur’an teaches its believers to appreciate one another (male to 
female and vice versa). In the sight of God, the noble people are those who are pious (have 
God consciousness). The Qur’an states both female and male the terms “shaaimuum, 
shooimaat, qaanitiin dan qaanitaat” or another verse saying   “man amila shalihan 
mindzkarain aw a untsa’ (whosoever either male or female) to refer to the rights of equality 
of both sides in the eye of God.   
Nur sees that both domestic and public domains have to become the concern of both 
males and females.  In reality there is no strict gendered division of labor between men and 
women.   In rural areas, males take charge of domestic works while his wife is involved in 
societal activities such as pengajian (religious forum). Aisyiah encourages its members 
(jamaah) to be involved in societal activites. Therefore, domestic works should not prevent 
females from getting involved in societal activities. However, Nur contends that there are 
still many people who diverge (dichotomize) domestic and public domains and put the 
domestic work on the shoulders of females.   
ZQ argues that gender equality does not mean to treat alike both sides, male and 
female. He point outs the role or function, which M members have to consider in looking at 
 131
 gender equality. There are some kinds of work that are functionally more suitable for male to 
handle, and there are some kinds of work that are functionally more suitable for females to 
handle. However, ZQ is questioning whether or not the idea of males being superior to 
females is justified. Is it true that a male is more intelligent or stronger than a female?  A 
female in a rural area, ZQ adds, leaves her home early in the morning or at 6 a.m to the rice 
field; she goes back home holding the pilling up of grass at 6 p.m.  A male leaves home to the 
rice field; he goes back home holding the pilling up of wood.  This case demonstrates that 
both female and male are physically strong.  Delivering and suckling a baby are of female’s 
responsibility. However, who deserves the care of children?    
According to ZQ, Muslims, possibly the majority, say that a female has to take care of 
children, so she is not permitted to work. Some people say that for a female leaving home to 
work will result in calumny.  These are problems that will be encountered by people who 
advocate gender equality. Moreover, Muslims tend to be prejudiced with respect to gender 
issues saying “gender equality is coming from the west and those who advocate this issue 
want to live free from any norms.” These issues make us uneasy to about advocating gender. 
Debatable issues with respect to the Sacred text (al-Qur’an and as-Sunnah)  
 There are several issues that attract people to be involved in the long lasting debate. 
The debatable issues are: 
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 Men have a “degree” over women 
The concepts of qawwamuna and fadhala stated in the al-Qur’an surah An-Nisaa 
4:3479 involve Muslim scholars in the long lasting debate. AH and HPPA perceive that the 
interpretation of   ar-rijaalu qawwamu a’laa an- nisaa has been a biased male interpretation 
within Muslims of Indonesia. They conceive that the male is the breadwinner; therefore the 
male has a degree (physically, economically and intellectually) over the female. AH clarifies 
this verse for her students from the various dimensions such as linguistics and asbabun nuzul 
(the occasion of revelation). By so doing, students will understand that their previous 
understanding was a male biased interpretation. Qawam does not mean that the male has a 
degree over or superiority to  the female, but refers to justice (‘adalah).  This interpretation is 
not coming from liberal Islam, but from the concept of justice in Islam. Justice represents 
harmony between two sides, female and male, in which both sides are not to be alienated.   
Contrary to AH, Maz insists that God has bestowed a male a degree in terms of 
physical and intellectual capabilities, as stated in the Qur’an “fadhdhala ba’dhahum ‘alaa 
ba’dhin”. The male uses his rationality or intellect in handling a problem, while the female 
employs emotion.  Taking an example, as stated by Maz, a child is falling down. Usually, the 
female would rather cry than helping the kid, whereas the male will help the kid quickly. It 
                                                 
79 Qur’an surah An-Nisa 4: 34 “Men have a degree over (qawwaamuuna ‘ala) women, (on the basis) of 
what Allah has (preferred) (fadh-dhalla) some of them over others, and (on the basis) of what they 
spend of their property (for support of women). So good women are (qaanitaat), guarding in secret 
that which Allah has guarded. As for those from whom you fear (nushuz) admonish them, banish 
them to beds apart, and scrouge them. Then, if they obey you, seek not a way against them. 
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 is possible that female students can attain the highest academic achievement but those are 
few. Female students have a degree over male students in the field of social studies.  
However, if the female students are faced with logical issues (thinking), they will be left 
behind by male students.  
To some extent,   Ilyas (2002: 69-70) has an opinion similar to the idea of Maz, but 
Ilyas has a different conceptualization of intellect.  A male has a degree over female 
intellectually in terms of facing a conflicting problem (involving ratio and emotion), but not 
in terms of intellectual potential. Faced with such a conflicting issue, a female will give more 
emotional precedence rather than rationality. In the normal condition, a female may have a 
degree over a male depending upon several factors such as educational attainment, 
experiences and the like. According to HPPA, ba’dhulun has to be linked with the verse of 
surah At-Taubah 9: 7180 referring to the idea of “mutual cooperation and protection”.  
Wadud-Muhsin (1999: 71) says fadh-dhalla cannot be unconditional because verse An-nisa 
4:34 does not read they (masculine plural) are preferred over them (femine plural). It reads 
‘ba’dl’ (some) of them over “ba’dl”. The use of ba’dl relates to what obviously has been 
observed in the human context. All men do not excel over women in all matters. Some men 
excel over some women in some manners. Likewise, some women excel over men in some 
matters. So, whatever Allah has preferred, it is still not absolute. 
                                                 
80 Surah At-Taubah 9: 71 states “And the believers, the men and the women, are friends one of the 
other; they bid to honor, and forbid dishonor; they perform the prayer, and pay the alms, and they 
obey God and His Messenger. Those—upon them God will have mercy; God is All-mighty, All-wise.” 
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 Heritage is a crucial issue 
When AH talks about the female share of heritage, she found out her students fit into 
main streams: a) those that hold tightly the male biased Qur’anic interpretation and b) those 
that have critical perspectives. The first group includes those who have not learned the 
sociology of religion. They say that the heritages system is fair since the male is the 
breadwinner. The second group states that the heritage system is unfair.  The situation has 
changed and in reality she often finds out that a wife earns an income higher than her 
husband’s. AH contends very much that women who earn a higher income than their 
husbands’ are few. Therefore, according to her, Muslims have to look at the nash (the 
scriptural text) from the context, not from the text (not in terms of sex differences). AH adds 
there are still many M members (the majority) who hold a similar idea to the first group of 
his students. 
Witness (testimony) 
 According to the cleric ideas in the medieval age (fiqh), two females are needed to 
appeal a case as the witness, while one male can serve as a witness to appeal a case. AH is 
questioning such a fiqh decree. Does it mean that a male is smarter than a female or a female 
is foolish and cannot be trusted to keep secrecy?   
Female leadership 
 According to ZQ, a female is allowed to take part in the public sphere. However, the 
female leadership is subject to debate among the Muslim clerics (ulama).  Some clerics 
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 perceive that women are prohibited (haram) from being a leader, such as the president81. In 
fact, according to Maz, a female is not allowed or prohibited from being the chair of the 
Islamic court or chair of judge. This key actor insists that women be prohibited from being a 
chair of judge since women give more emotional rather than rational consideration and 
might make controversial decisions.  
Factors causing gender bias  
 
In general, the proponent of gender equality says that several factors such as tradition, 
cleric interpretation, and political interest generate gender bias. HPPA argues that there are 
two factors that result in male biased perception. First, a patrichial tradition or culture has 
been strongly established within the Indonesian society.  While it cannot be argued that 
males are physically stronger than females, it is undeniable that females are biologically 
different from males; they have different special organs. For example, only females can 
become pregnant, deliver and suckle a baby. Second, the Qur’anic interpretation was the 
product of clerics of the medieval age that was male biased (occurred during the era of 
patriarchy). The clerics tend to interprete the text more literally than contextually. When 
                                                 
81 Ilyas (2002) argues that Surat An-nisa 4:34 is not appropriate to use the basis for prohibiting a 
female from being a president, since the context of this verse is household (family). Moreover surah 
An-Nisa 4: 71 implies a notion that both male and female have to establish a cooperation of being a 
leader and being led. That hadith does not prohibit a woman from being a leader. It has a connection 
with the condition of daughter of the Persian king who was expected to hold a kingdom, but had less 
capability (no leadership skills). During that time, a king has an authority over a variety of 
institutions such as executive, legislative, and judicial bodies. The text says laa yuflihu (not to be 
prosperous) and does not tell laa yahillu (prohibited).  
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 the Qur’an was revealed, the fate of women was worst. The Qur’an states that in the era of 
pagan ignorance, the Arabs killed their daughters.   
 The Qur’an promoted the status/position of women. However, people misinterpret 
qawwamun, which connotes the prohibiton of women from taking charge of leadership. The 
Qur’an states that a male and a female have equal positions, since “the most honored among 
you in the sight of Allah is he or she who is the most pious (righteous).”  HPPA confirms that 
the Qur’an entails the difference between males and females, but it does mean that males are 
superior to females. “Qawwamu ‘ala an- nisaa” refers to responsibility in the context of 
household.  The male has to be responsible for strengthening the household; therefore the 
male has to earn an income for eating, housing, and clothing. Both males and females have 
equal rights but both have different functions. But the majority of people argue that males are 
superior to females.  
 Qawwamu was perceived as “leader”.   Qawwammu, according to HPPA, derives 
from qaama and qawwama in line with the pattern of fa’ala dan fa’a’ala, which refers to 
“persons who take a responsibility to strengthen a household”.   Qawwaamu, which is 
defined as “a leader, is derived from the way of thinking of the era of patriarchy. “ This 
concept is applied in the public sphere; therefore, a male has more of a right (deserves) to be 
a leader in both the household and the public sphere than females.  Therefore, a female does 
not have any right to be a leader, like taking charge of the presidency.  Extremely stated, 
according to HPPA, a female has to obey the command of a male though she was harassed 
and treated unfairly.  
 137
 The Implementation of gender equality within M’s leadership  
 
MA says that M allows women to take charge of the M leadership at the various 
levels, i.e., center, provincial, district, branch, and sub-branch.  Males and females have the   
right to compete for leadership position. However, a female has not yet achieved the highest 
position, even though M has opened more room for females as guaranteed by bylaw. 
According to RH, conceptually, nothing prevents a female from being the M leader, however 
reality demonstrates that inequality still appears, as indicted by the figures (90 % of leaders 
are males hold leadership positions and 10 % of leaders are females). M boards in lower level 
(provincial, district, branch and sub-branch) still resist the idea or the decree of a National 
Meeting (Tanwir).  
A gender activist of NU, Mulia (2002: 129-131) comments that M has gone one step 
ahead of NU (1971) in determining a decision to involve women in the leadership of Majlis 
Tarjih (stated on the guideline of this council), however she was wondering about the actual 
implementation. Does this council articulate the aspiration of women and assign more 
women to be involved in the leadership of this council? She argues that M is not vocal 
enough to articulate the issues of gender. Some women activists of M (Aisyiah and Nasyiatul 
Aisyiah) complain the situation is very slow. They had better join the activities of Fatayat or 
Muslimat NU with respect to development of gender issues.  
ZQ confirms the opinion of Mulia, saying that M is late to respond to gender issues.  
Nowadays, M has made some progress in terms of gender, by allowing women to charge 
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 leadership position. YS adds that his brother-in-law, who was on a board of M at the central 
level, ordered his wife to stop working even though his family is economically vulnerable 
(got the hardest hit). He says that a woman has to stay home and care for children. 
According to HN and ST, the issue of gender has become a paradox (controversial) 
among the M members.   Empirically, M does not have a problem with this issue, since M 
initiated the women’s movement by establishing Aisyiah in 1918, which serves to give more 
room for women to articulate their potential and interests in the public sphere.  However, M 
has still many members who hold the previous political ideology (Islamic state) and a 
literalist perspective. Women, according to this group, have to care for domestic works (left 
behind or becoming the second class). Nowadays, according HN and ST, M has made a more 
progressive step—i.e., making decisions in  the Bandung  Tanwir in  2000 as stated on bylaw 
(ART=Anggaran Rumah Tangga), with respect  “Aisyiah as a special and autonomous body.” 
The Bali Tanwir produced a decree that women are allowed to take charge of leadership 
positions in M.  However, M has not yet intensified theological discourses about the 
leadership of women (a’immatul uza). Moreover, M does not make a problem out of the 
female presidency. According to these key actors, those who prohibit women from being 
president do not make a problem out of it in the sphere of social relation (muamalat). 
Therefore prohibition is not absolute (different from the prohibition of eating pork meat).  
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 5.2.1.5. Criticism and critical groups 
  A critical attitude is needed to create a democratic society. Any organization shall 
develop the potential of its members through a variety of activities or programs—such as 
training, education and the like—so that they become critical members.  Nowadays, the 
younger generations of NU and M have been getting immersed in critical perspectives in 
understanding religious spheres. How do M people conceive of critical attitude and criticism? 
How do M people respond to a critical group especially the young generation?   
Being critical, according to GL, does not mean that a person says something just for 
the sake of having something to say. A person has to have a certain basis (argument)—truth. 
M members have to be critical when M members have to care for any acts against the rules 
of law, but they have to hold facts (reasoning). Islam prohibits its followers from parroting. 
To criticize means giving alternative ways for solution. According to Maz, to criticize or 
explore the weaknesses of an individual is allowed as long as a person is well informed and 
does not make it public. Critiques are employed to see the weaknesses and advantages of 
persons for the sake of the public interests or as means of enjoining a good deed and 
prohibiting wrongdoing (amar ma’ruf dan nahyi munkar). Struggling to uncover weaknesses 
to make the public well informed (in negative way) is prohibited. AH says that Muslims have 
to be critical of the implementation of public policy. Muslims may use a variety of 
approaches and media, such as demonstration, protest, and the like; but they have to respect 
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 ethical issues (moral values). For instance, Muslims are not allowed to wreck public facilities 
or the property of other people while protesting.  
As far as I observe criticism against M board is very common.  For instance, pak 
Syaifi’i (the M president) was strongly criticized because he advocated the idea of religious 
pluralism. The M younger generation has developed critical perspective regarding the study 
of Islam and contemporary issues such as democracy, human rights, gender equality and 
tolerance by adopting social and philosophical theories and social movement. The literalist 
group was suspicious about the younger generation movement.  As stated in the Chapter 4, I 
stated that M was less critical of development issues during the New Order regime (discussed 
in the chapter 6), Rais was a M pioneer who advocated a crtical stance toward the New 
Order regime. Rais boosted the spirit of tajdid (renewal, awakening and reform) through 
promoting the ideas of social tawheed as the basis of the M new vision. At the same time the 
M younger generation adapted social and philosophical theories as well as social movements 
to promote intense studies of Islam in relation to contemporary issues (methodology). 
Who advocates critical perspectives in relation to religious studies?  
As says the M younger generation is engaged in developing their own potential and 
establishing intensive interaction with people who have different ideologies or perspectives. 
They have an educational background in the field of Islamic studies. They have great 
enthusiasm in developing M through promoting academic discourses with respect to Islam 
(religious thoughts), but they have much less attention from M.  They are developing 
intensive studies on religions by employing a variety of approaches and perspectives—
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 hermeneutics, social theories and social movements. They intensify critical studies about the 
Qur’an by employing such critical perspectives as Marx, Habermas, and Gramsci with their 
commitment to empower people, especially the powerless.  
ZQ argues that the M autonomous organizational bodies such as PM (M youth), IMM 
etc are unable to accommodate the younger generations who were born from the M tradition 
and have great potential, and so JIMM was founded.   On the other hand, there are many 
younger members of M who are on the board are inactive and have less intellectual 
capability.  The tendency is that M assigns a member of the younger generation who has 
been established. But M does not pay much more attention to the younger generation who is 
still struggling to develop their own potential, alaralung, (they seem to be out of reach). 
JIMM serves as a means to promote the intellectual potential of the younger generation who 
are out of reach of M.  
Unlike M, NU has many institutions such as LKIS, LKPSM-NU, P3, Syarikat the like 
to accommodate the potential and criticism of NU younger generations. NU has become a 
barometer of Islamic discourses.  Actually, M has many younger members who have a 
potential and critical capability similar to NU’s.  For instance, Muslim Abdurahaman is M, 
but he is more involved (in) with NU people, and so is Sobari. Darlis is M, but he feels more 
at home with the Catholic group. Those potential young generations of M are less 
accommodated by M.     
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 Critique against critical groups 
 
According to ZQ, critique and critical thinking by the younger generation are 
tolerated, but those who are most critical have to face high risks, especially those who 
advocate pluralism. JIMM, as a forum of a critical group, was criticized. They think that 
JIMM serve as a vehicle of the post power syndrome group who wishes to hold power in 
autonomous organizational bodies of M, but they were unable to do so. People who disagree 
with JIMM are often questioning this group by saying” Why are those people advocating 
pluralism while M has not admitted them? “Why did this group criticize the decree of M 
with respect to the designation of Amin Rais to be a president?  This group has to consult 
with M while speaking out on the issues in relation to M. If it does not, they have done 
illegal activities.   
  As explains that this group (JIMM)82 has developed critical perspectives intensively of 
Islamic studies (using critical perspectives to interprete or reinterpret the Qur’anic 
commentary). The critical ideas of this group were rejected by the old group who hold 
tightly the perspective   (ar-rujuu ilaa al-Qur’an waa as-Sunnah= calling for a return to the 
pristine ways of scripture and the recorded example of the Prophet Muhammad). The old 
group says that M members need not to question al-Qur’an and as-Sunnah. Developing a 
critical perspective with respect to religion (al-Qur’an and as-Sunnah) connotes doubt about 
                                                 
82 Though As was one of the initiator of JIMM, he has made a reflection pertaining to the activities of 
the M young generation. He is wondering whether their commitment is for the sake of sponsor 
interests. Perhaps they take benefits from the studies of hermeneutic, social theories, and the new 
social movement to do a critical interpretation of the Qur’anic texts, for the sake of sponsorship.   
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 the Qur’an and Sunnah. They have broken up the Qur’an. Though As was one of the initiator 
of JIMM, he has made a reflection pertaining to the activities of M’s younger generation. He 
is wondering whether their commitment is for the sake of sponsor interests. Perhaps, they 
take benefits from the studies of hermeneutic, social theories, and social movement to do a 
critical interpretation of the Qur’anic texts for the sake of sponsorship.  
  HN confirms that some M board and members reject critical perspectives. Perhaps 
NU has a group who has points of view similar to M’s. The conservative group of NU 
advocated fatwa about prohibiting Liberal Islam (JIL) (haram).   In contrast, other Islamic 
civil society associations such as M did not do it. According to HN, M lets both liberal and 
literalist groups develop according their own frames of mind, because no one has the right to 
devalue ways of thinking (world views) of each side.  M has facilitated a dialogue to abridge 
tension. However, each side sticks to its perspective firmly.  So let both groups become 
control groups for M and let them keep on debating. M gives more room for any group to 
develop critical perspectives or ideas. M has forums such as the National meeting, Tarjih, and 
the like that may give them room for dialogue.    
5.3. Citizenship 
5.3.1. How does Muhammadiyah conceive of citizenship 
Until now, M has not intensified an academic discourse about citizenship. MM argues 
that M vision about an ideal society (cita-cita sosial Muhammadiyah) is probably identical to 
the concept of citizenship. The concept of the ideal society advocated by M was first 
 144
 introduced in the 41st National Conference (Muktamar) held in Solo “To venerate and glorify 
the Islamic tenets in order to establish the excellent or ideal society (masyarakat utama= 
ummah fadlilah), in which members uphold justice and the equal distribution of prosperity 
as well as the struggle to reach God’s favor.”  Masyarakat utama contains two main 
components: i.e., institution and individuals. From the institutional dimension, masyarakat 
utama has to be a social and cultural system, which enables its member to create both 
material and spiritual prosperity. Masyarakat utama demonstrates legal order, safety, and 
peaceful condition; and respects the rights of members; and upholds justice and the equal 
distribution of wealth. Each person competes (fastabiqul khairah) to uphold iman (faith) and 
keep doing ibadah (ritual) good deeds (see also Hasyim, 2000:86-87).  Second, in the 44th 
National Conference (Muktamar) held in 2000 in Jakarta, M decided the concept of chairu 
ummah (the best society) as its vision as the development of a previous concept. So the vision 
of M, according to HN, MM, and As, is stated as follows: “M is an Islamic movement, which 
upholds the tenets of the Qur’an and Sunnah, commits to developing the spirits of 
reformation and to doing dakwah Islam (Islamic proselytizing) consistently, by enjoining 
good deed forbidding evil in various spheres of life to create rahmatan lil’aalamin (prosperity 
for all human beings) in order to create a true Islamic society (see also PP. Muhammadiyah, 
2000).” According to HN, the true Islamic society is khairu ummah (the best society) guided 
by the Islamic tenets (Ali-Imran 3: 110), being civilized or respecting  human rights (al-Isra 
17: 70); keeping close relationships with God and humanity (Ali-Imran 3: 112), and 
upholding equality and  prosperity for all human beings (see also Naser, 2001:130).  
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 Though M decided its vision above, M does not wish to create an Islamic state of 
Indonesia. M, according to HN, has to commit to NKRI (the Unified State of Indonesian 
Republic). M keeps tightly the NKRI frame in relation to the concept of nationalism for 
certain reasons: a) M wants  public properity (masalahah umma) to be the main  objective of  
the political struggle of any political parties; b) M has to be aware of  ‘a new or hidden 
agenda’ of the globalization proponents, which may be pushed to developing countries into 
the hegemony of neo-colonialism, so M has to construct the concept of state in order to 
defend the sovereignty of state, nation, and territories from the intervention of other 
countries (global injustice). So, M has seen this issue critically in order to construct and 
develop a state, nation, and civil society in response to the future. However, M has not 
elaborated this concept in detail.   
In the era of reforma i, M University of Yogjakarta has made changes toward the 
concept of civic education. During the New Order of Suharto, this course was subject for 
maintaining the status quo (abused).  The team of civic education has formulated the concept 
of “responsible citizenship/citizens”. According to AH, responsible citizens demonstrate their 
willingness to be involved in or take care for problems or issues that arise in this country.  
For instance, they use and understand their rights in electoral voting.   Responsible citizens 
have critical attitudes.
s
                                                
83 By means of critical attitude, according AH, HPPA and HR, citizens 
 
83 AH encourages her students to adopt the practice of democracy for selecting student body such as 
campaign. Students, according to her, have to be accustomed practicing democratic process and 
procedures, so that they will not grope. However, they have also to be taught ethical values in 
manifesting democracy (political process).  
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 have to control or criticize any deviation like injustice,  to be  conscious of their rights, to 
respect and tolerate differences, to be politically mature,  as well as to be against 
discrimination, parochialism, and chauvinism.    
 Citizenship, according to As, refers to people who are committed with agreement or 
regulation (contractual basis) to run societal life. The “Islamic formalists”   insist that Islamic 
shari’a should be institutionalized (formalized), i.e. Islamic state. In contrast, the “Islamic 
culturalists” argue that M members need not set up an Islamic state, but they have to 
encourage the holding power (government) to adopt  Islamic values in running its 
governance (to control power).  Through social contract, citizens (people) can make them 
aware that they have to be involved in defending the unity and development of society, and 
in controlling any deviation. In other words, a social contract makes members of society 
aware of taking part in the development of society as well as in controlling any deviation.  
Responsible citizens, according to N, make up individuals or communities who have 
rights and responsibilities in relation to the state.  People have equality of rights to get better 
education, economy, and self development, including defending the state in terms of a non-
physical perspective.  In a democratic society, as stated by According to INA and MM, 
responsible citizens have characteristics that mirror civilized society such as respect for the 
rules of law, rights of other and the like.84 M, according to MM, has to develop awareness of 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
84 INA argues that Indonesian people were depressed during the New Order Regime for 32 years, now 
they have relatively more room to express their rights; however, they often break up regulations and 
ethical norms (abusing the rights of others on behalf of democracy).  Therefore, Indonesian people 
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 law to its members (e.g., M members have to be more appreciative and to take initiatives or 
efforts to make communities aware of the law) as stated in the decrees of Muktamar of 
Ponorogo, and Palembang.  
5.3.2. Loyalty and commitment 
“Which of these, loyalty or commitment, has to be developed to citizens?” “How must 
it be done?” I believe that both commitment and loyalty has been embedded in the concept 
of citizenship. However, during the New Order of Suharto, the concept of loyalty was 
elaborated and imparted to the public for the sake of the status quo. The regime often abused 
“loyalty” to the state to suffocate those who were critical of Suharto, his policies, and the 
business of his family. The critics were threatened by “subversive law”. In other words, to be 
loyal to the state is to support the New Order regime. How does M conceive of commitment 
and loyalty to the state?   
Until now, M, according to MM, has not yet formulated the concept of commitment 
or loyalty to the state.  In his book, he states the M concept about social vision (cita-cita 
social), which is assumed to have a connection with the concept of citizenship but needs to 
be elaborated.  MM argues that the state is the product of a capitalist democracy, which 
might be appropriate for Indonesia.  M is committed with imparting social principles, which 
are supposedly related to the issue of state. INA argues that loyalty or commitment should 
                                                                                                                                                             
have to make an effort to strengthen or make people aware of their rights and responsibilities (equal 
position between citizens and state). 
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 correspond to the mission of state (not regime or government). Loyalty has to be translated 
into the equal relationships between state and citizens.  
Maz classifies loyalty in relation to social relation (dunyawiyah) and to God. With 
respect to social relation, loyalty might be manifested in various societal elements such as 
political party, organization and like. Pertaining to aqidah (faith), M members have to be 
committed with God (hold firmly the religious tenets).  According to Maz, they have to be 
loyal to a leader as long as the leader is still keeping firmly the tenets of God.  When the 
leader deviates from the tenets of God, Muslims have to be critical, i.e. Muslims have to 
struggle for a change85.  
RH explains that to be loyal refers to establishing mutual relationships between the 
state and citizens. Citizens become aware of rights and responsibilities. The individual rights 
are not absolute because a person has to respect the rights of other people.   Respecting the 
rights of other people is a responsibility of a Muslim. In other words, Muslims are not 
allowed to humiliate the rights of other in demanding or defending our rights. “Being loyal 
to state”, according to BC, requires being criticical of or taking control over the state 
especially when the state or government deviates from the rule of law. A responsible citizen 
has to keep the state secrecy. 
Say defines responsible citizens as citizens who have responsibility or care of social 
and physical environment. Keeping one’s surrounding area clean is an example of people care 
                                                 
85 How do we have to make a change? Mar suggests several steps: a) establishing a dialogue or debate; 
b) making a protes through, for example, petitions, demonstrations, and other activities that are 
legitimate; and c) contending by heart, which is the weakest way. 
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 of their physical environment. To make a social environmentally tidy, for example, members 
of society strive efforts to follow rules of laws and to refrain any acts that break up the rules 
of law such as bribery, breaking up traffic law, and the like. When a person is involved in 
bribery, or becomes permissive to corruption, he or she has no a responsibility to the 
environment.   
M, according to MM, has a bylaw regarding the rights and responsibilities of a 
member. M’s bylaw provides rules of law concerning what and how members’ act, a leader 
or leadership is assigned (recruitment), members’ participation as a right and responsibility. 
The rights and responsibilities of members and leaders are formulated through the 
democratic process. However, As., AH, MM and N acknowledge that the rights and 
responsibilities are not clear or strict as practiced in business corporations, since the 
involvement of M board and members in M (or locally called ber-Muhammadiyah) is more 
determined by “cultural basis” or social motives. For instance, what direct rate of return can 
M members get from being M and what do they have to give to M? The most important 
thing concerns how both M as an institution and its members make meanings for themselves. 
According to these key informants, being a M member, they got social satisfaction, which 
they considered the most valuable thing.  
5.4. Educating for democracy 
 It is common knowledge that every organization attempts to develop values 
congruent with the principles of democracy, such as open mindedness, tolerance, respect for 
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 difference, critical thought, and the like. These values or ideologies and attitudes are 
transmitted to its members through a variety of programs or forums like training, workshops, 
board and member meetings at various levels and the like.   By so doing, each member has 
the pride of his or her organization or group (personal preference). People will make a 
problem of it (pride) whenever they do not give room for other people to appreciate and 
manifest their own ideologies, including pride.  The discussion of this sub-section concerns 
how M people conceive of educating for democracy and how it has been practiced within M.   
5.4.1. What do M people understand about educating for democracy? 
M, according to MM, develops open-mindedness, respect for difference, tolerance and 
the like to its members through various activities or forums such as pengajian (religious 
forums), trainings, and board-member meeting at various (Muktamar, Musyawarah Wilayah, 
Musyawarah Daerah, Musyawarah Cabang and Musyawarah Ranting). Recently, M through 
the M University of Yogjakarta, for instance, has been making a radical change concerning 
how civic education should be taught to students in response to the new era of Indonesia. In 
addition, some autonomous organizations of M such as Aisyiah, Nasyiatul Aisyiah, and IMM, 
were involved in education for democracy in terms of people’s participation in the formal 
politics, i.e., voter education. Some M people who have been intensely discussing political 
issues argue that the involvement of M in voter education and monitoring electoral voting 
will result in a minimal impact to develop a culture of democracy to general people in the 
various spheres of life. Therefore, M has to make efforts to elaborate the notions of 
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 substantive democracy, and to promote these substantial values to the Indonesian 
community at large.    
Educating for democracy, according to BC, is the process of making people aware of 
themselves in order to be trustful (amanah). A trustful individual has the courage to take 
responsibility because he or she is not dependent upon others. Therefore, amanah contains in 
itself independence.  Both Indonesian Muslims and Indonesians at large make less effort in 
their development of independence within the general population of Indonesia, especially in 
the political process. Educating for democracy is needed for his students in order that they 
become independent (as a characteristic of maturity). It is hoped that whenever they have 
done their studies and are to get involved in the political arena, they will become 
independent politicians.  
During the New Order regime, BC adds that educating for democracy, especially 
political education, made politicians dependent upon others. People were joining a political 
party, which was assumed to have a large number of constituents and might have won a 
political contest, though the majority of leaders of that political party did not have a clear 
understanding and clear agenda with response to promoting the rights of constituents (public 
interests or prosperity).  It is hard to find a politician who is idealistically and consistently 
developing and advocating a mission, policy, and commitment to developing a community 
that include democracy in various spheres of  life.    In Indonesia, both political process and 
political education demonstrate self-interest fulfillment and money politics. For instance, it is 
common knowledge that the Golkar convention demonstrated money politics. Each 
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 candidate bribed each participant a certain amount of money (let’s say Rp 250 million for a 
delegate/district) to have a vote in the attainment of a leadership position (BC).  Furthermore 
BC says that those Indonesian politicians do not have sound and clear vision and mission; 
they were dependent too much upon money in order to win the political contest. Therefore, 
education for democracy, according to BC, is to make people politically aware and 
independent.86   
 GL argues that educating for democracy is an effort that enables people (a) to have 
the capability to make decisions reasonably, (b) to be open-minded and respectful for 
different ideas, and (c) to commit to establish dialogue and deliberation (mushawara) in 
making decisions for public interests. Educating for democracy shall produce democratic 
persons, i.e., those who are not only able to speak out about their ideas (rights), but also able 
to respect  the ideas of other people, able to make generalizations and decisions, which will 
satisfy all sides who are involved in decision-making. In order to produce a democratic 
person, GL suggest that M has to impart such values with respect to the others; critical and 
constructive thinking to its members and the community at large. A democratic person 
makes a critique and gives a solution in a wise way (al- hikmah)87, which according to 
Muhammad Abduh, connotes ilmu shahifah (knowledge gives benefits for public interests).  
                                                 
86 For example, people’s participation in the political process is not because of money but because 
they are aware of their political rights and want changes (betterment) in various spheres of life (BC).   
87Stated in -the Qur’an surah An-Naml 16:12-127  “Invites the polytheists to God’s Path with wisdom 
and good council; debate with them only in the presence of neutral onlookers, since this makes for 
the best and most courteous of debates. Your Lord knows best those who have strayed from His Path 
and those who have received   guidance.” “And if you enter into a debate with them and they begin 
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  HN acknowledges that though M has not formulated educating for democracy in a 
specific formula, M has operated under the principles of democracy with respect to (a) the 
process of getting a consensus, finding solutions and making decisions; as well as (b) social 
interaction. In M, democracy is designated to rational thinking in coping with societal 
problems. In terms of umurud ad-dunyawiyah (social spheres of life), M does not have  a 
problem with democracy.  M members are to involve all elements of society in making 
decisions with respect to a social sphere of life and formulating religious understandings.  
The decisions of Muktamar, according to HN, HPPA, MM, ST, and MA, are processed 
from the bottom levels: provincial, district, branch and sub-branch. The M board is elected 
via democratic procedures. The first step is the selection of members of Tanwir (body that 
will select candidates of national boards of M). The selection of Tanwir members takes its 
process from the lower level to the province (the procedure takes after the selection system 
of a senator in America). On the second step, the Tanwir members nominate 39 candidates of 
M boards at the national level. On the third step, the participants of Muktamar have to select 
13 out of 39 candidates of M boards selected by the Tanwir members. This process, according 
to MM, is a form of educating for democracy.  The same process is also applied to select 
members of the board of Majlis Tarjih and Promotion of Islamic Thought. The selection of 
members of this council is based on the criteria such as knowledgability of Islam and a 
discipline of knowledge (like medical, economics, politics, and the like).  
                                                                                                                                                             
to berate you or to act in a way that is threatening, you are free to repel the attack, so long as you do 
not give worse than you get. But if you practice self-restraint and forbearance it will be better for 
you.” 
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  In M, according to N, educating for democracy is done through civic education. M 
had made a change from the orientation of the New Order regime of Suharto into a new 
orientation toward civic education. It gives more nuances on democracy and civil society 
(will be discussed later).   Unlike Sun and En, they argue that educating for democracy is 
manifested through people’s participation in formal politics, especially the representation of 
women within the legislative body. The issue of women’s representation is important since, 
during the regime of New Order, women who were involved in the parliament were less 
proportionate. Out of the total number of congresswomen, few of them were vocal enough 
to speak out about the rights or aspirations of women.   
 Educating for democracy, according to ZQ, has to refer to a decree of the Annual M’s 
Board Meeting (Tanwir), i.e., to teach M members how to live in a pluralistic society. For 
example, ZQ suggests that M members need not devalue the rights or roles of NU members 
and vise versa. The younger generations of M need not annihilate the role of NU young 
generations. M has good schooling and has to give more room for NU members to get access 
to the M educational system, and so does the NU.   Both sides, NU and M, have to respect 
one another.  
 Educating for democracy, according to BS, is the process of creating good citizens. It 
teaches people how to know themselves or identity (Who am I?). By good citizens he means 
the citizens love their country, since loving one’s country constitutes faith (iman).   Hizbul 
wathan, M’s boy scouts, serves as a means to teach how students apply the principles of 
democracy, such as getting familiar with state governance, love of country, respect for 
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 others, and fair-mindedness. By so doing, they know who they are, have fair-mindedness in 
seeing problems and respecting differences. Nowadays in the political arena, educating for 
democracy, especially political education, according to BS, was misused by teaching people 
how to defeat political rivalry by using intrigue.  
INA argues that educating for democracy applies the process of making people aware 
of human rights. That means Muslims have to contend with the fact that Islam advocates and 
respects human rights. Whenever Muslims uphold human rights firmly, they have done a 
good deed (‘amala as-saalihat) because Islam addresses human rights as the basic rights. In 
addition, Islam not only teaches its believers to defend their rights but also to respect the 
rights of others. Islam prohibits zulm, which means any acts, like injustice and other kinds of 
human violation, result from transgressing against another person’s rights.88
5.4.2. The manifestation of educating for democracy (kinds/models) 
  M has its universities make a change of the orientation of civic education to promote 
core values of democracy and participatory approaches in running civic education. In 
addition to its autonomous organizations such Aisyiah (women), Nasyiatul Aisyiah (female), 
the IMM (M student association), and  IRM (secondary school student association) were 
                                                 
88 The hadith states “’an Abii Sa’iid ibn alik ibn Sinaanal-Khudri radiya Allahu ‘anhu qaala: anna 
rasulalaahi salallahu ‘alaihi wa sallam qaala: laa darara walaa diraara (rawahu Ibnu Maajah, Ad-daaru 
Qutni wa ghairihuma) “On the authority of Abu Sa’id ibny Malik ibn Sinan al-Khudri (may Allah be 
pleased with him) the Prophet of Allah (may the blessings and peace of Allah be upon him) said: 
There should be neither harming nor reciprocating (related by Ibnu Majah, ad-Daaraqutni and 
others].” 
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 involved in raising political awarness of public through voter education; monitoring electoral 
voting and education for anti-corruption; and promoting gender sensistivity.  
5.4.2.1. Civic education 
As was among those who strongly initiated or proposed a program for transforming 
civic education. His idea came from his analysis about the realization of civic education and 
kewiraan, which was implemented in M schools and colleges/universities, but which failed 
to meet the ultimate goal (promoting democracy in Indonesia). Its failure, according to him, 
is demonstrated by three issues: i.e. learning materials, methodology, and split personality 
that occurred in society.  With respect to learning materials, he saw that the learning 
materials of civic education and kewiraan did not constitute a discourse of democracy in 
which this issue has become global. In the previous civic and kewiraan education, a 
militarism perspective was significantly established and this perspective thwarted the 
development of democracy in society, especially on campuses.  
The methodology used to teach civic and kewiraan education was adopted from a 
military institution (Lemhamnas = The Institute for National Defense) and in reality was 
more oriented to creating loyalty of citizen to the government (defending the regime or 
status quo). He said that Indonesian people found a gap or split personality between what 
should be and reality. In reality, campuses, including M campuses, demonstrated gaps 
between the idealism of democracy and reality. Such gaps appear in assigning chairs of 
schools that avail in a university or the president of university, which was indicated by 
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 defending the status quo (undemocratic process). The same figure appeared in communities 
in which conflicts between the community and local government could not be disclosed. The 
local government wished to maintain its status quo by abusing the process of voting.  By 
analyzing three aspects, M has to make a change for civic education with respect to three 
issues: learning materials, methodology, and the learning environment.    
Civic education teaches students to be critical of problems that occur in a community. 
According to BC, civic education remains experimental, that is, we, M members, are not yet 
able to see its effectiveness. However, he is sure (insha Allah) that civic education has more 
values than the previous one (during the New Order of Suharto).  All faculty members were 
provided with text books written by those writers who have the spirit of reformation. In 
addition, the civic education committee trained them in order to get feedback for its 
betterment. Civic education is designed to be integrated into other courses. By so doing, it is 
expected that learning materials and approaches will encourage students to be involved 
actively and to have life experiences. In the long run, the faculty members are expecting that 
their students will become independent individuals who appreciate their own identities.  
When they are involved in the political arena, they are expected to be independent 
politicians who are sensitive or responsive to the problems of their constituents. BC contends 
that solving political problems requires the involvement of various elements of society: NGO, 
mass media, research centers, campuses, executives, the legislative, judicative, and military.  
However, he finds that a person, when he or she has become a congressman or woman, tends 
to ignore his or her social and political contract with his or her constituents.  People have 
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 voted him or her into office for five years, and he or she has become indebted to society. So, 
he or she has to give a rate of return by struggling to speak out about the pubic interests 
through legislative products, i.e., public policies, which are biased for the public interests and 
control over the implementation of public policies. By so doing, any abuse of power can be 
prevented.  The key actor says that nearly the majority of legislative leaders tend to ignore 
the mandates of public. The congressmen and women should become immersed in society so 
they can listen to what people say and need and establish a channel between the citizens and 
state.  
Stages in reforming civic education 
 
 As explains that the team at the University of M of Yogjakarta reformed education 
through several stages. With respect to learning materials, the team invited those individuals 
who have a variety of disciplines and writing capacity as well as concerns with democracy. 
The team organized a serial discussion program about issues, which might have to be 
developed within the M colleges/universities. The team conducted a field study (a feasibility 
study), its targets being the State of Islamic Universities, the M universities, and schools in 
the cities of   Medan, Jakarta, Yogja, Surabaya, and Makasar. The team was searching for 
research reports conducted in several countries of Asia in order to enrich teaching and 
learning materials. The study recommended eight themes that should be developed in the M 
universities. At the same time, the team made a convention that civic education should make 
up political education and education for democracy. 
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   From the methodological points of view, the team kept firmly to the principle that 
democratic values have to be perpetuated to individuals (students) by employing 
participatory approaches.  To get a holistic picture of participatory approaches, As spent his 
time doing the participatory study on a voluntary basis for one month in the Islamic State 
University (UIN) in Jakarta, with the emphasis on the application of civic education for a 
month. The Institute for Community and Civic Education Development (ICCE) of UIN has 
developed the curriculum of civic education. He found out the curriculum reform has less 
significant results in promoting the principles of democracy since the faculty members 
employed non-participatory approaches in the teaching-learning processes. Refering to 
research findings, finally the team recommended that participatory approaches had to be 
developed in the teaching-learning processes of civic education.  In order to make a change, 
the team firstly introduced the participatory approaches to faculty members of M University 
of Yogjakarta who were trained by the Institute for National Defense (LEMHAMNAS)—The 
Ministry of Defense. Later, the team introduced a participatory approach containing 
participative learning, case studies, portfolios, and contextual learning, to 350 faculty 
members of M universities in seven cities.     
M universities took several steps to socialize the ideas of democracy (civic education) 
as follows: first, the M universities have developed learning materials through curriculum 
reforms. Second, civic education was inserted into the program of in-service learning. About 
75 % of students who would graduate had to take part in the service learning program 
(obligatory). From their observations, students who had done the in-service learning 
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 program were not concerned with promoting the values of democracy to the public, because 
the university did not advocate this issue through its program in the previous times. The 
students were merely involved in a practical work, for instance building public 
infrastructure--rest rooms, renovation of sewer, and the like.  The M university of Yogjakarta 
has provided its students who are going to do the in-service learning program, with the 
knowledge and skills that may help them to socialize the principles or values of democracy. 
In Malang, the University of M equipped its students, who were doing in service training 
programs with skills to reconcile NU and M members (to refine the relationships between 
NU and M), because the relationship was thwarted after the downfall of President Wahid in 
2001. In some districts of East Java, both boards and members of M became the victims of 
anarchic actions and the psychological violation of supporters of Wahid89.  Third, the M 
university of Yogjakarta has infused the principles of democracy into the programs of the 
student board (student governance).   
 
 
                                                 
89 After President Abd. Rahman Wahid was impeached by the parliament in which Amin Rais was 
the chair. Thus, Abd. Rahman Wahid was disposed from his presidency. In some districts of Java such 
as Banyuwangi, Bondowoso, Gresik, Pasuruan, Situbondo, Sidoarjo, and Tuban, the “NU umma” 
(Wahid’s supporters) got angry with Amin Rais and destroyed such M public facilities as mosques, 
schools, orphan care, and universities. Some of M public facilities were burned by them. In Pasuruan, 
Sidoardjo and Situbondo, the supporters of Wahid attacked M schools while students were taking 
exams and inciting them to psychological violence and traumatizing them. In Banyuwangi and 
Pekalongan (Central Java), Wahid’s supporters marked red crosses on the houses of M boards and 
members inciting psychological violence. Abd. Rahman Wahid’s supporters demonstrated anarchic 
action, which contradicted the era of reformasi and the democratic slogan advocated by Abd. 
Rahman Wahid. M became the victim of political harassment and the politics of violence that did not 
have a direct relationship with M   (Naser, 2001).  
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 Learning materials and teaching-learning approaches and the target  
 
Civic education, stated by As, contains eight themes: civil society, good governance, 
family values (educating for democracy through families), “people economy”, national 
identity, the new world order of democracy, human rights, and social relation, including 
social responsibility. The objective of civic or citizenship education, according to M Council 
for Higher Education, Zamroni (2003: xi), is to provide students with principles and ethical 
values (characters) as the new ethic order so that Indonesian people can live in a democratic 
or pluralistic society.  The new ethic of Indonesia, according to MM, entails the ability and 
commitment of all elements of Indonesian society to establish among themselves a sense of 
responsibility (care) of building the future of this nation and state, and mutual help and 
mutual understanding among themselves who have diverse backgrounds such as socio-
cultural, political, and religious, so they can live in a pluralistic society. God’s consciousness 
should be established in the political sphere in order to prevent this nation from power and 
moral corruption.  Political education should be led to develop awareness among all elements 
of Indonesian nation of upholding firmly values supporting the creation of democratic 
culture in the various spheres of life for the sake of prosperity for all Indonesian people and 
the nation’s betterment. (Mulkhan, 2004: 25).  In the long run, through civic education, a 
democratic and civilized society of Indonesia can be created (vision).  
 The team published a book entitled “Civic Education and Bringing Democratic and 
Civilized Society into Reality” containing issues as follows:  
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 a) A Guideline with respect to Islamic lives for M members, i.e., the moral guide or    
conduct have the tenets of al-Qur’an and as-Sunnah in relation to human kind and God 
relationships and societal relationships (family, neighborhood, association and society at 
large, state) as the source.  
b) Civic education and a vision of civil society that constitutes several issues such as  the 
significance (urgency) of civic education, civil society concepts, and the application, 
perpetuating  civic values or civility;  
c) Overview on democracy consists of values or principles of democracy (freedom of speech, 
freedom of association or participation in public sphere, equality among societal members, 
gender equality), pluralism, state and society;  
d) good and democratic governance contains good governance, democratic government, 
presidential election, electoral system, system of political parties in Indonesia,  coalition and 
opposition, role of non-political party organization, mass media, anti corruption movement 
and autonomy system in Indonesia;   
e) developing core values of democracy to families and community at large entails the rights 
and responsibilities of citizens, developing Islamic ethics to families and the community at 
large, preserving principles of gender equality to  families and the community at large;  
f) National identity formation encompasses the definition of national identity, national 
plurality  and integration, world ideologies such as Marxism, socialism and communism; 
liberalism or capitalism; nationalism; feminism; pluralism; postmodernism; Islam; and 
Pancasila;  
g) The new world order and globalization entails globalization of the economy and its 
dilemma; politics within the global era; cultural homogenization and reproduction in the 
global era, conflict and peace; Islam and pluralism, Islam and peace, Islam and perestroika, 
Islam, justice and societal empowerment, Islam and human dignity, Islam and science and 
technology, and Islam and individual ethos;  
h) “People economy” covers  the concept of” people economy as economic system, “people 
economy” and business ethics of Indonesia, strengthening people economy, government 
policies on strengthening people economy, Islam and economic development, industrial 
relation and Islam, Islamic ethics and individual ethos development; and  
 i) Human rights entail history of human rights, areas of human rights, individual rights 
(rights to live, religious rights, rights for justice, freedom of minds and opinion, the right to 
work, political rights, historical dimension human rights in Islam, Medina charter, Cairo 
declaration, human rights enforcement in Indonesia and the role of human rights in 
strengthening civil society (Ibnu Hamin, Istianah, Nasher, Bashori, Setiartiti, Azhar and 
Tahuleley, 2003) 
 
  INA argues that she focuses her teaching on the issues of human rights by employing 
various methods such as discussion, seminar, limited observation, and study of the 
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 community at large. The civic values (civility) are, according to As, to be developed within 
his students by using methods in order to enhance the perpetuation of democratic attitudes 
in them. Therefore, the values of democracy, or civic values, should be developed by 
employing participatory approaches. Otherwise, a split personality will occur. Participatory 
approaches are characterized by student centered approaches; students have to become the 
source of teaching-learning activities, and dialogue has to be established in the teaching-
learning processes.  Each student is encouraged to do a study case by among other things, 
analyzing the literature and newspaper, and by direct observation (field studies). Each 
student has to reflect a case study and make a portfolio report. The portfolio report of a 
student shall be discussed in the classroom. Aside from that, the roles of playing, problem 
solving, and project works are applied in the teaching-learning processes.   
Civic education does not only teach the issues about the relationships between  state 
and citizens but also values congruent with democracy that have to be grown up in a 
community and the principles of new ethics  such as tolerance, mutual understanding, 
respect for differences and the rights of others, trust and discipline. In other words, civic 
education is to establish ‘civilized democracy’, i.e., creating an individual or community who 
has good characters and commitment to promoting democracy (INA, Say, ST & ZQ).   
 The crucial point is concerning how to sustain civic education, since civic education 
is by a pilot project; or how are the civic values developed to the whole M members and the 
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 community at large without depending upon a project? Civic education has to be a cultural 
movement and must be integrated into other programs of M90.   
5.4.2.2. Voter education 
Voter education aims at promoting public participation in the formal politics, i.e. 
public participation in electoral voting. During the era of reformasi, Indonesia has intensified 
its program to promote the roles of civil society in promoting the process of democratization. 
This program was supported by the international superstructure agencies such as UNDP, the 
Ford Foundation and the like. For the short term, education for democracy was manifested 
through voter education in order to promote community participation in electoral voting. 
Like other civil societies, M was involved in voter education with the financial support from 
the Asia Foundation and UNDP.  
There are some reasons, as stated by BC, En & Sun why M was involved in such a 
program. First, the M National Meeting per annum (Tanwir) recommended that M members 
(umma) be involved in realizing the national agenda (electoral voting).  Second, the 
involvement of civil Islam is to create fair, quality electoral voting without any harassment.  
                                                 
90 Contrary to previous key actors, BS did not agree with civic education (reformation 
perspective) since the realization of civic education may cause historical moments to 
disappear. He sees that civic education provides issues that are not integrated into other 
historical issues of Indonesia.   He argues that without the roles of pak Dirman and Suharto 
Indonesia as an independent nation and state has disappeared. Therefore, civic education 
with a new perspective shall be accused twenty years later. The downfall of Suharto, 
according to him, is not because of reformation, but because of the intervention of foreign 
countries.  
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 Aisyiah has mobilized 8100 voluntary workers who were organized in the national network, 
which was called JPPR. JPPR consists of 24 organizations including the Research Center of 
Aisyiah (LPPA) with the main task of manifesting voter education and monitoring, or 
control of electoral voting. Third, the 2004 electoral voting is different from the previous 
systems. Fourth, the community or public of Indonesia especially women lack information 
pertaining to the current system of electoral voting.    
 The tasks of Islamic civil associations, like M, according to BC, are to train and 
prepare those who are willing to work voluntarily. BC assumes that voter education has not 
been institutionally well established, since all sides were involved in this program for the 
project (the Asia Foundation) or for the sake of short term objective (electoral voting). 
Islamic civil society associations, NU and M, were involved in promoting community 
participation in the formal politics (electoral voting). Both M and NU seek to reach the 
ultimate goal of educating for democracy, i.e., to promote political awareness of the 
community at large, to dissolve patron-client relationships between the elite group and 
grassroots, and to prevent the elite group from practicing the abusing power for their own 
interests.  It seems to him that M demonstrates its willingness to conceive of voter education 
from a comprehensive way, i.e., creating its cadres who are politically literate and aware of 
political development. The direct system in both presidential voting and DPD (Dewan 
Perwakilan Daerah=congressman) has stimulated civil society associations to revitalize the 
potential values congruent with democracy, which used to support community but which 
were thwarted during the regime of the New Order in various spheres of life.   That system 
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 will stimulate the elite of M to develop its model of human resources development 
approaches and programs, which have to be more responsive to societal dynamics.   
For M, voter education, according to RH, serves as a means to develop civic education 
to the general people of Indonesia, i.e., to be responsible citizens who are willing to take part 
in societal development.  Also, voter education is to enable women to partake in a public 
sphere, i.e., making decisions for public interest. In addition, to promote awareness of politics 
among students of M universities, M universities equipped its students who would join in 
service training program with knowledge and skills needed to give guidance to the 
community at large with respect to electoral voting and control of their votes.    
Voter education Training materials  
 
According to En and Sun, voter education was to promote awareness of citizens of 
their rights to vote and control their votes. In a guide book,   it was stated that voter 
education provides the community with   a) the notion and mission of electoral voting, 
voters and voter education, and  b) the 2004 electoral system that comprises electoral voting, 
congressmen and women, presidential election and the like, c) people participation or 
involvement in the control of electoral voting, d) Islam, women and the electoral system, 
and e) the role of critical participation in supporting free, fair election  (LPPA, 2004; LPPA, 
2004; JPPR, 2004). For the sake of this purpose, M, according to ST, mobilized (deployed) 
70,000 volunteers to lead guidance with respect to the electoral system for all Indonesian 
voters, especially the beginners (youth). In addition, LP3 of M University of Yogjakarta has 
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 provided a set of books pertaining to civic education for the students of high schools (both 
private and public schools), and issued a special edition about electoral voting through its 
Gerbang journal, which were distributed to those schools.   
5.4.2.3. Education for political awareness among females (gender appreciation) 
 
Education for gender appreciation was a program with aims at developing the 
awareness among females of their rights in public spheres such as politics. This program was 
to equip the female candidate of congress with issues, by which they have to fight for 
women’s rights in the parliament at various levels: i.e., district, province and national (Sun & 
Nur). This program was manifested for several reasons. In Indonesia the issue of gender 
equality is subject to be problematic since people of Indonesia respond to this issue in a 
variety of perspectives. The tendency is that the majority of Indonesia rejects the ideas of 
gender equality for various reasons, as stated in the previous section. The regime of New 
Order acknowledged the idea of gender equality, but this regime put the issue on the shelf. 
Female participation in public spheres, i.e., politics, remains beyond expectation as does their 
representation in the parliament, as demonstrated by 13 % of the total number of parliament 
members in 1997. These congresswomen did not play a significant role in fighting for the 
rights of women as was expected, because the majority of them were assigned under the basis 
of the crony system. In the era of reforma i, the total number of congresswomen decreased, 
with the figure less than ten percent, but they were better quality than those who were to 
represent during the New Order.  
s
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 Several issues, which have relationships with the rights of women, have still been put 
aside such as mother and child health care, women’s labor force, women in the informal 
sector, harassment toward women, domestic harassment, migrant women labor, prostitous 
women and the like. In the parliament, there are some bills with respect to gender issues 
subject to be pending such as bill on women harassment, including domestic harassment,  
pornography, and the like (Nur). On the other hand, the candidate of congresswomen, 
according to (Sun), demonstrates a lack of knowledge about issues and mission, which they 
have to fight for whenever they become congresswomen. The tendency is that the majority 
of those congresswomen candidates (district level) does not know the issues with respect to 
gender equality and does not have an agenda to fight for when they become congresswomen.  
Therefore, education for gender appreciation was meant to provide those congresswomen 
with sensitive issues that they are to fight for in parliament.  It was also an effort to raise 
awareness, among general women, of the sensitive issues, as stated earlier. By so doing, they 
would be aware of and responsive to any acts that humiliate the rights of women (Nur).  To 
the general women, this program may enable them to establish a channel with their 
congresswomen (Sun).  
 
 
 
 
How is awareness of gender equality (sensitivity) raised among women in general (public)?  
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 Aisyiah, according HPPA, Nur, End and Sun, has a number of religious forums, and 
the issues of gender equality (sensitivity) are introduced through religious forums by 
employing such various methods as sharing experience or ideas, dialogue, and discussion 
about the role of women religious leaders such as the companions of the Prophet. Those 
forums and methods are used to enable women to speak out about their rights or what has 
happened to women within their surroundings. Also Aisyiah manifests action programs 
affecting their lives such as a mother child health care program, and small-scale credit so as 
to make the program of gender sensitivity socialization complete. Aisyiah uses ‘religious 
terms’ in perpetuating the issues of gender sensitivity to the general women. Women are 
encouraged to take part in public spheres such as politics, civic associations, or at least a 
surrounding program which may affect or promote the betterment of the community. 
Aisyiah introduces the theological perspectives with respect to public interest (maslahah 
‘ammah).  Aisyiah always reminds M members of the idea of KH Ahmad Dahlan, that doing 
domestic works should not prevent women from getting involved in the public sphere.  Both 
domestic and public works are important for women. Through religious forums, Aisyiah 
advocates the ideas that both female and male have equal rights. Females have the equality of 
rights to better education, jobs, and the actualization of their potential.     
 Aisyiah uses mass media in socializing the issues of gender sensitivity through a 
political appreciation program for women. This program is to explore the perception 
(understandings) of beginner female voters via dialogue (talk show) for this group. Aisyiah 
established a joint program with private radio stations such as Radio Star FM, Radio 
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 Swaragama FM (Yogjakarta), Radio Polaris FM, Radio Unimma FM, Radio Tidar FM 
(Magelang), Radio Andalus FM 91.8, RRI, Radio FM 891 (Malang), Radio Gemar Surya, 
Radio RDN (Ponorogo) to disseminate the issues of gender equality (gender sensitivity) and 
to build political efficacy and standing points among women (PP. Aisyiah, 2004). The radio 
talk show program constitutes the issues of politics and electoral voting (election), which 
were elaborated in the following issues, i.e., female beginner voters, the politics of beginner’s 
voters, critical voters, electoral vote and gender sensitivity. The participants of radio talk 
show program are female students of M and non-M totaling as follows: 250 persons (Malang), 
318 persons (Yogjakarta), 220 persons (Magelang) and 200 persons (Bandung) (LPPA, 2004). 
5.4.2.4. Educating for anti-corruption  
The anti-corruption movement serves as the follow-up of the M and NU commitment 
against corruption in Indonesia. Both M and NU consider corruption as acute social 
pathology in Indonesia (ST and Is). Corruption tends to be unchanged in Indonesia.  Data 
from the International Transparency demonstrate that Indonesia is a country with high 
corruption. The LP3 of the M University of Yogjakarta proposed a program with emphasis on 
maximizing the role of religions to mobilize a massive movement against corruption. The 
LP3 of UMY, together with Yogjakarta Corruption Watch, set up a program involving a 
variety of religious groups to launch and fight against corruption. A Coalition among 
Religious Groups against Corruption was founded so that the religious groups could continue 
to promote a working cultural movement against corruption. The coalition members are 
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 attempting to bring the tenets of each religion to light, and to establish these religious tenets 
as the foundation for the anti-corruption movement.   
 The coalition’s proposal contains two main spheres: a) formal education, i.e., 
integrating the themes of anti-corruption into the religious or moral education for college or 
university students; b) informal education takes a form of trainings to provide youth activists 
for a variety of religious groups with skills and knowledge needed for advocating the anti-
corruption movement via training programs for trainers (TOT). By so doing, they understand 
what, why, and how corruption can surface over daily life from the religious and judicial 
perspectives.    
The coalition introduces the religious values enforcing anti-corruption to the public 
via a Friday sermon, mass and other religious events. Common values of religions constitute 
justice, accountability, responsibility, and trustfulness that have to be developed within the 
public (the community at large). The coalition contends that advocating religious values with 
respect to anti corruption may less be effective through those activities (sermons of Friday 
prayer or mass), since those activities involve one-way communication. Therefore, the 
coalition members are attempting to establish a close contact with strategic groups in society 
such as religious leaders, community leaders and the like to establish their commitment to 
develop a mass movement against corruption.   
 The coalition is approaching religious leaders for several reasons: first, religious 
leaders (clerics) advocate religious tenets with the emphasis upon (interpretation), 
theocentrism, i.e., less relationship to empirical situations that human beings experience.  
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 The coalition members encourage those clerics to elaborate religious tenets in response to 
human problems. The concept of ritual works or devotion to God (ibadah) has put too much 
emphasis on the relationship with God. The clerics speak with less elaboration on the 
concepts of evil and fasad in relation to social relationships (muammalah ma’a an naas). Fasad 
refers to acting corruptly, corruption, violence, oppression or any acts that will devastate the 
life of a community at large. For example, abusing power to have exclusive control of, for 
instance, trading cloves in Indonesia (in the hand of family regime) devastated the life of a 
large number of Indonesian clove farmers who relied on it for their livelihood. It is advisable 
that clerics introduce the concept of evil, which corresponds to issues of humanity. Evil takes 
various dimensions, including zulm, refering to any acts like injustice and other kinds of 
human rights violations resulting from transgressing against another person’s right. Second, 
in formal schooling religious education is manifested through transmitting more knowledge 
about a religion, rather than religious attitudes or religiosity (God’s consciousness). The 
concept of ibadah (devotion to God) is more often interpreted (elaborated) into ritual 
activities rather than social aspects of religion. Or the “social values” of ritual activities are 
subject to the outreach of religious practices.  Islam, for instance, advocates that ritual 
activities imply social values that each individual has to strive for. This coalition is 
attempting to impart such an understanding of ibadah through schooling. Introducing 
religious values with respect to anti corruption through schooling and public forums is 
expected to result in collective attitudes against corruption. Once such collective attitudes 
may have been established in the community at large, and the anti-corruption movement 
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 will be strengthened and this movement will enhance law enforcement against corruption 
(LP3 of UMY, 2004).    
Activities, materials and skills 
 
The coalition members are doing trainings for various levels. The coalition provides 
training for trainers with respect to the anti-corruption movement. Each religious group will 
do the follow up, i.e., advocacy training against corruption. Such trainings will provide those 
activists of religious groups with knowledge and skills to launch an anti-corruption 
movement.  The training materials contain two major issues: first, the judicial aspect of 
corruption includes what are corruption, the reasons for corruption, and the impact of 
corruption on various spheres of life. The second issue concerns how religions play a 
significant role in developing an anti-corruption movement, and how moral movement 
against corruption has to be built up. At the same time, the participants (youth activists) are 
provided with advocacy skills concerning (a) how they have to study public policies in 
relation to law enforcement over corruption cases, (b) what and how data have to be 
collected, (c) how corruption cases are to be exposed to the public, and (d) what efforts are 
needed to prevent corruption. The field work or study is implemented to give more nuances 
and skills pertaining to handling corruption cases. In the Sleman district, for example, the 
participants will be encouraged to do field investigation about money manipulation in one 
village. They have to do field observation, to make interviews with local leaders, including 
clerics and member of community. Later, they have to make an analysis with respect to the 
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 causes and effects of corruption. They have to do field work for five days. The field work is 
expected to give life experience in investigating corruption cases.   
It is not easy to uncover corruption cases because the information about corruption is 
usually sensitive or subject to be covered. Therefore, the coalition members are making cases 
with respect to public policies or devastating public interests a priority. The big scandal of 
corruption in Jogjakarta is JSC (Jorjakarta Showroom Center) and was discovered by NGOs of 
Jogjakarta. This corruption involved some congressmen and officials of the local government. 
Some of those involved in corruption have been brought into the court.  
Follow up of training 
 
Those activists who have been trained have to follow up action in each religious 
group, and have to prepare an action plan for the follow-up. They have to do advocacy 
training.  Each religious group has 300 activists who will be the pioneers of the anti-
corruption movement. The coalition selects 25 persons representing religious groups; 25 
delegates will have to take advocacy training. These 25 persons will be involved in 
advocating anti-corruption in each religious group. To sustain this program, the coalition has 
established networks with NGOs, universities, and YCS. 
The coalition will implement five time trainings involving 150 members of cadre for 
the anti-corruption movement. The training for trainer program with respect to corruption 
advocacy will be done for 25 participants. Each religious group has to do the follow-up of 
trainings. This program is finally led to strengthen civil society for the enhancement of the 
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 democratization process.  This program is also expected to promote community participation 
in the control of public policies, including the accountability of public officials (good 
governance). Control and participation of the community aim at creating equal relationships 
between society and the state (government) to promote balance of power. 
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 6. CASE 2:  NU’s CONCEPTUALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION FOR 
DEMOCRACY 
 
In the last two decades, NU was more active than other Islamic civil society associations in 
promoting theological discourses on such contemporary issues as democracy, human rights, 
pluralism, gender equality and civil society. NU members interviewed claim that NU has 
become more focused on such contemporary issues, especially after the NU has restated its 
position as a social and Islamic civil association (khittah 1926) and the younger generation of 
NU has struggled to transform NU’s previously more orthodox perspective toward the 
ideology of   ahlussunaah waljamaah (aswaja).91 
The ideology of aswaja contains within it such principles as awassut and ‘itidaal 
(moderation), tawazun (equilibrium), tasamuh (tolerance), and these enable NU members to 
be democratic; NU members appreciate the principle of democracy. Holding firmly to the 
t
                                                 
91 Alussunah waljamaah contains in itself a variety of notions. It is in opposition to Shi’I, 
which constitutes Mu’tazilla and Khawariz.  Ahlussunah wajama’ah is identified as al-
Ash’arinism. It refers to those who consistently follow the tenets of the Prophet 
Muhamamad and keep on defending its tents in various spheres of human life (Hasan, 2003: 
viii-ix). Ahlussunah waljamaah as the ideology (doctrine) of NU is defined as al-i’tiqadi ilaa 
al-Ushu al Thasalathash (meaning that NU theologically follows the ideas of imam Al-Asya’ri 
and al-Maturidy; commited to the practice of one of four schools of thought in Islamic 
jurisprudence (Fiqh), i.e., Ash-Shafii’sm, Hanafi’ism, Malikiism, Hanblism; with two schools 
of sufiims, i.e., Abu Hamdi al-Ghazally and Al-Junaidi al-Baghdady) (Lukman, 2004). 
However, the critical ulamas of NU have transformed the ideology of ahlussunah wal jama’ah 
into an inclusive notion. Agil suggests that ahlussunah wal jama’ah has to be defined as way 
of thinking in understanding the religious tenets (manhajul fikri) in relation to various 
aspects of human life. It contains in itself the principles of balance, moderation, neutrality (in 
the area of faith), harmony or societal cohesiveness and justice (Qomar, 2002). 
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 Islamic jurisprudence school of thought (mazhab fiqyihah), according to MFM, NU gives 
more room for local culture to develop92. Such an attitude, this key informant claims, enables 
NU to be more moderate and open-minded than the modernist groups such as M and Persis 
who advocate the principle of arruju ilaa al-Qur’an wa as-Sunnah (returning directly to the 
Qur’an and Sunnah).  
In the political arena during the New Order regime NU members felt alienated from 
the process of development. The political action of the New Order enabled NU to be more 
critical of the government’s policy NU assumed deviated from the ideas of democracy and 
independence in relation to state.  The “critical movement” has been initiated and advocated 
by the younger generations of NU who have been fighting for NU to gain a significant role in 
leading the nation.  In order to achieve this objective, NU, according to the NU younger 
generation, has to transform itself from an orthodox understanding of the NU ideology of 
ahlussunah waljama’ah and fiqh tradition, which generated close-mindedness to societal 
dynamics or ideas coming from outside NU.  Contending such a situation, the younger 
generations of NU have instigated both intellectual discourses, which were manifested 
                                                 
92 Aswaja and fiqh tradition is seen as an inner impetus (social capital) for NU members to become 
democratic. Social capital has various notions. Flap (2004:4-5) demonstrates several notions as 
follows: Social capital is relational resource, having ties to enable one to have access to their 
resources, to borrow them, so to speak. The notion of social capital ties in with the classic neo-
Weberian core of sociology: people achieve their goals better if they have more resources—economic, 
political, and cultural—and institutions and other social conditions determine who has what kind of 
resources and how useful these are. The notion of social capital implies that people invest in each 
other because networks are instrumental. Social capital has three dimensions—norms and values, 
network, and consequences [voluntarily produced collective facilities and resources (Newton, 1997 
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 through the reinterpretation of the ideology of “ahlussunnah waljamaah” and fiqh tradition, 
and action programs (community development) as the response to societal problems.  
This chapter discusses NU members’ conceptualization of democracy, democratic 
society (includes individual freedom, gender equality, pluralism, and tolerance), citizenship, 
and educating for democracy.  It also discusses NU members’ efforts or experiences, applying 
these concepts to their organization and programs. 
6.1. Democracy  
Similar to members of M or Muslims in general, NU members’ conceptions of 
democracy vary depending on their backgrounds (e.g., the range of their interaction, 
educational attainment, and other experiences). From interviewees’ conceptions of 
democracy can be categorized into either substantive or procedural democracy.  
6.1.1. Substantive democracy 
Twelve of 23 key informants emphasized the idea of substantive democracy.  For 
example,  TH says that based on a holistic understanding of Islam and democracy, NU 
members and Indonesian Muslims should  support democracy because democratic practices 
are in line with the basic principles of Islam. However, he contends that Muslims in different 
societies will perceive differently the possibilities of constructing a democratic system, 
depending on their social context. For instance, TH believes that people in Saudi Arabia are 
less likely to see the possibility of democracy in Islam (laa demoqratiya fil Islam) because of 
the political conditions (a country headed by a monarchy) of that country.  
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 He said we found some Muslim groups struggling to follow this way of thinking 
(appreciation of different points of view) both in the present and past time. From the history 
of Islam, we found an ironic example during the medieval ages (Abbasiah). Initially, the 
Mu’tazilla93 school of thought gave more room (freedom of thought) to anybody. However, 
under the Caliph al-Makmun (d. 218h/833), the doctrines of Mu’tazilla were recognized as 
official and were imposed on the population by state acts. Those who were critical of the 
ruler’s ideology might have been considered a kafer group (disbelievers) and punished. Imam 
Ibnu Hambal, for example, was imprisoned for a long time. This case demonstrates how ideas 
about democracy may be used (inappropriately) in an authoritarian manner if they become 
institutionalized as the only interpretation recognized by those in power (the state). 
                                                 
93 Al-Mu’tazilla is the name of the great theological school that creates the speculative dogmatics of 
Islam. The Mu’taziliis advocate five principles or fundamental doctrines (usuulu al-khamsah): 
(a) al-Tawhiid (monetheism or uniqueness of God) denies all resemblance between Allah and 
his creatures; recognizes the divine attributes of  God but deprives the real existence (the 
attributes are not entites added to the divine being; and denies the beatic vision); (b) al-‘adl 
(God’s justice) means that God is just; all He does aims at which is best for his creation  
(aslah). God does not desire evil and does not ordain it (amar/irada). All human activities 
result from a human being’s free will. A human being has a kudra (potentness) and an 
istitaa’a qabla al-fil (having power to do something).   (c) al-Wa’d wa al-Wa’iid (The promise 
and the threat) means that a human being will be rewarded for his good deeds and punished 
for his evil because a human being has free will. (d) al-Manzila baina manzilatain (the theory 
of an ‘intermediate state’) refers a Muslim committed to grave sin. A sinful Muslim cannot be 
closed either on ‘believing (mu’min)’ or on ‘disbelieving (kafer)’, but belongs to a separate 
category [intermediate rank or intermediate state], that of the faasiq [malefactor]. [e] al-
Amru bi al-ma’ruf wa al-nahyu ‘an al-munkar (To command the good and forbid the evil) 
means that each believer has the obligation  to command good deeds and prohibit from 
wrongdoing (evil) or to intervene in public affairs to uphold the law and oppose impiety. The 
Mu’tazila derived its name as “ahlu al-‘adl wa al-tawhiid (the Partisans of Justice and 
Oneness) from two of five doctrines (Gimaret, 1990; Houtsma et all, 1987; Khadduri, 1984). 
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 NU members (and other Muslims) have different points of view regarding the women 
role in public sphere such as political arena (political rights).  The sacred text is very often 
used to counterattack the political rivalry. Some years ago, a group of clerics of Dewan Fakar 
(think tank) of P3 (United Development Party) of Indonesia issued a religious decree (fatwa) 
prohibiting females from holding leadership position (e.g., the presidency). TH argues that 
issuing fatwa conceals political motives of this group (making public opinion to reject any 
candidate female president).  The prohibition of female to charge a leadership position is 
subject to debate among Islamic clerics. 94  
Four  key informants (M, MFM, MM and W) argue that democracy consists of 
freedoms of thought and expression, equality of rights (musawah) and justice (‘adalah). 
Equality of rights includes social rights (such as quality education, and health care) and 
political rights. Justice includes the equal right to better education, economy, politics, and 
social freedoms.  For Fatayat’s informants (UM, MU, V and M), democracy is represented by 
equality of rights for every person including women (gender equality), or no discrimination, 
                                                 
94 A democratic Muslim community, according to TH, has to demonstrate its willingness to appreciate 
different schools of thought in Islamic jurisprudence, because this jurisprudence serves as a guide for 
manifesting the ideas of devotion to God and social relationships. He found out that a Muslim 
country enforces a policy on the application of one mazhad fiqhiyah (school of thought of Islamic 
jurisprudence): for example, the Hambali school of thought in Saudi Arabia. In contrast, Egypt (Al-
Azhar University) teaches students with the subject of five Islamic schools of thought (al-madzaahib 
khamsah) to give more room for the Shii’ school of thought.    Saudi Arabia has prohibited any books 
that are in opposition to the ideology of the state. This key informant (TH) brought many books from 
Egypt pertaining to contemporary issues, such as democracy, while doing umrah performing a 
pilgrimage, usually during the non-hajj season, and omitting some of ritual such as the visit of field of 
Arafah]; these books were censored and forbidded by the law of immigration. He said “to me the 
censorship does not have a connection with the mission of science or Islam development,but it does 
have a strong connection with political interests of the rulers 
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 along with the rule of law. Also, democracy constitutes appreciation of plurality. Islam, 
according to these key informants, respects the rights of women, as stated in the Qur’an. 
Democracy, according to MA, connotes the sovereignty of people; this concept is derived 
from the concept of human being as the vicegerent on the earth (khalifah fil ardl). As a 
creature of God, a human being has a mandate from God to make the universe with all 
everything in order. A human being is granted rationality or intellect by God in order to 
develop his or her own potential as well as the universes.     
6.1.2. Procedural democracy 
Democracy is defined as a political system addressed by a slogan “from, for and by the 
people” (J and M). It has two faces, i.e., procedural and substantive. From procedural 
perspective, democracy concerns how government institutions (such as the justice system, 
courts, and police) function.   Islam, according to (MFM), does not have a specific term for 
democracy, though Islam advocates the concept of shura, which provides a foundation for 
procedural democracy. That is, Shura contains basic principles on which democracy depends: 
1) freedoms of individuals, including freedom of expression and thought; 2) respect for 
plurality of viewpoints; 3) equality of rights among members of an organization, community, 
or society; and 4) commitment by decision makers to follow and respect decisions 
(agreement).  MFM also states that democracy implies justice95 as stated in the hadith that 
“Litakula kullu haqqin haqqahu (every individual has to be granted individual rights).”   
                                                 
95 There are several words used to indicate justice, but the most common in usage is the word 
adl. Several synonyms are the following: qist, qasd, istiqaama, wasat, nasib, hissa, mizan. Adl 
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 How does procedural democracy work? It is, according to Ban, HH and Muh, 
demonstrated by participation of people (citizens) to control the state (public policy). Bur, 
HH, and MFM argue that the role zakat (religious alms giving, as one of the five pillars of 
Islam) can be maximized as a means of the public control over the state (government), i.e., 
public policies. NU establishes shura (deliberation and dialogue) as tradition for making 
decisions for both its and public interests as well as leadership recruitment through five 
yearly board-members meetings  at various levels such as muktamar (national congress), 
muswil (provincial level), musda (district), muscab (sub-district level), and musran (unit of 
sub-district) as stated on its bylaw. In addition, NU has a shura (legislative) body with 
                                                                                                                                                             
is in opposition to ‘jawr’ (injustice). There are several synonyms of jawr such as zulm (wrong 
doing), tughyaan (tyranny), and mayl (inclination), inhiraaf (deviation).  Literally, the word 
adl is derived from the verb adala, which means: first, to straighten or to sit straight, to 
amend or modify; second, to run away, depart or deflect from one (wrong) to the other 
(right); third to be equal or equivalent, to be equal or match, or to equalize; fourth, to 
balance or countner-balance, to weigh, or to be in a state of equilibrium. The notion of adl as 
equality or equalizing is used in the sense of equating one thing to another. This meaning 
may be expressed either in qualitative or quantitative terms. The first refers to the abstract 
principle of equality which means equality before the law or of having equal rights, as 
implied in the Qur’anic dictum surah Al-hujurat 49: 10, that “the believers are indeed 
brothers.” The second, stressing the principle of distributive justice, is perhaps  best expressed 
in such terms as nasib and qist (share), qistas and mizan (scale), and taqwim (straightening) 
The notions of balance, temperance and moderation may be said to be implied in the words 
ta’dil, qasd and wasat. The first, which means to amend or to adjust, expresses the notion of 
balance; the second and the third, which literally mean the ‘middle’ or a place equidistant (or 
midway) beween two extremes, may be taken to imply moderation and temperance. These 
notions of justice are perhaps more finely expressed in the principles of the golden mean. 
The believers are not only individually urged to act in accordance with this principle, but 
collectively called upon to be “a nation in the middle’ (Qur’an surah al-Baqarah 2: 137; Ar-
Rad 13:11) (Khadduri, 1984:6-7”). 
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 members of influential clerics, which has a significant power (influence) in the decision 
making process for organizational and public interest and in selecting leaders.  
6.1.3. Democracy and Islam  
With respect to compatibility of Islam with democracy, NU members are divided into 
three categories: accomodationist, rejectionist and in between. 
6.1.3.1. Islam is compatible with democracy  
 
 All key informants (23 persons) support efforts toward democracy in NU such as 
voter education, deliberative democracy, gender equality, emancipatory Islam and the like. 
The leaders of NU such as TH and MFM argue that Islam is compatible with democracy, as 
stated earlier. Muslims, especially NU members, according to Z, have to look at two 
dimensions, i.e., the implementation of moral values and contextualization. Islam advocates 
democracy explicitly and implicitly: i.e., the shura concept. The Qur’an states “wa 
syawirhum fil amr (refers to command). Muslims need to elaborate the concept of shura into 
a detailed description, which includes the procedures and mechanism of democracy.    
6.1.3.2. Democracy is incompatible with Islam   
These key informants (HH, IR, J, M, W, and Z) confirm that NU has its members who 
reject the idea of the compatibility of Islam with democracy. The reasons are as follows. First 
democracy is not recognized by Muslims who have standing points against democracy 
(conservative or scholastic tradition) (from West).   They literally hold firmly the ideas 
 184
 (doctrines) of “ahlus sunnah wal jamaah.” Any ideas coming from outside the Sunni cleric 
works (jurisprudence) of the medieval ages should be rejected. Therefore, we have to ensure 
that democracy constitutes principles that will generate benefits (goodness) for the 
community at large.  
Second,   from the history of Islam, musyawarah (dialogue and deliberation) was not 
proportionately put into practice. For instance, the NU younger generation sees the fiqh 
product (Islamic jurisprudence) demonstrating more of a personal ijtihad than a collective 
ijtihad. The fiqh rulings were produced to give guidance for the ruling group (sultan) to 
implement its policies and programs in various spheres of life (subject to be 
authoritarianism), which is against democracy. Muslims, according to the NU younger 
generation, have not implemented the religious tenets, which are explicitly and implicitly 
congruent with democracy. Also Muslims have a problem with developing religious 
(theological) awareness at the empirical stage, i.e., God’s consciousness reflects a 
commitment to empirical issues (societal problems). Until now, the discussion of religious 
tenets has been dominated by the theocentric themes for the sake of God’s purpose, whereas 
the issues, which have a direct relationship with humanity, tend to be neglected.  P3M, for 
instance, is attempting to develop the theocentric understandings by employing 
anthropological ways of looking at societal problems.  This approach is not new nor is it 
imported, but it is explored from the Mu’tazilla school of thought. Mu’tazilla advocates the 
theocentric theology (at-tawheed) and justice theology (al-‘adl). The theology of justice 
refers to an understanding that humane justice reflects the justice of God and vice versa 
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 (sociological and anthropological concept).96 Ibnu Rusyd used to develop fiqh in response to 
societal dynamics such as the issue of women’s leadership. However, his ideas disappeared 
because of hegemony and the authoritarianism of the rulers.  
The third factor has a connection with the implication of the debacle of the Muslim 
sultanate (emperor) or after the death of Ibnu Rushd, in which the ruler gave little room to 
study the civilizations of other nations (Western civilization). Such a situation created 
psychologically inferior complex amidst Muslim society.  Such a psychologically inferior 
complex is demonstrated by an attitude or points of view of claiming ‘truth’ derived from us 
(our religion) by rejecting the ‘claim truth’ of other religions.  NU members, for instance, 
often take their points of view (standing points) as the absolute truth, and at the same time 
consider the views of M’s members to be untrue. Such attitudes by Muslims, including NU 
members, demonstrate that Muslims are unable to culturally interact with Non-Muslim 
groups (Society). NU, according to Z, has to be more open (not exclusive) and become more 
aware that NU cannot be seprated from society at large. Thus NU has to establish effective 
interaction with non-NU groups.  
                                                 
l
96 See previous footnote on Mu’tazila. Khuddari (1984) argues that the Mu’tazila held that Divine 
Justice is an expression of God’s Essence and that He can only do what is salutary (al-as ah) to a 
human being. God by nature can do no injustice. Human beings always endeavors to realize Divine 
Justice on Earth, but human beings  can only do so by means of Reason—a level of justice which is an 
approximation to and a reflection of Divine Justice and is translated into human acts by a free will 
(ikhtiyaar) for which human beings are responsible. The Mu’tazila’s doctrine of Rational Justice 
constitutes the following principles: (a) rationalism—that justice is determined by Reason, (b) 
voluntarism—that man’s acts are the product of free will (ikhtiyaar), and (c) the principle of 
responsibility—that human beings would be ultimately be rewarded or punished in accordance with 
his or her choice (Khuddari, 1984: 42). 
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 Fourth, empirically democracy is half-heartedly accepted as the ideology of states in 
developing societies. Such acceptance has a connection with the views expressed by those 
countries that advocate democracy such as America, which demonstrates a double standard 
(injustice) in the world orders (a foreign policy for the Middle East countries) in relation to 
developing countries, especially Muslim or Islamic countries. Such a double standard 
confirms the majority Muslim to believe that the project of democracy conceals hidden 
agenda. 
6.1.3.3. Those who have an idea in between the previous groups 
This key informant (J) confirms that NU has its members to be categorized into the 
third group. This group believes that democracy as a political system is the best choice for 
Indonesia as a nation to which democracy has not been developed. However, since 
democracy is coming from the West, it does avoid the dilemma (previously stated in the 
fourth point above).  For the Indonesian people especially those who economically and 
socially are low, the idea of democracy is out of their reach. Therefore, the values of 
democracy should be elaborated into the local concepts or domesticated so that it could be 
better understood by the community at large (BE and J).   NU, for instance, adopted the ideas 
of al-Ghazaly in order to introduce the ideas of democracy to both its members and the 
community at large (this will be discussed later). 
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 6.2. Democratic Society  
6.2.1. Conceptualization of   democratic society 
In general, all key informants define democratic society is wherein the values of 
democracy (as stated earlier) are functioning.  However, different informants emphasized 
different values or element of democracy. First, some informants (J, MFM, and TH) argue 
that in democratic society members of society have equal rights (equality).  Equality is 
derived from a fundamental value of Islam, saying that in the sight of God all human beings 
are equal. Equality implies the ideas of egalitarianism and anti-discrimination. Islam also 
advocates that individuals have different potential. Such differences in potential do not 
connote discrimination (negating the principle of equality).  A hadith states that “All human 
beings are descended from Adam and Adam was created from the essence of soil. No Arab 
people are above or better than non-Arab people. It is only piety that makes people 
honorable one to another.”   In democratic society, according to them, achievement has to be 
the basis for assement of every group or individual regardless of his or her background such 
as ethnicity, religion and the like. Everyone has to be treated equally and none should have a 
privileged position.    
Second, some informants stressed freedom of expression in characterizing a 
democratic society. They explained that a democratic society is one in which every 
individual has room to have different points of view, and there is a willingness to respect the 
law and criticism (Ban, MM, M and Mu). 
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 Third, other informants emphasized that in a democratic society justice has to be 
manifested in various sphere of life and every body has to have the right to life. Therefore 
exploitation among people should be eradicated from various spheres of life (V). 
Fourth, another group of informants highlighted that in democractic society, citizens 
have chances to participate in decision-making in relation to public interests (HH, UM and 
V). 
Fifth, other informants stressed that in a democratic society its members establish 
mutual understanding or cooperation while acknowledging differences (Ban & Mu). 
Sixth, another group of informants emphasized that in democratic societies, citizens 
tolerate and respect diverse political ideologies and religions (KHJ & MA).   
6.2.2. Description of charactristics of democratic society  
The sub-section will describe some of several characteristics of democratic society 
stated earlier:  individual freedom, people sovereignty, pluralism, tolerance, ciriticism, and 
gender equality. According to informants, these charactristics are subject to controversy 
among the NU members and the Muslim umma.  
6.2.2.1. Individual freedom 
The key informant (J) considers this issue to be problematic. Islam, according to him, 
advocates freedoms for individuals; however, Muslim society is often prejudiced against the 
issue of freedom, especially in relation to democracy. People are worried about individual 
freedoms since they assume that such will lead to anarchy, disorder and destability. The 
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 regime of the New Order advocated the idea of freedom with responsibility.  Muslims often 
say that Islam teaches freedom. However, they argue that freedom ‘has to be limited (for 
instance by responsibility), which does not leave enough room for individuals to be 
independent and responsible human beings. In Muslim society, the concept of individual 
freedoms is always guided by the religous norms since Islam supposedly has more legal 
norms than other religions. The majority of key informants such as (Bur, M, MA, MFM, MM, 
Mu, KJH, and TH) agree with J who states that God’s rule and the protection of rights of 
others will limit freedom of an individual. According to those key informants, Muslims are 
not allowed to use rational argument to contradict wahyu (revelation).    
  Even in practice, the idea of modernization of Islam, according to J, was often 
elaborated into closed mindedness (thwarting individual freedom). For instance,  Abduh 
advocated the idea of modernization of Islam in terms of Islamic purification achieved by 
calling for a direct return to the prestine ways of scripture (ar- ujuu’ ilaa al-Qur’an wa as- 
Sunnah), i.e., giving more room for individuals to do ijtihad by developing freedom of mind 
or thinking (rationality or ra’y). However, his idea was often reduced to perspectives based 
on fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence schools of thought) based perspectives (reductionism).  Fiqh 
provides people with room for debate, but it does not provide sufficient freedom. The Sunni 
fiqh was developed from the tradition (interests) of the rulers (kings or sultan). When a 
regime released a fatwa (religious decree) pertaining to civil liberty, this fatwa concealed an 
agenda to limit the rights (freedoms) of individuals.   Fiqh makes us doubtful (scared) when 
Muslims come across contemporary issues; i.e., Muslims are always embeded in the issues of 
r
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 halal (permissible), haram (prohibited), right or wrong, sin or evil and ajr (reward from God), 
and paradise or hell. So Muslims always encounter a problem when they come across such 
contemporary issues as demoracy, human rights, pluralism, gender equality and the like, 
because they do not have genuine freedom similar to those people from the West. By 
genuine freedom, according to him, people of the West become fully responsible human 
beings because they do not have rigid rules.   
How is individual freedom practiced within NU? All informants claim that the Aswja 
ideology and fiqh tradition give more room for NU members to respect individual freedom 
(opinion and expression). NU shows its great appreciation to its clerics. Organizationally, NU 
establishes a shura body with its membership of influential clerics (a priviledged position). In 
addition, anyone has individual freedom including criticizing clerics as long as he or she has 
paramount knowledge to the clerics. The NU younger generation members have transformed 
its orthodoxy, since they contend that patrimonalism might have thwarted democratic 
attitudes.  Even some NU younger generation has been involved in liberal ideas (liberal 
Islam) and their ideas were rejected by the NU older generation through, for example, 
releasing a fatwa to consider the liberal group kafer (disbelievers) (HN). 
6.2.2.2. People’s (individual’s) sovereignty   
With respect to this issue, key informants (M, MM, MA and TH) refer to the concept 
of khalifah fil al-ard (vicegerent on the earth); a human being has temporary sovereignty 
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 because only God has the absolute sovereignty.  A human being is granted a mandate 
(amanah) by God to organize this universe, including human beings (theocracy). 
In contrast to these key informants, J refers to the NU experience in the political 
arena during the New Order regime. According to him, popular sovereignty is defined as the 
restriction of the dominant role of the state (government) in the political arena by means 
that people have to make decisions for making changes (betterment). For the NU umma, 
popular sovereignty means to end the state repression of the people. 97  
6.2.2.3. Pluralism 
According to the Fatayat Journal (2003 and 2004), NU is rich in traditional assets and 
more responsive to diverse religiosity than the modernist group that advocates the spirit of 
Islamic purification based on a return to the original Qur’anic texts (rujuu ilaa al-Qur’an wa 
as-Sunnah.). As J expressed it, the modernist group often elaborates the idea of 
modernization into the concept, which produces a simple-minded view, making 
invidividuals see the religious issues simplistically, in black and white, haram (prohibited) 
and halal (permitted), good and evil—no gray anywhere.  In contrast, NU people, such as the 
                                                 
97 Although not officially stated, NU felt alienated from the Indonesian state during this 
period in the following ways: a) NU was not involved in the process of development; b) the 
process of development was escalated, and those parties who were not ready or late to take 
part in the modernization process were left behind. From the perspective of many NU 
members, Suharto did not employ participatory development approach and the state 
development was oriented initially toward economic growth and stability and only later to a 
growth and equity model. Morover, many NU members perceive that a large number of 
umma was being left behind.  
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 founding fathers of NU (e.g. hadhratus syeihk Hasyim Asyari), tend to be tolerant of the 
attitudes and actions of diverse religious believers. An illustration of this is provided in the 
1937 NU National Conference (Muktamar) speech by KH Hasyim Asy’ari: 
… I was well informed that you were involved in sedition, mockery, and hostility 
toward one another. You were involved in quarrels … Oh, clerics who were persistent 
to keep tightly an (Islamic jurisprudence) school of thought! Let’s throw fanaticism 
about fiqh issues (furuiyyah) away, because all clerics have diverse ideas (opinion) 
about the fiqh issues and have many ideas or understandings (quoted in MHB, 2003:5). 
 
 
   All NU interviewees, except J, state that most NU members define pluralism as 
respect for diversity of God’s creatures. Religious pluralism refers to the acknowledgement of 
rights of other believers (diversity as das sain). For J, pluralism constitutes a deeper notion 
than tolerance. It is defined not as only the recognition of the existence of other people but 
also encouraging a person to understand or recognize the concept of the religion of others.   
Genuinely, people have to become immersed into the concept of a religion, so that they have 
an understanding that the truth is universal meaning each religion has its own truth.  
  Such a genuine concept of (religious) pluralism for Muslims including NU members, 
according J, will be problematic because contextually pluralism assumes several conditions. 
First, pluralism assumes that truth is universal. It is problematic for Muslims that other 
religions have truth (truth claim).98 The study of religions demonstrates that religions of the 
Eastern Asia (Oriental) tradition are more pluralistic than the religions of Western 
                                                 
98 Some younger NU generation members advocate a radical perspective of pluralism  saying that 
truth is not  single (universal), which means every religion has its truth (truth claim) as stated by key 
informants (MM and M).  
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 (Occidental) tradition. The religions of the Western tradition are singularistic or 
monotheistic, such as Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Therefore, in Eastern religions there 
is less conflict over religious tenets and social ethics than in the Western religions such as 
Islam, Christianity, and Judaism.  
Second pluralism assumes that the differences between religions are not a matter of 
truth and falsehood, but of a different perception of the one truth (see Kuhle, 2003). When 
we acknowledge the truth of other religions, they cross the border of aqidah (being an 
idolater, disbeliever or apostate), and that issue is a serious one for Muslims. As an activist of 
ICRP (Indonesian Coaliatin for Religious Pluralism), J is much bothered with the effect of 
this opinion.  The NU informants KHJ, MA, MFM, and TH and a chair of the NU shura body 
such as Siraj confirm that aqidah is the fundamental aspect of religion to which each 
religious group is not allowed to break. So, Muslims need not get immersed in syncretizing 
(heterodoxy) (see also Qomar, 2002; Siraj, 2004). Therefore, many Muslims, according to J, 
are still afraid of establishing dialogue with other religions in order to understand or 
recognize other religions or religions of other people.  They keep a principle of safety, i.e., 
Muslims including NU are not to bother one to another99.   
                                                 
99 J argues that people had better address the issues of the social contract such as participation in 
discussing the bill of law with respect to Harmony among believers (RUKUB = Racangan Undang-
undanga Kerukunan Umat Beragama, which was intiated by the Ministry of Religious Affairs) than 
getting involved in understanding the concept of religion of others. According to J, this bill will fence 
off the relationships among diverse believers. Therefore, we have to try any effort to develop a better 
understanding among people of Indonesia 
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 In general, according to J, on the surface of daily life, NU members do not have a 
problem of pluralism. However, there are still many Muslims who reject the idea of 
pluralism especially those clerics teach Islam in pesantren and majlis ta’lim (community 
religious forums) and have less access to contemporary issues such as pluralism.100  
6.2.2.4. Tolerance 
All key informants say that the NU ideology as stated earlier contains the principle of 
tasamuh (tolerance) which is important for the establishment of a pluralistic society. These 
key informants (KHj, M, MA, MM, and MFM) define tolerance allowing equal room to 
others to develop their own potential. In the area of religion, tolerance means giving the 
rights of other religious believers to exist. Exclusivism, according to MFM, is natural since 
each religious group has a personal preference for embracing a religion. But we need to make 
room for other believers to live.  Therefore, it is not easy for a person to be inclusive while 
maintaining his or her own identity (acknowledging universalism of truth while defending 
‘my personal preference or pride’). To be inclusive person, he or she has, for instance, to live 
in a pluralistice society and interact with diverse groups.  
                                                 
100 According to J, a person will become more pluralist whenever he or she has experiences of a 
“spiritual” (real) life. A person who lives in a pluralistic society will become more pluralist than one 
who lives in homogenous surroundings. Introducing the ideas of pluralism thorugh panel discussion, 
seminar or publicataion per se will be less effective. J encouraged his students to establish a dialogue 
and asked every student to write a paper concerning the tradition of religions, i.e., a Muslim student 
has to write the tradition of Christainity, Hinduism, Budhism, or Con Fu Cionism. A Christian 
student has to write the tradition of Islam, Hinduism, or Budhism, and so forth. By so doing, they are 
ecourged to learn or ask his or her friends who have different religious background about the 
tradition of religion. His students might have done this work by feeling a state of being forced. 
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  Tolerance has been workable in our society, stated by Ban.  Although in general NU 
has been tolerant toward other religious believers (Bur and Ban), some NU members seem 
not to tolerate other religions because they engage in proselytizaiton (dakwah). But this issue 
is less serious for NU members than for M or Persis’ members because the mass bases of NU 
live in rural areas.  According to Ban and W (see also Siraj, 2004), relationships between NU 
members and non-Muslims have become better due to the inputs of NU’s younger 
generations.  The NU members have to uphold a basic principle of Islam, lakum diinukum
waliya diin (to you is your religion to me is my religion) and the acknowledgment of the 
existence of ahlu al-kitaab (people of the book), Thabiin, and Majuz; as to build up mutual 
relationship or cooperation with non-Muslims.  NU has been involved in inter-religious 
coalition, and some of its members have been engaged in interfaith dialogue. Regarding 
social relationships, in general NU members tolerate. However, many NU members argue 
that the following activities “Going to church for dialogue and saying Merry Christmas” 
remain sensitive.   
 
6.2.2.5. Gender equality 
Similar to pluralism, gender equality is still a ‘sensitive issue’ for NU members and 
others in Indonesia (UM, MU and J). Islam, according to MFM, advocates gender equality 
with respect to doing good deeds (amal saleh). Islam does not make a distinction between 
males and females.  As stated in the Qur’an “Whosoever does good deed, either males or 
females, Allah will reward him or her.” However, he sees that one side (male) has a degree 
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 over another side (female). He acknowledges that both males and females have different 
rights and responsibilities represesnting a division of role.  This idea is held by the majority 
of NU members.  
  The NU National Conference (Muktamar) issued a decision to include women in the 
NU leadership, and such a decision, according to J, was established by a compromise between 
the rejectionist group and the proponents of gender equality.  In reality, J adds that this 
decision was halfheartedly accepted by the NU members (both the NU younger and old 
generations). For J and fatayat informants the fatwa of some NU clerics indicates that NU has 
half-heartedly accepted gender equality.  In NU activities, it is apparent that women are 
usually assigned much more frequently to the positions of treasury or secretary than to 
public relations. Women are hardly found out at the NU forums. Though NU has female 
autonomous organizations, Muslimat and Fatayat; the boards of NU tanfidziyah (executive) 
as well as shuriah are dominated by males to this day. Gender equality has been accepted 
much more as discourse (idea or elitist) than practice (still far away) (J).   
Debatable issues 
 Though the NU National Conference issued a decision with respect to gender, NU 
members still debate several issues with respect to gender equality. The issues pertain to the 
concept of qawwamuuna and darajat (a male has a degree over a female), and the role of 
females in the public sphere or women’s leadership. 
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 Males’ superiority to females (Ar-rijaalu qawwamu ‘ala an-nisa)   
   MFM recognizes that the interpretation of scriptural text (the Qura’n and Sunnah) 
has been mostly dominated by male biased interests, and such interpretation has interfered 
with the rights of females. The cleric interpretation of the following verse from Qur’an is to 
legitimate the idea that males are superior to females (has degree over a female or a female is 
in the low position in various spheres of life) “Male has a degree over female (Qur’an Al-Nisa 
4: 34). The clerics interpret qawwamuna as leader, and such interpretation does not sound 
good (see also Qamar, 2002: 207). Ar-Rijaal (male) means have the responsibility to empower 
the female. If males do not go to work (care domestic works), they will be considered 
irresponsible. MFM said “I think women do not like such kinds of male” and “males do not 
like females who take charge of economic aspect of household”. It is natural. According to 
MFM, females are not prohibited from engaging in a public sphere (like economy) as long as 
their engagement is not just for the sake of material (property). If getting material is the 
ultimate goal, he said, females will disgrace their own values, because women are vulnerably 
subject to economic exploitation.   Women are engaged in a public sphere in order to 
promote or articulate their self-potential. Women are permitted to get a rate of return as a 
result of their engagement in a public sphere.   
UM and M from Fatayat-NU argue that ar- ijaalu qawwamuuna ‘ala an-nisaa as stated 
on the Qur’an   has a connection with the household affairs. The male takes charge of the 
household, but he has to establish a dialogue with his wife in order to make decisions for his 
r
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 family. Fatayat-NU sees that the male has a degree over female in terms of protection. “Male 
has a degree over female” does not mean that a male can act what he wishes (despotically) 
such as harassment of his wife. Therefore, Muslims have to see other verses of the Qur’an 
saying that washaarihuu hunna bil ma’ruf”, hunna libasul lakum wa antum libasul lahunna. 
(… You must treat your wives with kindness and compassion and in a way that is conducive 
to the smooth running of the household and society at large…).  Ar-rijaalu qawwamuuna ala 
an-nisaa (Men are the protector of their women …) does not automatically mean that men 
are superior to females. There is al (or definite article or the in English) in the word al
rijaalu’ indicating certain males, not males in general (conditions). Al-rijaal, or the males, 
refers to those males who have fulfilled a condition or gotten a degree from Allah (fadhala 
Allah). Should a male who is not knowledgeable about religious affairs be responsible for that 
matter over his wife who is more knowledgeable than her husband?  In a case, where a 
female is economically productive while her husband is unproductive, who among both sides 
has to take responsibility for the economic affairs in the household? In addition, Muslims 
have to understand another verse of the Qur’an such as … mawwadatan warahmah   (to 
establish harmony in a household) and to establish a connection with this verse. As the 
leader of a household, a male has to be responsible for creating a harmonious household. 
-
UM and MU have a similar idea to Fatimah’s, a female NU activist, arguing that 
qawwamu implies several meanings such as ‘companion’, ‘guardian’ or ‘guarantor’ in terms of 
functional roles. Qawwamu, Fatimah adds, has to be defined as a commitment to, care of, 
protection of the rights and needs of a female. Equalizing qawwamu with the world 
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 “pemimpin (a leader) in Bahasa Indonesia is not appropriate, since this verse was related to a 
household case that was complained to the Prophet; this verse was revealed in response to it. 
In addition there is the word ba’dl serving as “muqayyad” (explanation) indicating the 
criteria for being a leader. A leader, according to the Qur’an, has to have a degree over the 
masses such as intellect, leadership and the like. The phrase ba’dluhun a’la ba’dl refers to a 
degree, which refers to general human kind (could be either male or female). The classical 
commentary (interpretation) of the Qur’an demonstrates that the male has a degree over 
female physically and intellectually. The classical interpretation of the Qur’an was 
influenced by the socio-cultural setting at that time (patriarchal era). In fact, this 
interpretation contradicts the reality in the current situation where women are able to hold a 
role that was dominated by males (Fatimah, 2004: 15). In addition, Muslims, according MU, 
have to uphold the general principles, which are stated in the Qur’an, i.e., both male and 
female have equality of rights (Qur’an surah An-Nisa 4: 1), the degree of piety is a significant 
determining factor in the eye of God (Qur’an surah al-Hujurat 49:13); and the rights of an 
individual have to be protected/respected (Qur’an surah al-Isra 17:70) (see also Natsir & Abd. 
Kodir, 2004). 
Women’s leadership 
The issue attracted a heated debate, especially prior to the presidential election (July 
4, 2004); a group of NU clerics who are politically affiliated with PKB (The Awakening 
Party) issued a fatwa about the prohibition of females from holding leadership (presidency).   
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 With respect to women leadership, the NU members are divided into pro and con.  KHJ is 
among the proponents of a cleric fatwa. He upholds firmly to the hadith “la yuflihu qawmu   
walla amrahu imraatan (the belief that a nation or society will not be prosperous whenever it 
hands public affairs over to a female) and the opinion of fiqh clerics who prohibit women 
from taking charge of leadership roles. For instance, fiqh has demonstrated that a female is 
not allowed to lead prayer.   
Four key informants from Fatayat NU (UM, MU, V, and May) do not care for this 
debatable issue. Fatayat-NU contends very much that both sides, pro and con, have their 
own references and interpretations. According to them, whosoever wishes to be a leader 
shall meet certain criteria, Fatayat NU has identified a basis for the sacred text regarding the 
allowability for female to hold a leadership position. UM, MU, V and May argue that women 
deserve to hold the presidency as long as they are able to fulfill the criteria (conditions) such 
as capability, trustworthiness and leadership skills.  In a community there is a woman who 
has a degree over community members (has attained high educational attainment such as 
DR); she is more eligible to be a leader of the community than others.     
MFM says that a woman is allowed to hold a leadership position as long as her 
involvement is for promoting or articulating her potential. Trying to show his neutrality, MA 
argues that whoever advocated the idea that women should be allowed to be president is 
based on the Islamic tenets pertaining to a worldly affair (muamalah ma’aa an-naas). To the 
worldly affairs, Islam encourages its followers (male and female) to compete, in terms of good 
deeds (fastabiqul khairah).  An NU leader such as Siraj (2004) adds that the NU shuriah 
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 national meeting (Konbes = Special Congress), held in 19 March 1957 in Surabaya, issued a 
decree that women were allowed to engage in legislation.  The 1961 NU National issued a 
decree that women were allowed to take charge of village leadership. The 1996 National 
Meeting of NU Clerics (Munas Alim Ulama NU) issued a decree permitting females to hold 
leadership in various spheres of life. 
 The sacred text (hadith), which is used to prohibit women for taking a leadership 
position, does not expose a word “laa yahillu (not permitted or prohibited) instead using the 
word laa yuflihu. Laa yuflihu derives from the word falahaa, yuflihu, referring to unsuccess. 
So the scriptural text (hadith) does not tell us ‘prohibition’.   The text of hadith serves to give 
more information   (khabariyah) than prohibition (nahyi).   From the point of  asbabul 
wurud (the occasion of narration),  hadith was to respond to the wish of the Emperor Kisra 
from Persia who would have handed his leadership over his daughter who was not mature or 
did not have leadership capability.  It was in a connection with a Persia emperor whose 
responsibilities included legislative, executive, judicial, war and the like.  In addition, the 
integrity of rawi (narrator) of this hadith, Abi Bakra’s integrity, is doubtful (unbelievable) 
(MFM, see also Fatimah, 2004: 7; Marcus-Nasisr & Abd. Kodir, 2004; Siradj, 2004)).  
MFM wonders whether both females and males have precisely similar capabilities as 
demonstrated, for instance, by the academic attainment of female students. He wondered 
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 whether or not a female who has high IQ can be successful in the arena of politics.   IQ can 
contribute to the successful leadership to only 30 %.101     
6.2.2.6. Criticism and being critical   
Being critical and having critical thinking constitute the characteristics of democratic 
society.   For instance, TH defines criticism as the utilization of rationality 102to determine 
truth. Whosoever is criticizing other people for fulfilling his or her interests by neglecting 
the rights of others, she or he might not have been critical.103   
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101   For him, this means that both sides, male and female, have different capability one from another. 
With reference to verses of the Qur’an walil a rijaali alahinna darajaat (males are superior to 
females), and wala tatamanaw ma fadh-dhla All h ba’dluhum ‘alaa ba’ld (Don’t you imagine that God 
has granted an advantage to one group (males) over another group (females)),” the key informant is 
questioning the idea that both males and females have a similar capability. Or is it true that 
psychologically, physically, and socially both males and females have precicely equal capabilities. 
Anyone can have such an opinion, but the history of human beings has not demonstrated yet that 
females have similar capabities to males. Does a difference between males and females mean that one 
group is superior to the other? So, let’s prove this statement, whether it is right or wrong. Is the 
statement of Qur’an “ar-ijaalu qawwamu a’alaa an-nisaai (male has a degree (superior to) over female) 
needs to be subject to ideological, sociological, and empirical evidence in order to be proved. 
102 A critical thinker has characteristics as follows: willingness to engage in and persist at a 
complex task (hard work), willingness to plan (he or she must become habitual approach that 
is applied in many different contexts), flexibility or open mindedness (she or he demonstrates 
a willingness to consider new options, try things in new way, and reconsider old problems), a 
willingness to self-correct (he or she has willingness to learn from errors instead of becoming 
defensive about them), being mindful (develop the habit of self-conscious concern for and 
evaluation of the thinking process), consensus-seeking  (to find ways to compromise and to 
achieve agreement. Consensus seeking is not meant to imply conformity; rather it requires 
the ability to persuade others that a particular response is the right one in a particular 
situation) (Halpern, 2003: 196-199). 
103 The key informant is taking an example of dialogue beween the Prophet and his companions as 
follows… The prophet said that “by the endd of epoch, you will find something strange like this and 
like that?” The companions asked him “What shall we do whenever it happens?” “ You have to do 
this.” The companions asked again “Is there a possibility we can do it?”  For this key informant (TH) , 
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 All key informants believe that the Qur’an encourages its believers to think critically. 
As vicegerent on the earth (khalifah fil alardl), a human being is granted intellect, or 
rationality, and other capacities so that he or she can be critical.  In addition, NU members 
claim that NU has inner impetus (e.g., fiqh and mujadalah104) to support the development of 
criticism among its members. 
However, NU members tend to defer to clerics’ authority with respect to 
knowledge,105 and tend to have conservative understanding about the NU ideology and fiqh 
(the authority of jurisprudence in the medieval age). Such orientation might have generated 
an uncritical attitude.106 The conservative understanding about the NU ideology and fiqh are 
not conducive to critical thinking. I am seeing that the NU’s younger generation, according 
to HH, IR, Mu and W, has developed critical thinking of the NU umma.  Their efforts 
                                                                                                                                                             
such questioning mirrors both consciousness or eagerness and efforts to seek the truth. The 
companions were very critical of the Prophet 
104 NU has established mujadalah (public debate)  as tradition in pesantren to promote ciritical 
potential of santris (MFM & MA).  
105 Interruption or criticism against kiyai is considered as suuul adab (morally unethical). However, in 
other pesantrens kiyais are strongly encouraging santris to get much involved in dialogue (discussion) 
(J, HH and TH). These key informants (BE and MA) argue criticism and freedom of mind are allowed 
within the NU tradition, but members have to meet a certain condition, i.e. people have to own 
profound knowledge.
106 Such an uncritical attitude, according to TH, is established for two reasons: first, clerics have strong 
charisma over NU members and they strongly value ulama. The tendency is for the NU umma to  
follow what  clerics say because they assume that only the ideas of their clerics are the righteous (as 
dogma). Second, it assumed that they lack information so they are unable to get other alternative 
information (as comparison). 
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 involve a reinterpretation of the scriptural understanding in response to societal dynamics107 
and the political awareness of the NU umma 108(see subsequent discussion).  
6.3. Citizenship  
With regard to this issue, I did not find special conception from key informants. All 
key informants refers to ideal society (the NU vision), i.e., democratic and just umma, who 
adhere the principles of NU ideology (Aswaja). All NU members interviewed agree that basic 
principles of Aswaja, such as tawasuth, tasamauh, i’tidal (justice) amar ma’ruf (enjoining good 
deed) and nahyi munkar (refraining wrong doing), which are stressed in the Qur’an, serve as 
the bases for defining what a good citizen is. Tawasuth and i’tidal demonstrate moderation 
with the emphasis on justice for all and refraining from adopting extremes (tasarruf) in views 
and actions (see also Lukman, 2004).  At-tawazun demonstrates the attitude of ‘in between 
position’ (balancing) by which the NU umma has to struggle for their rights and commit to 
duties as citizens of the state. NU, according to M and MM, has a code of conduct which is 
used to lead the NU members in relation to the state. It is formulated within the concept of 
                                                 
107 The progressive the NU ulama (clerics) have attempted to reconstruct the understanding of 
theological norms. They made a change of their perspectives from theo-centric to anthropological 
ways of thinking. Islamic concepts, which were put too much on a theo-locus, have to be interpreted 
and practiced in terms of anthropological dimensions. In Islam any ritual devotion to God (hablun 
min Allah) contains in itself social dimensions (hablun min an-naas). Muslisms are strongly 
encouraged to strive any efforts to manifest the social dimension of ritual devotion into reality or life 
(Z and see also Lukman, 2004: 92-93). 
108  NU umma participates in the control of the implementation of public policy at local levels (village, 
sub-district and disstlrict). The NU members have to uphold the principles of serving the public 
interests (mashalihu umma) as a means for assessing the government policy and implementation (HH, 
MM and IR). 
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 ukhuwah wathoniyah. According to the NU code of conduct, the NU members have to 
commit to rule of law and the unity of Indonesia, to be dedicated in their actions to serving 
public interests.  Also all key informants say that NU has a bylaw to regulate the 
relationships between board and members, as well as leadership recruitment. Similar to M 
key informants, NU interviewees argue that people’s involvement in NU is based on the 
spirits of voluntarism, competing for good deeds and social satisfaction. 
6.4. Educating for democracy 
For NU, educating for democracy concerns how NU transforms itself from the 
orthodox understanding of its ideology and fiqh, disseminate the ideas of moderate, inclusive 
and emancipatory Islam to the community at large, promotes political awareness among  NU 
members and community at large in formal politics (electoral voting) and public policy at the 
local level, and develops  such democratic values as freedom, justice, equality, justice, respect 
for plurality to both NU members and the community at large (Bur, HH, IR, J, IR, LNS, M, 
Muf, MU, UM, V, W, & Z). NU has attempted to do a variety of thins in this regard, as will 
be discussed in the following sections. 
6.4.1. Transforming ways of thinking of kiyais  
This program has been initiated and organized by the NU’s younger generation 
through autonomous bodies of NU such as Lakspesdam including fatayat and NU-NGO 
(P3M).  NU’s younger generation believes that the orthodox understanding about the 
ideology of Aswaja and being blindly obedient to the authority of classical work of clerics of 
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 the medieval ages has generated close-mindededness of the NU members.   NU has to 
transform the ways of thinking of orthodoxy (the ideology of ahlus Sunnah and fiqh) to be 
more open (rational) before it introduces the idea of democracy to the community at large, as 
stated earlier.  
Why does NU need to transform itself from orthodoxy? NU has established fiqh as 
tradition and NU members argue that fiqh is derived (developed) from the Qur’an and 
Hadith. Fiqh which is usually introduced to the NU umma is conventional and emphasizes 
issues about personal affairs (ahwaalu sakhshiyah) and ritual devotion than societal issues 
such as human rights, gender equality, and the like.  The majority of NU members identify 
classical works (kitab kuning) as an ideal type of personality; such perceptions make NU 
members closed to any different perspective. Also NU’s younger generation contends that 
Islam contains some tenets that can be interpreted as being in opposition to the ideas of 
democracy. For instance, verses in relation to jihad, individual freedom and exclusivism. 
Moreover, the kiyai (clerics) plays a more significant role than rationality and reasonable 
argument in making decisions. Such a role has drawn kiyais into authoritarianism, since the 
followers are fond of extolling their kiayis and become blindly obedient to kiyais. Kiyais are 
like kings of “pesantren kingdom”, the followers (santris) consider the speech of kiyais as 
“regulation or law”, which binds them (BE, HH, IR, J, M, MM, TH, W and Z and see also 
Qomar, 2002: 88).      
 PPWK, according to   MM, M, HH and W, is to provide the younger generations of 
kiyai muda who are willing to take on leadership roles using methodological and ideological 
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 nuances in order to make them responsive or open to contemporary issues. This program 
provides kiyai muda with notions or understandings about the pluralist theology and shariah, 
social analysis (theories), and other contemporary issues.  
According to IR, this program serves as the elaboration of three missions of NU in 
relation to the development  of Indonesian society: i.e., ukhuwah i lamiyah (relationship 
among Muslim), ukhuwah bashariah (NU in relation to all human beings), and ukhuwah 
wathnoniyah (NU in relation to the state), after it has re-established its position for a return 
to the spirit of 1926, the year of NU’s formation as a social and religious body, implying that 
NU might soon shed its political character and function (W and see also Vasil, 1997). Each 
mission has a connection with issues in relation to the state, politics and human rights.  
Ukhuwah wataniyah is related to the concept of politics of a nation-state that includes the 
issue of gender of equality and mission of democracy. These issues are not well known 
among the majority of Indonesian Muslims and some Muslims consider the discussion of 
such issues un-Islamic (secular) (IR). So this program is to deconstruct the ways of thinking 
of the younger generations of NU kiyai and by so doing they get familiar with the issues of 
democracy, human rights, and genders, and they are provided with social analysis (tool) in 
order to make them open-minded (HH). 
s
6.4.1.1. Approach and Activities.    
To transform orthodoxy within the NU umma, the autonomous organizational bodies 
of NU (BANNU) have organized activities with the focus on respect for plurality, tolerance, 
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 gender equality. Lakpesdam-NU of Jakarta province developed such democratic values as 
tolerance, respect for pluralism (respect for the rights of other believers or non-Muslims), 
and the like to da’is (proselytizers) who have umma basis—i.e., those who lead religious 
forums (Majlis Ta’lim and Majlis Dzikir). Lakspesdam-Jakarta organized a workshop forum 
(saresehan) attended by various believers to identify and set up an approach or program in 
promoting democratic principles especially tolerance, mutual respect, and respect for 
plurality to diverse believers. Through this workshop, diverse believers were encouraged to 
identify and set up alternative approaches or program in order to promote mutually 
harmonious relationship among diverse believers. At the same time, Lakpesdam-Jakarta 
organized a similar program for Muslim clerics (da’i) of various groups (moderate and 
fundamentalist) to introduce the issue of Islam in relation to such contemporary issues as 
tolerance, mutual understanding, and respect for plurality (religious pluralism), gender 
equality and democracy. Through this program, Lakpesdam-Jakarta sought to reduce the 
tensions between moderate and ‘radical/fundamentalist’ Muslims. In turn, those dais are 
expected to disseminate ideas regarding contemporary issues to the Muslim community at 
large.  
Lakpesdam-NU of Jakarta selected da’is for several reasons. First, since da’is interact 
daily with umma; da’is might play a more effective role in disseminating the ideas of 
democracy to the public than other groups in a community. Second, da’is know how to 
introduce new ideas to the public by using their own language. This program is to transform 
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 their ways of thinking (perspectives) toward understanding religious tenets in relation to 
societal problems (J).    
Fatayah-NU, according to MU, advocates the rights of equality between males and 
females. Fatayat-NU introduces such female rights as reproduction, access to education, 
sexual enjoyment, pregnancy, baby delivery, and breast feeding. Fatayat-NU contends that 
the NU umma think of fiqh as a sacred book, the cleric ideas as dogma. Such a point of view 
demonstrates obstinacy. Fatayat-NU is of the opinion that a female as a human being is 
granted (by God) the freedom of mind or expression, which includes the rights to reinterpret 
the scriptural text, including interpretations that reflect male biased interests.   Fatayat-NU 
has organized several activities. For instance, it has facilitated discussion about the scriptural 
text pertaining to gender issues, including the occasion of revelation (asbaabu an-nuzul), 
grammar and patterns, as well as semantics. Fatayat-NU invites the board members of 
Muslimah NU (Female Body of NU) and gender specialists from outside NU.  
In addition, Fatayat-NU has criticized a classical book “Uquud al-Lujjain’ written by 
Nawawi (cleric). The book discusses “a model of wife-husband relationships” that 
demonstrates male bias interest’109 Fatayat-NU has also organized the materials of serial 
discussion into a book, published and distributed it to the Fatayat-NU board  of various 
                                                 
109 This book is usually studied by santris (pesantren students) during Ramadan month. Some 
examples of the writer’s interpretation with respect to husband-wife relationships (male biased 
interests) are (a) a husband considers his wife as slavery, (b) a wife is not allowed to manage her own 
property without any permission from her husband, (c) a wife is not allowed to give a meal to 
another person without permission from her husband, (d) a wife who leaves home without 
permission from her husband will be cursed by an angel (Nawawi, .n.a: 17, 21). 
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 levels, i.e. provincial, district, sub-district, of all Indonesian provinces. Moreover, Fatayat-
NU organizes a dialogue with the NU clerics (ulama) and daiah (female proselytizers) about 
the gender issues such as role of women in family and public sphere, reproduction right, 
abortion110 and health (family health program = LKK) and women rights protection (legal 
aid).     
An NGO, which is ideologically affiliated with NU, P3M (Center for Pesantren and 
Community Development) in cooperation with Lakpesdam-NU organized a series of 
discussion about Islam and contemporary issues for NU activists from autonomous bodies 
such as students (PMII), Fatayat, Ansor (NU Youth Body). It also conducted workshops to 
introduce to pesantren (kiyai s=clerics) the ideas of “emancipatory Islam and transformative 
Islam” along with the ideas of civil society and democracy. W and Bur explain several 
reasons for choosing pesantren. First, pesantren is the target group of P3M. Second, the 
majority of pesantren communities are unfamiliar with such contemporary ideas as 
democracy and human rights because those issues are not written in Arabic (kitab kuning = 
classical books). Therefore, P3M has developed discussion program to criticize the issues of 
                                                 
110 Fatayat-NU has promoted discussion about abortion for several reasons. First, MUI (Muslim 
Clerics Concil) and NU clerics argue that abortion is prohibited (haram) and that their opinion relies 
too much on the classical books. Second, Indonesia is not an Islamic state, so we don’t have a legal 
authority to prohibit people from practicing abortion because the ‘secular’ law does not prohibit 
abortion. Third, data indicate that 2.3 million females have died because of having had an abortion.  
Some women practice ‘traditional abortion’ (drinking herbal medicine) in order to prevent 
pregnancy. Essentially traditional abortion is similar to medical abortion (seeking the service of 
medical doctor).  Fourth, Fatayat-NU suggests that al-Qur’an strongly prohibits killing human beings. 
Do we have to consider that embryo (fetus) of 0-1 month age has a soul (life)?  Fatayat-NU argues 
that abortion is a fact and we, Muslims, have to have a perspective that helps females. Otherwise, 
there will be many more abortion cases (victims). Conversely, all clerics insist that allowing abortion 
means to legalize prostitution (pre marital sexual intercourse). 
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 Islam and contemporary issues such as poverty, human right, democracy, gender equality 
and the like using socio-philosophical analysis (critical perspectives). Then P3M introduced 
via workshops such contemporary issues to members of the younger generations of kiyais 
(who will take charge of pesantren leadership from the old generations of kiyais). To make 
these issues easy for those kiayis to understand, P3M uses such terms as al-musawah 
(equality), al-‘itidal (justice), and hurriyah (freedom), with which they are more familiar 
than they are with other terms such as individual sovereignty, freedom, and gender equality. 
In addition, P3M organized trainings with respect to “participatory or emancipatory Islam”. 
These trainings concern how Islamic tenets (the scriptural text) can be interpreted and 
elaborated in relation to societal realities (societal problems) such as gender sensitivity, poor 
liberation, protection of labor rights, response to human rights violation and the like.   
P3M, according to W, introduced training materials about, for example, Islam in 
relation to democracy, Islam and citizens (umma), Islam and human rights. Those issues are 
elaborated into the concepts used in the Islamic discourses in pesantren.  For instance, P3M 
takes the concepts of Al-Ghazaly stated in his book entitled usuulu al-khamsah111  and the 
principle of Islamic jurisprudence (e.g., kaidah fiqh ‘tasarraful imam ‘ala maa ra’ya bil 
masalahah (a leader has to uphold firmly the principle “for public interests” in running his 
policies and program) to introduce principles of democracy.      
                                                 
l111 Usuulu a -khamsah (five principles), the work of al-Ghazaly contains freedom of beliefs or 
religions (hifzu ad-din) from enforced conversion, freedom of self protection  (hifdzu an-naf) from 
violation, the protection of family and next generation (hifzu an-nasl), protection of property  (hifzu 
al-maal), and the protection of profession and intellect (hifzu al-aql). 
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 6.4.2. Disseminating the idea of Moderate Islam the community at large 
  This program concerns how NU promotes the idea of moderate Islam to the 
community at large. This program is a means to communicate about issue as democracy, 
gender equality, pluralism, and tolerance as they relate Islam; the target participants are 
members of the rejectionist group.  To disseminate such contemporary issues as democracy, 
human rights, Islam and democracy, pluralist Islam, Islam and the anti-harassment 
movement, and the anti-corruption movement to the community at large, Lakpesdam-NU 
uses various communication channels. Lakpesdam-NU cooperates with private radio stations 
to broadcast statements and debates on these contemporary issues. Second, Lakpesdam-NU 
has taken initiatives for establishing “discussion forums” on several campuses such as UI 
(universitas Indonesia = University of Indonesia), ITB (Institut Teknologi Bandung = 
Bandung Institute of Technology), IPB (Institut Pertanian Bogor or Bogor Institute for 
Agricultue) and UMMI (Universitas Muslim Makasar Indonesia = Muslim University of 
Makasar, Indonesia).112 
For Lakpesdam-NU, the “Islamist/fundamentalist group” misinforms the community 
at large. Because the majority of Muslims in Indonesia, according to HH, IR and W, do not 
consider Islam compatible with democracy. Lakpesdam-NU and P3M have been struggling to 
establish a theological basis for advocating ideas related to democracy. As J explains, that 
                                                 
112 These campuses are chosen for several reasons. First, these campuses are assumed to produce 
“radical Muslims”. Second, external organizations of Muslim students such as HMI (Muslim Students 
Association of Indonesia), IMM (The Association of Muhammadiyah Students) and PMII (Muslim 
Indonesian Movement= NU autonomous organization) pay less attention to the issues of Islamic 
radicalism or fundamentalism, which has grown up fast in those campuses (MM, M and HH). 
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 Lakpesdam-NU of Jakarta province organized a training, which involved FPI (Forum 
Pembelaan Islam= Forum for Islam Defense)—Islamic fundamentalists of Indonesia.  The 
objective of this program is to normalize the relationships between the Islamic 
fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist Muslim groups. This forum has encouraged both 
sides to communicate with each other, though they cannot be unified.  
6.4.3. Deliberative democracy:  Education for Democracy113
This program has been run by Lakpesdam-central office for three periods during 
December 2000 until April 2005.  This pilot project is financially supported by the Ford 
Foundation within the scheme of civil society and democratization program in Indonesia. 
The goal of this program is to develop participants’ knowledge about procedural democracy 
and to raise awareness of the extent to which public policy corresponds to public interests. 
Lakpesdam-NU is of the opinion that democracy will work (be functional) whenever 
community members becomes aware of their rights, takes part in making decision, and 
aggregates their rights (MM & M).  While the New Order regime of Suharto disconnected 
community participation from the process of development, in the era of reformation 
                                                 
113 James (2004: 52) advocates the idea of plural deliberation, saying that it is a framework for 
assessing the legitimacy of the democratic process and institutions through which members of diverse 
and constructed collective identities reach collective decisions. Central to this framework is a critical 
process that induces participants to reflect upon and potentially to revise their preferences, interests, 
opinions, perspectives, and worldviews. Collective decisions may include the choice of broad 
constitutional frameworks and specific policies or candidates. Legitimacy is is central within plural 
deliberation. Legitimacy derives from a complex assessment of four elements: the scope of 
deliberation, the relationship between understanding and criticism, the link between deliberation 
and decision-making, and conditions governing the deliberative and aggregative fairness of 
institutions and processes. 
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 Lakpesdam-NU encourages the community members to take part in developing policies that 
serve the public interest.  Lakpesdam-NU assumes that citizen forums, representing various 
community groups, are important to explore and develop community participation and 
identify the public interests.    
6.4.1.2. Objective:  knowledge or skill developed within public  
This program is to develop political awareness among community members of 
government, especially local government, policies. It provides community members with 
knowledge about such public policies and promotes community participation in shaping 
policy and local government management (e.g., at the village level). To achieve this 
objective, Lakpesdam-NU organizes workshops for community facilitators, who are informed 
about public policy and provided with skills on how to negotiate, to advocate, and to respond 
to a case or moment/public dialogue (political organizing). The participants are also guided in 
how to facilitate community involvement in identifying problems, formulating objectives, 
making decisions, reaching agreement within a group or with another party (becoming 
aware of), organizing members of community into small groups, and monitoring these 
groups. The program is also designed to increase community members’ awareness of their 
rights (expression, assembly and negotiation with the government) as well as to enhance 
their understanding about procedural democracy, i.e., elections and the ideal and actual 
functions of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.   
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 6.4.1.3. Coverage areas, approach, and citizen forums   
Lakpesdam-NU (Center) selected three districts; each district covers 12 sub-districts 
and 50 villages. In the first phase of this program (December 2000 until April 2002), 
Lakpesdam-NU organized workshops on P4D (Perencanaan Partisipatif Penyusunan Program 
Pembangunan Desa = Participatory Planning for Rural Development Program) involving 
community representatives from 50 villages, including village chairs. Having participated in 
the P4D workshop, participants from each village were expected to follow up on two main 
agendas: 1) a proposal for rural development program and 2) a plan for establishing a 
community or citizen forum (FW = Forum Warga) for each village.   
In developing these workshops, Lakpesdam-NU employs a participatory approach, 
emphasizing informal discussion and small group meetings, which involve members of a 
group either in solving a problem or in planning a follow-up program.  Once a citizen forum 
has been established, the facilitator’s role is to organize a public dialogue that involves local 
government officials such as village chairs, sub-district chairs, and district personnel. A 
facilitator promotes dialogue between the parties, i.e. community and local government 
officials, to reach an understanding and commitment about a community-based development 
program and its implementation. At the district level, public dialogue is held at least once a 
year, while at the village level, a public dialogue can be held at any time when the 
community wishes to do so.  
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 Through FW (Citizen Forum), the community at large is involved in informal 
meetings, individual consultations, and group discussions. The community at large is 
informed about issues, such as the urgency of community participation, the process of 
making public policies, the role of social institutions including mass associations, and 
community representation.  To communicate the development agenda of a community with 
local government and the legislative branch, an ad-hoc committee is created within every 
citizen forum.  This committee is responsible for pushing the local government to 
adopt/enact the community’s program and to support its implementation. 
 In the second phase of this program, Lakpesdam-NU (Center) organized  three main 
elements: facilitators, citizen’s forums, and the citizen forum media forum. The task of a 
facilitator, who is a member of the local community, is to facilitate members of citizen 
forums of five villages.  Lakpesdam-NU provides facilitators with knowledge and skills 
related to the technology of participation (TOP) and community empowerment. Each 
facilitator is strongly recommended to establish a network with local organizations and 
conduct joint training or advocacy activities with other community organizers and NGOs.  
Through a citizen forum, each facilitator is supposed to involve the community in 
assessing community problems, developing proposals for solving these problems, and 
establishing communication and other links with relevant agencies. Also, facilitators assist 
community members to understand the implementation of public policies at local level, and 
help them to fight for a program proposed by the community. For example, in the districts of 
Jepara, Wonosobo and Cilacap, facilitators together with the community analyzed the 
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 shortcomings of a local development program and developed a new/different program based 
on community needs. Later, they organized a dialogue with local government officials so that 
this new/different program would be implemented114.      
Media such as the Citizen Forum journal serves two functions: a) disseminating 
information pertaining to public policy and (budget) development programs of government, 
especially local government, to the community at large and b) communicating the needs or 
aspirations of the community to the local government. The Journal of Citizen Forum for 
Bekasi district for instance is distributed to 23 sub-districts and 182 villages (Sul and Mu).  
 In addition, Lakpesdam-NU Bekasi has organized a program to strengthen the 
position of the community in relation to the local government. This program is to provide 
such strategic groups as clerics and community leaders, with knowledge about public policies 
and skills for analyzing local government budgets (APBD). In addition to clarifying 
community’s needs, this program helps community leaders to influence the development of 
public policy and its implementation at the district level.  
6.4.2. Voter education 
Voter education, focusing on a key element of procedural democracy, aims at 
promoting people’s participation in elections. Through voter education, Lakpesdam-NU of 
the Bekasi district seeks to promote the political rights of the community at large (Muf, Yul 
                                                 
114 Lakpesdam-NU Bekasi is going to develop a dialogue between citizen forums, the local 
government, and the media.  There is a gap between the interests of the local government and the 
community’s needs. The local government tends to be closed to the ideas coming from below. At the 
same time, the community at large has less access to information about the development program, 
especially the budget 
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 and Sul). Those people who were involved in voter education should be neutral in relation to 
political choice (e.g., selecting a particular presidential candidate). However, some of them 
were also involved in the campaigning for a candidate, such as Amin Rais for president or 
Hasyim Muzaddi for vice president (Muf). 
In 2004 Fatayat-NU used a voter education program to mobilize 12,000.0 volunteers 
to monitor voting in 297 districts in 12 provinces. These volunteers taught the community at 
large how to exercise their rights to vote, to monitor ballot, and to understand whether the 
candidate congress members fight for the rights and aspiration of women. In addition, 
Fatayat-NU established centers for election consultation (Posko) in 10 locations of Java in 
order to promote voters’ participation in election. Fatayat-NU reported that 120 people 
visited to each posko.   
An NU-NGO, P3M, organized workshops about voting for volunteers, to develop 
their capacity to analyze the Indonesian Constitution and the UU Pemilu (Electoral Voting 
Law)115.  With the help of voter education, P3M wanted to encourage community leaders, 
including kiyai, to promote participation in voting and to become involved in district-level 
                                                 
115 According to Muh, UU Pemilu is to cope with problems that arose in the previous electoral system, 
but this law demonstrates its weaknesses.  It was stated that open and proportionate electoral voting 
is to bridge the gap beween the interests of the community and political parties. In practice, political 
parties have the predominant right to decide who will be on the list of parliament candidates. The 
scoring system gives room for the political elites to establish the crony system in the political process.  
For instance, A is a  board member of a political party at the district level, while B is a board member 
of the same political party at the sub-district level.  A will have more room to be a parliamentary 
representative/member at the district level or provincial level than B because A gets a range of score 
higher than B, though B has closer contacts with his constituents (mass basis). Such a system 
demonstrates the crony system by which community representation shall be thwarted. 
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 policy-making process.  P3M informed participants about the electoral system, and the 
voting law. P3M encouraged participants to consider crucial issues of community 
representation116, addressed in Charter 82 of this law. The 2004 electoral system provides 
people room to evaluate the track records of each candidate of parliament.   
6.4.3. Education for anti-Corruption Movement  
In 2002, the International Transparency Agency published its research report 
describing how in some Islamic or Muslim countries as having high levels of political 
corruption, while secular states such as Singapore and Switzerland are less likely to witness 
corruption,117 Indonesia has demonstrated a paradoxical feature. Indonesia, a Muslim country 
where 87 % of the population is Muslim, has ranged in the position between 1 to 3 of 
countries with high corruption rates.118  Although not denying this fact, P3M is seeking to 
                                                 
116 According to Muh, about 70 to 80 % of parliament candidates (DPR Pusat) live in Jakarta, but they 
had to be representatives of the districts where they were born. It is estimated that 80 % of 
parliament members have at best only limited with their constitutents, because of this situation.  
117 Corruption can be defined ass the abuse of trust in the interest of private gain. It is the intentional 
misperformance or neglect of a recognized duty, or the unwarranted exercise of power with the 
motive at gaining some advantage more or less directly personal. Corruption can be described as 
stealing through decception in a situation which betrays a trust (Alatas, 1990). Corruption may occur 
in various institutions such as executive, legislative, judicative, media, civil society andbusiness. 
Corruption by public officials takes the form of behavior which deviates from the normal duties of a 
public role by favoring  private interests (e.g. family or friends) for pecuniary or status gains or  by 
violating rule against exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. This include such 
behaviors as bribery (use of reward to prevent the judgement of a person in a position of trust), 
nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reasons of ascriptive rather then merit-based criteria), and 
misappropriateion (illegal appropriateion of public resources for private-regarding use) 
(Heidenheimer, 2002). See also Waren (2004).  
118 Harris (2003: 199-200) classifies high corruption and low corruption countries. High corruption 
countries are those where corruption is “normal” behavior. Such behavior may manifest itself in 
different ways. In its pure forms, it is likely to entail: all other branches of government being 
subordinated to an-all powerful and unaccountable executive; a banking system which funds the 
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 make religious tenets functional and, according to W, has proposed an anti-corruption 
movement based on the pesantren community.119  However, there are several reasons why 
corruption might occur in Muslim majority countries: 1) “ar-rasyi wal murtasyi” states that a 
person who is involved in a lawsuit is prohibited (haram) from bribing the judge and 2) 
many literalists among Muslims say they have difficulty finding scriptural  texts as hujjah 
(proof) for the prohibition (haram) of corruption, although the Qur’an includes words –
‘rishwah,’ sariq,’ bathil, and fasaad that connote corruption, or acting corruptly. As stated on 
the surah An-Nisa 3: 29 and 30 “Oh ye who believe, consume not your property between 
your selves unlawfully …”  “Whosoever seeks to acquire property by way of transgression 
and injustice, We shall cast him into the Fire…”   
6.4.3.1. Stage and activities  
The anti-corruption movement (a coalition of diverse religious groups) published a 
guidebook for proselytizers of Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism. This guidebook 
can be used to disseminate the idea of anti-corruption to the community at large.  Aside from 
                                                                                                                                                             
l
executive’s predatory conduct; a series of variably coordinated but symbiotic clientelistic and patronal 
networks sometimes passing as manifestation of traditional culture; a general assumption that to 
obtain a service one must make a payment; a non-democratic or ineffectively democraic political 
system; a heavily controlled press; low GDP; poor literacy standard; high military and low social 
expenditure;  and heavy IMF debtor status. A low-corruption country is one where: the structures of 
government are basically robust and accountable; one would not seriously contemplate  trying to 
bribe a judge and police officer; constitutional safeguard against abuse exists; whistle-blowing is 
practical option; when instances of corruption emerge, the miscreant is disciplined or prosecuted , an 
inquiry is held and system glitches rectified. In other words, the system correct and return to a 
functioning state. 
119 Those who are involved in secular NGOs want to see how religions like Islam respond to the 
problem of corruption.    Muslims often advocate hadith, saying that “ar-rasyi wal murtasyi fin naar” 
or “la’natullaahi a al rasyi wal murtasyi” (those who are bribing and bribed shall be cursed by God). 
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 a guidebook, P3M will publish an anthology entitled “Kiyai dalam kontrol public dalam 
menghadapi korups (Clerics and their Roles in Control of Public Policy and Anti-corruption 
Movement).”  In May 2004, P3M organized a national workshop, attended by kiayis from 14 
districts of Central Java, East Java, West Java, Banten, and Lampung, to discuss and formulate 
a theological and fiqh foundation for a stance against corruption. This program, i.e., 
education for anti-corruption, is derived from the concept of emancipatory Islam, in which 
the scriptural text is used as an incentive for launching an anti-corruption movement.  
Through education for anti-corruption, kiyais might have to also be committed to an anti-
injustice movement. To follow up this program, each participant (kiayi) has an agenda to 
establish a forum in his community, which serves to discuss and control public policy in his 
district.  
6.4.3.2. Issue of investigation techniques 
According to my informants, there are several techniques to make sure that 
corruption investigations are conducted properly, and these are the focus of some of the 
educational programs discussed above. Kiyais are taught techniques for analyzing district 
budgets, Thus, they may be able to detect, for example, that the administrative budget 
represents 60 % of the total, while 40 % of total is allotted for societal development. Or they 
may be able to discover that a governor has received Rp 300 millions per annum for a coffee 
budget, which is equivalent to Rp 400.000.0 – Rp 500.000.0/day for coffee. These skills were 
provided to those participants who would become community organizers (CO). Several steps 
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 have to be taken by each community organizer: fact findings, organizing data into legal 
documents, and disseminating information about corruption to the public (such as 
community leaders). The team encourages community leaders to scrutinize, study, and 
analyze data as well as to advocate120 (W, Ban, and Mu).  
                                                 
120 A mayor received a budget amount of Rp 200,000.0/day for his breakfast. The budget for the mayor 
household has reached hundreds upon hundreds million rupias fper year. Therefore, this program is 
expected to generate the skill and awareness needed to control the budget at the district level 
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 7. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
  
The previous two chapters have discussed separately M and NU in relation to the role of each 
in the process of democratization, their members’ perceptions and experiences in democracy, 
as well as their experiences in developing education for democracy in Indonesia. This 
chapter will compare M and NU members’ concepts and experiences with respect to 
democracy, democratic society, citizenship, and education for democracy.  Each Islamic civil 
society association has its basic values or ideology, which serve as a guide (essential) for each 
association and its umma to realize its mission within society. Therefore, a discussion of the 
ideology of each organization will be included in this chapter. 
7.1. The ideology underpinning M and NU 
Both M and NU are affiliated with the ideology of Sunni (orthodox), but M members 
prefer to say that their organization follows the  tajdid movement advocating ijtihad and 
calling for a return to the pristine ways of scripture rather than following the Sunni tradition 
per se (Naser, 2000; Saleh 2001: 97).   Aside from upholding three characteristic above, M, as 
a tajdid movement,   reformulates the Islamic doctrines by adopting modern perspectives or 
thoughts. In this way, M seeks to eradicate feudal attitude, promote civil values such as a 
willingness to help others; and translate the scriptural text as stated earlier into praxis121 in 
                                                 
121 These praxis works serve as the manifestation of the Islamic tenet, amar ma’ruf (enjoining good 
deed) (Naser, 2001).   
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 various fields of works such as education,  health system, cooperative, small-scale credit, 
bank, orphan care, and the like.  
According to Wahid (2000), M’s call for a direct return to the Qur’an and Sunnah 
allows the organization to develop the understanding of scriptural text into praxis along with 
societal dynamics (problems), without spending too much time in continuous debates about 
the classical works, kitab kuning, (the ideas of the Islamic clerics in the medieval age). By 
being actively involved in various spheres of life M’s membership is able to translate and 
elaborate the maqashidu samaa (God’s will) into reality (humane lives or humane problems).  
Such conditions enable M to develop a new and dynamic intellectual tradition and to make a 
clear distinction between two dimensions of religion (Islam), i.e., values system and praxis 
(hablun min an-naas). Also these conditions enable M to introduce a new model of 
understanding the Qur’an according to themes or issues, which are related to societal 
dynamics (tafsiru maudlu’i—taking the Qur’an and as-Sunnah as the primary sources and 
employing ijtihad to the maximum). By so doing, M can distinguish religious understanding 
and the scriptural text clearly (Wahid 2000). The religious understanding is relative, which 
means that the interpretation of the scriptural text has a connection with the social, cultural 
and psychological setting of mufassir (the exoteric commentator of the Qur’an). The 
scriptural text is merely the absolute one.  
However, M was often trapped into conservatism and rigidity with respect to the 
religious ideology (Puritanism), and reductionism, especially in translating the tajdid concept 
into fiqh issues (furuiyah). The M umma often get involved more in the on going debates 
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 about furuiyah (such as qunut) or heterodoxy (like tahlilan) with the NU umma   (J; also see 
Azra, 1997; Mulkhan, 2000; Saleh, 2001). Its involvement in that matter enables M members 
to have one-sided stance which will thwart its effort to create democratic attitude.  Amin 
and the M young generation look into M itself and suggest that M have to energize the spirit 
of tajdid and ijtihad into both thought and praxis works more responsive to societal dynamics 
of Indonesian society at the present and future times. Otherwise, M ajdid would be counted 
for the past history.  A new vision of M, which contains five formulae advocated by Rais (see 
Chapter 4), is supposed to develop and boost the spirit of tajdid responsively and diligently.  
t
In contrast, NU insists that its membership have to be affiliated with the ideology of 
ahlus Sunnah wal jamaah or aswaja (Saleh, 201: 97; Lukman, 2004; Wahid, 1986). NU 
members believe that the aswaja and fiqh tradition gives room (inner impetus) to respect 
differences or plurality, individual freedom, and local culture amidst the religious teaching. 
Aside from that, NU establishes fiqh as both a tradition and guide in making decisions for its 
organization and public interests (masalihu umma). NU claims that fiqh and appreciation of 
local culture will give more room for people who have different religious beliefs to coexist. 
These points, which serve as an asset for NU to promote democratic society in Indonesia, 
enable the NU umma to be more open-mind and appreciative of the plurality than the 
modernist group (J &MFM). NU’s involvement in the Islamic classical works, kitab kuning, 
(clerics of the medieval age) enables especially the NU members to develop Islamic thought 
through intensely analytical studies. By so doing, NU can develop open-mindedness among 
NU members (criticism and critical thinking).  
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 This ideal is not fully realized. As noted in Chapter 6, some key informants, as stated 
earlier, argue that the Sunni fiqh was derived from the tradition of the ruling group (the 
interests of elite and very personal) and focused more on the concept of piety from the 
perspective of personal interest (masalatu sha’shiyah) rather than addressing human 
problems (such as justice, and social inequality). Fiqh was the product of personal ijtihad, 
which according to the NU’s younger generation is subject to authoritarianism. The NU 
umma take fiqh not only as a reference but also exemplary model of behavior/attitude. The 
tradition of sami’na wa atha’na (obedient without reserve especially to its clerics), according 
to a key informant (BE), is accepted by most NU members. Freedom of expression and 
criticism against their clerics are permitted as long as a person has profound knowledge. The 
NU umma exaggeratedly respect its clerics and such appreciation has enabled its members to 
make a cult of its clerics, and the NU members closed-minded. These mentioned factors may 
have thwarted the development of democracy. The NU younger generation members have 
attempted to transform the orthodox understanding of aswaja and fiqh through various 
programs  since NU restated its spirit of khittah 1926 in 1984 (IR, J, RR &Z).  The educational 
attainment of the NU younger generation in both secular and religious disciplines has 
enabled them to be critical of and to generate criticism and critical stance in relation to the 
state (see also Ida, 2004). The NU younger generation has successfully transformed NU itself, 
and such internal transformation has enabled NU to generate critical thoughts about Islam in 
relation to contemporary issues or societal problems.   
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 7.2. Democracy 
 M and NU informants express similar conceptions of democracy as a social and 
political system. Both M and NU see democracy as including two dimensions: procedural and 
substantive. The former concerns how a democratic institution such as trias politica, which 
includes people’s participation in formal politics such as electoral voting, works effectively. 
M and NU members argue that the manifestation of democracy has to be framed within the 
creating prosperity for all citizens regardless of their backgrounds. Everyone has to be fairly 
treated to access, for example, better education, better job, better health services and the like. 
The substantive democracy, according to M and NU’s interviewees, has to do with imparting 
such core values of democracy as respect for differences or plurality, rights of individuals, 
freedom, justice, open-mindedness, tolerance, criticism, independence, amanah and other 
civil values to the community at large, including in Indonesia. Pertaining to this point, the M 
and NU’s interviewees agree that Indonesia has to develop substantive democracy because 
Indonesia has already realized a degree of procedural democracy such as electoral voting and 
reforming state institutions. Indonesia needs to develop democratic culture to its general 
population because Indonesia is a multiethnic state whose population identify with diverse 
religions. Such diversity could stimulate a conflict if the population is not well prepared to 
live in pluralistic society.  
With respect to Islam and democracy, there are several issues such as the 
compatibility or incompatibility of Islam with (Western concepts of) democracy. Both M and 
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 NU members believe that the Qur’an contains tenets such as ‘adalah (justice), anti-dzulm 
(against injustice, corrupting act or oppression), musawwat (equality) and shura that are 
equivalent to Western ideas of democracy. Both M and NU argue that concept of shu a 
(understood as consultation, deliberation and dialogue, council and experts giving advice to a 
ruling group) needs to be elaborated into a system or mechanism. Moreover, M and NU 
members argue that shura assumes certain conditions such as equal rights, egalitarianism, 
rights of freedoms, and respect for differences, justice, and commitment to obey agreement 
(law) among those people who make decisions.  
r
                                                
The membership of both M and NU reflects diverse viewpoints: accomodationists, 
rejectionist and in between. Some NU and M members say that Islam contains in itself tenets 
congruent with (Western notions of) democracy such as shura, justice (musawat), anti-dzulm 
(anti-injustice) and the like. They say that Islam has tradition with respect to organizing 
society (baiah) and a model of pluralistic society led by the Prophet Muhammad, al-mujtama 
al-madinah (Medina society) bounded by the Medina charter, and this term is now used to 
designate the Islamic concept of  civil society. In contrast, other M and NU  members reject 
the idea of compatibility of Islam with  (Western conceptions of) democracy because Islam 
does  not recognize popular sovereignty122 (theocracy); the concept of freedom is limited by 
the rule of God; and the classical work (kitab kuning) does not contain in itself the idea of 
 
-122 Human beings (khalifah fi al adl ) have temporary mandate to take world in order. The concept of 
khalifah fi al-adl consists of two dimensions (e.g.  religious and non-religious leadership 
responsibilities).   
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 democracy.123 A third group within M and NU believes that Islam contains values congruent 
with democracy, but that Islamic ideas of democracy differ from those of Western 
democracy. The goal of democracy of the West is to achieve merely material happiness, 
which differs from Islamic concept (e.g. material and spiritual happiness; the present world 
and hereafter). Moreover, Muslims have to place wahyu or revelation (the scriptural text) as 
the primary authority, so that individual freedom must not contradict the wahyu; and have 
to be responsible of their acts including leadership before the public in the present world and 
before God in the hereafter.     
 
 
 
                                                 
123 Ramadan (2004: 24-30) distinguishes six trends with respect to Islamic schools of thought and 
Islamic movement: (a) Scholastic traditionalism—Muslims strictly follow medieval schools of thought 
of  Islamic jurisprudence (the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali, Zaidy, and Ja’fari); (b) Salafi 
literalism—Muslims are disallowed to follow both medieval Islamic jurisprudence (taqlid), and reject 
the reinterpretation of the sacred text since the Text cannot be subject to interpretation (no ijtihad), 
like Wahabi; (c) Political Salafi literalism—Muslims reduce Islam to a political ideology (advocating 
and struggling Islamic state), such as Hizb at-Taharir; (d) Salafi reformis—Muslims reject medieval 
schools of thought of Islamic jurisprudence as binding but reinterpreting the original Islamic sources 
(ijtihad); (e) Sufism—an apolitical, oriented toward the spiritual life and mystical experiences; and (f) 
Liberal rationalist reformism—Non-practicing, ‘cultural Muslims’ seek total assimilation of Islam 
with Western civilization (a complete adaptation to the Western way of life). Esack (2000) advocates 
the idea of Islamic theology of liberation. Tawheed, according to him, contains in itself faith in God, 
which also has to be manifested to promote justice and to liberate those who are oppressed and 
powerless [poor] from social-economic and political injustice, corrupting acts, and any kinds of 
oppression. Based on Ramadan’s, this group belongs to scholastic traditionalists. 
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Some M and NU members have half-heartedly accepted democracy. People who are 
reluctant to Western democracy adhere to conservatism or the salafi group.124 The tendency 
is that former group affiliates with NU who uphold the ideology of ahlussunnah wal jamaah 
and fiqh as an orthodoxy. The second group is found in the M members, who tend to be 
literalist. The younger generation of NU (liberal group) argues that many Muslims are 
reluctant to the ideas of Western democracy because of the historical problem of Muslim 
world in the past (the debacle of the Muslim emperor, in which the ruler gave little room to 
study the civilization of other nations).  
Both NU and M key informants see that the development of democracy in the 
Indonesian Muslim society may be thwarted by the political stance of the political elites of 
developed countries who advocate democracy. Indonesian Muslims doubt whether the 
                                                 
124 Salafiyya is the name given to those who follow the ideas and practices of the righteous ancestors 
(al-salaf al-salih). The “salafi” approach rejects later traditions and schools of thought, calling for a 
return to the Qur’an and the Sunna as the authentic basis for Muslims life. The salafi approach 
emphasizes the application of ijtihad (independent informed judgement) and rejects taqlid (adherence 
to established precedents and conformity with existing traditional interpretations and institutions). 
“The righteous ancestors,” or salaf, are usually considered to be the first three generations of Muslims, 
including the immediate companions of the Prophet. Because the closeness to these “salaf” to 
Muhammad, later Muslims regarded the former’s transmissions of the Prophet’s traditions, their 
informed practice as believers, as having special authority.  The goal of the movement is to make 
Islam a dynamic force in the contemporary world.  In the modern context, this involved an emphasis 
on the compatibility of reasons with modern science. It also entailed a call for moral social reform. 
However, by the end of the 20th century, the term salafiyya also came to be applied to an extremist 
movement that advocated violent jihad against existing regimes and social orders, both Muslim and 
non-Muslim, and that did not adhere to a rigid and literalist understanding of the Qur’an and Sunna. 
Tawheed was the basis for showing the compatibility of Islam with modern science and revelation 
with modern reason. Consistent with the earlier salafiyya, Abduh advocated the informed, 
independent analysis of the Qur’an and Sunna (Voll, 2004). 
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 project of spreading Western democracy is designed to improve the quality of life humanity. 
There is a double standard employed by the political elites from developed countries toward 
developing countries, especially Islamic or Muslim countries. For instance, the political elites 
have exaggeratedly advocated the issues of human right violation of Muslim countries, but 
they do not do so intensely (whenever the cases are linked with their own countries). For 
instance, the cases of Abu Ghraib and Afghanistan’s prisoners demonstrated both human 
rights violation and the abuse of the project of Western democracy.     
NU and M members who were interviewed agree that democracy is not monolithic 
but has multiple dimensions. Any nation or society has its own values such as respect for 
others, tolerance, cooperation, care and the like (universal norms) congruent with the 
principles of Western democracy.  For them, the principles of the Western democracy must 
be linked with the Islamic terms and in turn these Islamic terms have to be framed in terms 
with which the general population of Indonesia is familiar. NU younger generation, for 
instance, has attempted to develop the ideas of Ghazaly (usulu al-khamsah) as the five basic 
human needs  that should be protected: (a) the protection of self (hifzu al-nafs) from 
violation, (b) the protection of religion (hifzu ad-dien) from enforced conversion, (c) the 
protection of family and the next generation (hifzu an-nasl), (d) the protection of personal 
property (hifzu al-maal), and (e) the protection of professions and intellect (hifzu al-aql). 
These five rights can be achieved by freedom, equality, shura and justice.  Contextualization 
(dipribumikan), according to NU leaders (e.g. Gus Dur), is an attempt to consider local needs 
in making decisions about Islamic law based on the principle in Islamic legal theory (usul 
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 fiqh) saying that al-‘aadat muhakkam (local custom can be law) (see also Mujiburrahman, 
1999: 342  
7.3. Democratic society  
In general, both M and NU members define democratic society as a society where 
such democratic values as freedom or individual sovereignty, respect for plurality or 
differences, and the rights of minorities including women, justice, equality, and open-
mindedness are established within various spheres of life. In democratic societies those 
values serve as a guide to establish relationships among people, between the ruler (state) and 
citizens. In democratic society anyone is fairly treated. M informants argue that the 
relationships between the state and umma should be established in balance, meaning the 
state has to respect the rights of citizens on one hand, and citizens have to take part in and 
control the state policy implementation on the other hand. M members interviewed 
generally advocate the concepts of pluralistic society, participatory society, and open 
society125 and they focus on people’s participation and commitment to issues rising at the 
                                                 
125 I did not find detailed information on whether or not this concept has a connection with 
the idea of Popper. Open society, according to Popper, is a society based on the ideas of not 
merely tolerating dissenting opinions but respecting them. Free speech, in an open society, 
should be an instrument for discovering errors. Open society is identified with scientific 
society. Popper thought that the public character of science and its institution imparts a 
mental discipline upon an individual scientist that preserves the objectivity of science and its 
tradition of critical discussion (Notturo, 1999).  Openness permits a critical attitude toward 
choice and even toward the social framework those constraints choices. To think with a 
critical attitude is to capture and institutionalize in methodological rules of science, since the 
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 local, national, and global levels as to develop human civilization. An informant of M 
advocates the concept of open society as a rational society where its members respect and 
uphold mandates (amanah), and the sovereignty of people.  
7.3.1. Individual freedom and sovereignty 
From the previous discussion, it is apparent that M and NU have similar ideas about 
freedom and (individual) sovereignty. They argue that Islam grants freedom and sovereignty 
for an individual since God grants human beings rationality or intellect by which human 
beings can use to think, and to discover the secrets (benefits) of the universe.   In Islam 
freedom and sovereignty, according to the key informants of M and NU, are limited or 
bounded by the norms of God (shariah). Freedom does not mean that everyone does what he 
or she wishes (liberal ways of looking). Freedom is a right of an individual but his or her 
right is bounded by the respect or protection the right of others.126   
Some NU younger generation argues that Islam does not have a concept of genuine 
freedom as Western society does.  Fiqh, according to some NU younger generation members, 
acknowledges freedom of the individual; such individual freedom is limited by the concept 
of respect for or protection of the rights of others at the same time.  In general, both M and 
NU informants agree that the concept of individual sovereignty has to be connected with the 
                                                                                                                                                             
adoption and institutionalization of the rational attitude designates the initial stage of science 
(Jarvie, 1999). 
 
126 Stowasser (1994: 35) confirms that in Islam freedom is that “the human realizes that his or 
her freedom is not freedom of beasts, but that true freedom is possible within the law…. ”.   
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 concept of vicegerency (khalifah fil ardli) on the earth.  God has absolute sovereignty (see 
the concept of theodemocracy) and a human being is granted temporary sovereignty with 
which a human being has to be responsible for his or her acts or mandate of God before Him 
in the hereafter.  All young generation members, according to J, argue that the issue of 
popular sovereignty cannot be separated from NU experiences during the New Order regime 
(the state-NU relationship). For NU, popular sovereignty means that the state (regime) shall 
not impose the restriction of the rights of citizens in the political arena.  
7.3.2. Pluralism and tolerance 
Both M and NU members argue that the Qur’an contains norms or tenets with respect 
to the relationships among diverse believers such as no compulsion to convert Islam, ta’aruf 
(social relationship), and mujadalah. In addition, Islam has a tradition in organizing society 
(bai’ah), and exemplary pluralistic society (mujtama’ al Madina). NU believes that the 
ideology of ahlus Sunnah wal jamaah makes up such principles as tawa uth, tasamuh, and 
‘itidal, which serve as a guide to lead a pluralistic society. Both M and NU members refer to 
pluralism connoting the recognition of other religions or giving other believers room to 
coexist and the prohibition against anyone from expelling the believers of other religions. M 
members establish amar ma’ruf stated in the Qur’an as the basic principle for societal 
arrangement and has elaborated into the “basic principles of M concerning social   
relationships”. NU elaborates amar ma’ruf into muamalah bil ma’ruf, muasharah bil ma’ruf 
and mukasabah bil al-ma’ruf.    
s
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 The M and NU younger generations and members, who attained higher educational 
attainment from Western countries such as the USA, England, and Canada, advocate the 
ideas of (religious) pluralism. Some M and NU young generations advocate a radical concept 
or idea of religious pluralism, i.e. they recognize that other religions such as Christianity, 
Judaism, and Confucianism have truth.127  
With respect to (religious) pluralism, Indonesian Muslims are divided into three 
categories: rejectionist (Islamists), accomodationists (liberalists/pluralists), and in between. 
The three categories are apparent in M and two groups (rejectionists and accomodationists) 
exist in NU. The third group disagrees with the liberalists (pluralists) who advocate the idea 
that every religion has truth because each religion has different settings, shariah, and aqidah 
from one to another. Also this group does not agree with the Islamists (rejectionists), saying 
that anything coming from outside Islam (West) has to be rejected. Islam teaches its umma to 
establish good relationships with other umma (non-Muslims).   
With respect to tolerance, both M and NU members have similar conceptions. 
Tolerance implies mutual understanding, cooperation, recognition of the rights of others, and 
prohibition of harassment and violating the rights of others. Both M and NU say that Islam 
advocates tolerance. The Qur’an recognizes the ahlu al-kitab (people of the book= Christians, 
                                                 
127 In general, both M and NU umma reject the Hick’s idea of (religious) pluralism. The old 
generation of both NU and M insists that those whose advocate the ideas of religious 
pluralism genuinely have deviated from the basic tenets of Islam (break through the aqidah 
territory). Both M and NU umma admit religious pluralism in terms of the non-aqidah area 
(muamalah ma’a an-naas).  
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 Jews and Majuzi). Even several M and NU people have expanded the notion of ahlu al-kitab 
to other religions such as Sabeans, Zoroastrians or Magians, Confucianism, and Buddhism, 
aside from Christians and Jews. But this idea was rejected by a majority of the umma of each. 
Both NU and M argue that cooperation between Muslims and non-Muslims is admitted along 
with the dimensions of hablun min annaas.  Both M and NU argue that Islam regards 
freedom of thoughts, conscience, and religion as an inviolable human rights which God gave 
man through the exercise of power of choice (i.e. the ability to believe or disbelieve) (see also 
Muhibbuddin, 2004).  M and NU have prohibited the umma of each from the reviling of idol, 
because reviling can generate ill-feeling. It also can drive non-Muslims away from the 
religion (of Islam) and instill in them hostility and annoyance.128  
What is prohibited is tolerance which means supporting the belief of other religious 
believers at the expense of Islamic belief (aqidah). Pertaining to the issues saying “Merry 
Christmas” or “going to Church for social relation,” M and NU umma have different points of 
view. They are divided into two groups: rejectionists (Islamists) and accomodationists 
(liberalists). Accomodationists (liberalists) say that these activities are out of reach with 
aqidah. So we are not prohibited from doing these activities because they belong to 
muamalah ma’a an-naas (social relationship). In addition, Islam teaches its believer that any 
act will rest on intention. Verily, God knows what occurs in our hearts129. In contrast, 
Islamists argue such activities are designated to ibadah and aqidah dimensions. So a Muslim is 
                                                 
128 It is stated in several verses of the Qur’an.  
129 In one hadith, it was stated that any acts or activity rests on the intention…. 
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 prohibited from doing these activities. The NU umma believe that ‘alim (kiyai) has profound 
knowledge of shariah and can distinguish the areas of aqidah and muamalah.  
7.3.3. Gender equality  
Both M and NU members believe that Islam contains in itself tenets with respect to 
the appreciation of women. M and NU have female organizational bodies such as Aishiyah 
and Nashiatul Aishiyah (M), Fatayat and Muslimat (NU), giving more room for women to 
articulate their aspirations. M released its decision to involve females in Majlis Tarjih (Fatwa 
Council) earlier than NU (in 1971), but its realization was questionable. M formally and first 
introduced the idea of giving equal chances for both females and males to compete to gain M 
leadership in the 1995 Muktamar (Congress) in Banda Aceh, but the majority of participants 
rejected that idea. Finally, the 2000 M Muktamar in Jakarta approved a decree (by law) that a 
female has an equal chance to a male to take charge of M leadership. NU did the same work 
after its National Congress (Muktamar) in 1999.   
NU has been more vocal than M in advocating the idea of gender equality. The 
younger generation of both NU and M feel that both parties find it easy to deliver the idea of 
gender equality on the paper. However, it is how the idea is upheld in practice that matters. 
The younger generation of NU says that there is no female taking a leadership role in NU.  
Some key informants of M say that there are some women taking leadership positions but 
not in the 13 leadership position (top leadership). Informants from NU and M confirm that 
gender equality is a sensitive or controversial subject because it is seen as coming from West. 
With respect to this point, both members and board of M and NU are divided into groups: 
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 rejectionists and accomodationists. Those who reject the idea of gender equality of M and 
NU have similar ideas as stated by Stowasser (evoking the medieval theme of women’s innate 
physical and mental deficiency). The younger generations of NU and MU advocate the idea 
in opposition to conservatism, as stated earlier.  The conservative group insists that gender 
equality is coming from the West, i.e., rooted in Western secular ideology, and believes that 
those who advocate the issues of gender equality wish to set themselves free from the 
religious norms. The proponents of gender equality, according to Islamists, have deviated 
from the religious norms, being the agent of West, secularists and the like. 
The rejectionists and accomodationists within both M and NU are involved in 
continuous debates about several issues such as qawwaamu and darajat (males are superior to 
females), the role of women in testimony (eye witness), and females in public spheres such as 
taking leadership, heritage, reproduction rights and sexual enjoyment (the two later issues 
are advocated by the NU-Fatayat). Reinterpretation of the belief of medieval age religious 
scholars remains a sensitive subject among the old generation of NU and M. The rejectionists 
(traditionalists) believe that the sacred text is subject to dogmatic interpretation, which has 
to be taken for granted. On the other hand, the accomodationists (modernists) assume that 
the sacred text contains verses that allow anyone, who has paramount knowledge of the 
Qur’an (ulumul al-qur’an) and knowledge of Islam (ulumu al-Islam), to interpret the verses 
of the sacred text. According to gender proponents, those verses above, which invite 
ceaseless debate among Muslims, allow us to scrutinize the sacred texts from various 
dimensions, i.e. occasion of revelation (asbaabu an-nuzul) and occasion of narration (hadith), 
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 linguistics, logics (mantiq) and other disciplines. For accommodationists, the cleric fatwa 
about prohibiting women to charge leadership, and qawwamu and darajat (males are superior 
to females) are designated as the interpretation of clerics (of the medieval age), which was 
affected by socio-cultural settings (the era of patriarchy).  
7.3.4. Criticism & being critical   
This issue likely has a connection with two main points: critical thinking of and using 
critical perspectives, especially in relation to understanding Islam and the contemporary 
issues (stated earlier). The establishment of M and NU has a connection with its mission: i.e. 
to make the umma of each become critical of societal issues. Both M and NU believe that 
God has granted human beings rationale, intelligence or intellect as fitrah (an innate God 
given sense of right and wrong or human pristine nature) from God in order that human 
beings can gain the benefits of  God’s creation (the world) and promote God-consciousness. 
From the broad sense, both M and NU members conceive of being critical as the use of 
rationale or intellect as to understand issues and in the pursuit of solution.  
With respect to criticism, M and NU members claim that each has “social capital” for 
the promotion of the umma potentials.  M members claims that ijtihad, arruju ila al-Qur’an 
wa as-sunnah (calling for a return to the pristine ways of scripture and the recorded example 
of the Prophet Muhammad), and (the spirits of) tajdid give more room for the M members to 
be critical. At the same time NU argues that the ideology of ahlus Sunnah wa al-jamaah and 
the fiqh tradition give more room for the NU umma to be critical and appreciative of 
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 plurality.  However, the “social capital” is often challenged by the attitude or acts of the 
umma of each.  
For NU, exaggerated respect for the clerics and the religious scholar’s works of the 
medieval age has created fanaticism and closed-mindedness among the NU umma. Therefore, 
the younger generation of NU argues that criticism and being critical have a connection with 
transformation of the orthodox understanding toward the ideology of ahlusunnah wal 
jamaah and fiqh, as well as the promotion of political awareness of the NU members and the 
community at large. The former serves as a prerequisite for NU in order to enable NU 
members to deal with such contemporary issues as democracy, human rights, gender 
equality, pluralism, and tolerance to the community at large. The “cultural NU” and younger 
generation has intensely criticized the conservation of classical works, through the adoption 
of critical perspectives (social and philosophical theories), and making other classical works 
advocating societal issues and empowerment as the counterattack references. The “cultural 
NU” and young generation advocate an idea that ibadah (any religious devotion to God) has 
to reflect any effort to social transformation.  By so doing, the “cultural NU” and younger 
generation can transform the wisdoms of fiqh to be more responsive to societal dynamics, 
and reconstruct the political approaches and ideas of Islam (ahlussunna wal jamaah) within 
the political constellation of Indonesia  (IR, HH; also see Hakim, 2004; Misrawi, 2001; 
Prasetyo & Munhanif, 2002: 199-200).  
NU has attempted to promote political awareness among the NU umma and the 
community at large to strengthen the Indonesian civil society movement through which 
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 civil rights are protected (see Hakim, 2002; Prasetyo & Munhanif, 2002: 208). At the local 
level such as the village, sub-district and district, NU is involved in raising political 
awareness of members through intermediate groups as kiyai and local leaders who facilitate 
members to articulate their aspiration, and to control the implementation of public policy at 
the local levels.  To achieve the objective, NU has been doing a pilot project about the 
development of “citizen forum” in several districts (Lakpesdam, 2004).  
M members acknowledged that their organization has succeeded in eradicating feudal 
mentality and constructing a democratic attitude and others (discussed in chapter 4). The 
“social capital” of M is often challenged by reductionism (such as tajdid is often translated 
into furuiyah issues which draw the M umma to be involved in ceaseless debate with the NU 
umma). M is less aggressive in responding to the idea of democratization and civil society 
(ZQ; and see also Mulkhan, 1996) than NU, in which paternalism and patrimonialism130 has 
been established (see Billah, 2004). People were impressed that M was not so critical of 
development cases such as the eviction of powerless people from their rights (lands) as the 
Kedung Ombo dam project and Talang Mas elite housing project in Semarang (YS and ZQ) 
during the era of New Order (the days of the New Order establishment until 1992).   
However, in 1993, M demonstrated a critical stance toward the regime of New Order 
Suharto pertaining to sensitive issues such as successional leadership, corruption, and 
nepotism. Amin advocates social tawheed and “high politics,” which generated a new spirit 
                                                 
130 Patrimonialism has been strongly established as a result from the social institutionalization of 
Pesantren (Billah, 2004: 383).  
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 for the M younger generation to develop criticism and critical thought. M, according to 
Amin and other members of M’s young generation, has to energize the spirits of tajdid and 
ijtihad in response to societal dynamics at the present and future. M has to be vocal to 
advocate the fate of powerless and poor. In the days of its establishment, the founding father 
of M strove to elaborate the spirits of ijtihad and tajdid into a social and cultural praxis 
movement which protects the rights or fate of the powerless and poor (oppressed and 
alienated group). However, their ajdid (social and cultural movement) was often reduced 
into the ceaseless debate about heterodoxy and heresy and issues of fiqh such as haram 
(prohibition), and halal (permissible) rather than social movement (Mulkhan, 2000; Rais, 
1998, 2000). The M younger generation would return to the spirit of its movement (civil 
society movement or ar-ruju ilaa mujtama al-madani) which was established by its founding 
fathers. Also the young generation of M has intensely developed critical perspectives 
pertaining to Islam and contemporary issues. They have adopted social and philosophical 
theories and ideas of social movement to develop the study of Islam (Islamic thought) in 
relation to contemporary issues. In developing critical perspectives, the younger generations 
of M and NU have to face ceaseless criticism and accusation as deviating from the Islamic 
norms from their own colleagues in each association. 
t
7.4. Citizenship 
Both M and NU members refer to citizenship in relation to the ideal community 
(vision or social ideals) that they want to achieve. M advocated (e.g. in its bylaws) the 
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 concept of al-mujtama al-fadhilah (excellent society) stated on the M’s bylaw, which was 
promulgated in the 41st Congress (Muktamar) of Surakarta, to designate the concept of 
‘genuinely Islamic society’ (the M social ideal or vision). In response to the New Order’s 
policy (asas tunggal = Pancasila as the sole principle of all social and political organization), 
M revised its vision into the formulae masyarakat yang adil dan sejahtera yang diridai Allah 
(just and prosperous society which God blesses).   
The NU concept of citizens is framed within its vision of the ideal society and was 
sated at its 30th Congress (Muktamar) held in Kediri in 1999. Therein, NU identifies as its goal 
“to establish a just and democratic society in adherence to the ideology of ahlussunnah wal 
jamaah.”  
Both M and NU members emphasize loyalty to the state (not to the regime), which 
means having a commitment to follow the rule of law (for the enhancement of democracy), 
being critical of problems rising at the community at large, participating in the development 
of society for the creation of prosperity and control of public policies and services. Both M 
and NU have a bylaw on the concept of rights and responsibilities of their members and 
boards.  However, the rule of the game with respect to membership is manifested on the 
basis of the spirit of voluntarism, sincerity (ikhlas), competition for doing good deeds 
(fastabiqul khairat), and getting  social benefits (social satisfaction) more than economic 
motive or values.   
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 7.5. Educating for Democracy  
M and NU members have a similar view about educating for democracy in terms of 
political education, which aims at raising political awareness of the umma of each 
organization and the community at large. Both NU and M organizations are involved in 
developing political awareness, in terms of people’s participation in formal politics, such as 
electoral voting, and people’s awareness of societal problems rising at the local and national 
levels. Both NU and M organizations advocate gender awareness to the members of each and 
the community at large serving as education for democracy.   
Aside from similarities, NU and M have their own emphasis pertaining to the concept 
of educating for democracy. NU has attempted to contextualize the democratic values such as 
freedom, respect for plurality, and equality into the Islamic concepts.  NU has implemented a 
PPWK program (discussed in the chapter 6), which aims to transform itself from the 
orthodox understanding toward the ideology of ahlus Sunnah wal jamaah and fiqh tradition. 
NU provides the younger clerics who will charge the leadership in pesantren with social 
theories and social philosophies as well as social movement. This is to equip the younger 
clerics with an understanding of Islam in relation to the contemporary issues such as 
democracy, gender equality, pluralism and tolerance. This program, according to NU, serves 
as a prerequisite for NU before it has to introduce the contemporary issues to the community 
at large.  
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 On the other hand, M has initiated to transform civic education, because M believes 
that civic education was subject to support the status quo of the New Order regime (abuse), 
with aims at introducing the ideas of democracy and civil values (civility) as response to the 
process of democratization and civil society promotion to the students of its universities 
(formal schooling).  By so doing, M wishes that the students or scholars are able to 
disseminate values of democracy and civil values (including civility) to the community at 
large through locally existing forums (spill over effect).    
M and NU have been encouraging their own members and the community at large to 
take part in the political process (procedural democracy) such as electoral voting and direct 
presidential election in 2004 through voter education. Through voter education, M and NU 
wished to promote the awareness of the whole umma to control their own vote. The M and 
NU ensured the whole members that their votes would politically affect public policy. Both 
M and NU were also involved in promoting education for anti-corruption movement. This 
program aims at raising people’s awareness that corruption is social pathology which 
deteriorates human life. Through this program, NU and M have attempted to lay a 
theological basis (the Islamic theology) in order to launch the members’ consciousness based 
anti-corruption movement. Voter education and education for the anti-corruption 
movement are elaborated on from the democratization and civil society package program for 
Indonesia.  
On the other hand, NU has been engaged in promoting the ideas of “inclusive Islam” 
and “emancipatory Islam” to the academic society (campuses), which are supposed to 
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 produce “Islamic radicalism.” This program designates NU commitment to develop moderate 
Islam in Indonesia. To obtain this objective, NU has intensely developed discussion about 
Islam and contemporary issues such as democracy, pluralism, gender equality, tolerance, and 
the like through promoting forums in those campuses and talk shows on the private radio 
stations. Also NU is involved in promoting ‘political awareness’ to the community at large at 
the local levels (village, sub-district and district) through advocacy and the establishment of 
“citizen forums” which serves to raise people’s critical awareness of public policy and public 
service at the local levels.    
M through Aishiah has been intensely involved in promoting gender awareness 
among the candidate legislative people (females) on the gender equality issues, especially the 
political rights of women such as political representation in legislature. This program was to 
equip female congressional candidates with gender equality issues with respect to the rights 
of females in domestic and public spheres and efforts to fight for the female’s rights through 
legislature. This program was done through a serial discussion program (talk show).  
NU via Fatayat-NU made an efforts to criticize the orthodox opinions from the 
classical works of the clerics in the medieval age (kitab kuning such as uqudu al-lujain), 
especially in the issues of wife-husband relationship in the family (biased male interests), 
female reproduction rights, and female rights for sexual enjoyment and abortion. Fatayat NU 
argues that the cleric ideas of medieval age were valid for that time, which was different 
from the current and future situation. Therefore, the cleric ideas (fiqh) need to be 
reinterpreted along with societal dynamics (the present and future conditions). Fatayat NU 
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 advocates critical ideas (gender equality) through serial discussion, publication, and dialogue 
with the NU clerics. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION  
   
8.1. Summary  
The central question addressed in this study is “How are the conceptualization and 
operationalization of education for democratic citizenship similar to or different within and 
across the two Islamic civil society associations in Indoensia?” The study explored the ideas 
and practices (experiences) of two large Islamic civil society associations: Muhammadiyah 
(M) and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), pertaining to four issues: democracy, democratic society, 
citizenship and educating for democracy.  
 Because the target groups of this study are Islamic civil society associations, this study 
was based on theoretical framework from the Islamic tradition (perspective).  Shura, 
according to Muslim scholars, has a meaning that is comparable to and compatible with 
democracy. Shura implies a system of government’ and the new Islamic political or “Islamic 
democracy,” which encompasses democratic ideas and institution in keeping with the 
following values or norms: First, shura is based on the principles of the sovereignty of God 
and supremacy of Shari’ah. Second, the supreme and higher power in the Islamic state is the 
Divine Texts—the Qur’an and the Sunnah—and people as second. Third, the people of the 
Earth derive their authority from God’s authority according to the concept of istikhlas 
(vicegerency) (al-Sulami, 2003; Maududi, 1997; Moten, 1996; Mousalli, 1999).  
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 Though Muslim scholars have diverse perspectives in the way they view civil society, 
they agree that the umma concept embodies the original concept of civil society in Islam. 
Also umma implies the Islamic concept about citizenship. Umma means the brotherhood of 
faithful society across various boundaries such as geographical areas, ethnicity, and social and 
economic status (Kelsay, 2002; Kurdi, 1984). Umma is  based on the following principles: a) 
solidarity, cohesion among members, across territorial borders, and heterogeneity (classes, 
and ethnicities); b) bound with similar faith  (Tawhid or the Unity); c) polity, which is based 
on the Tawhid that God is the ultimate sovereignty, and subject to the rules and norms of the 
Shariah; and d) common affairs are undertaken in mutual consultation and discussion (shura) 
among members of Umma, and decisions are arrived at through ijmak (consensus among 
people and/or scholars) (Moten, 1996).  
Because Muslim scholars have not yet formally outlined the concept of education for 
democracy, in order to frame this study, the ideas of western scholars were employed.  
Education for democracy is defined as  the process of imparting  a set of core values of 
democracy or democratic attitudes such as respect for reasonable differences, different 
viewpoints, and human dignity, respect for minority rights, a caring attitude toward others, 
justice, equality, participation, freedom as requirements of citizens in order to create a 
democratic society (Bank, 1997; Calcendo, 2000; Christopher, 1989; CIVNET, 2000; Hoge, 
2002; Kaltsounit, 1990; Meyer, 1990; Schwarzmantel, 2003) or to maintain a democratic 
community or society (Dynneson, 2001); teaching how to use the concept of a democratic 
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 government  (Patrick, 2000: 20); and making  effective citizens or politically literate (Conley, 
1993; Pring, 1999). 
I carried out qualitative study which an ethnographic methodological approach to 
explore the ideas and practices of M and NU with respect to the above issues. To obtain the 
relevant information, I conducted “limited” observation through my involvement in several 
activities  (e.g. a workshop on redesigning a manual for training for trainers about “Islam and 
anti-corruption,” a coordinating meeting of M boards of district level from all Java and Bali 
provinces, and one day seminar about Islamic proselytization) in M. In NU, I was only able 
to be involved in one day panel discussion about “NU and the 1926 spirits in relation to 
political constellation.” I interviewed 23 informants for each Islamic civil society association 
by employing open-ended questions. I collected documents such as articles, journals and 
books pertaining to M and NU from libraries of M, NU and PPIM-UIN to complement data I 
gathered through observation and interviews. I organized all data that were collected by 
using the procedure of ethnographic data analysis as described by LeCompte & Schensul 
(1999) with adjustment.  
  This study explored several findings, which are linked with the following themes: 
ideology underpinning, democratization including political involvement, democracy, 
democratic society, citizenship and education for democracy.  
First, ideologically both M and NU are affiliated with the Sunni ideology. NU adheres 
strictly and exclusively to the Sunni ideology but M does not.  M would rather say that it is 
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 tajdid movement, which advocates the spirits of ijtihad and calls for a return to the pristine 
ways of scripture. 
Second, politically M and NU was involved in initiating the establishment of a 
confederated Islamic political party (Masyumi) in the days of Indonesian independence. Both 
NU and M differ in their political involvement.  NU did become or involve in political Party 
until 1984, but M has never become a political party. NU upholds the ideology of Aswaja as 
the basis of its political culture. M takes in some principles stated in the Qur’an such as amar 
ma’ruf nahyi munkar (enjoining good deed and forbiding wrongdoing), mauizah hasanah 
(wisdom and good counsel), and mujadalah bil ihsan (debate with the other side in the 
presence of a neutral outlooker) as the basis of its political culture (see Chapter 4).  M and 
NU had politically different experiences (treatment) regarding the relationship to the 
regimes of two orders (the Old and New Orders). 
Third, both M and NU claim that the basic values or ideology that are upheld by each 
association have a significant role in creating democratic atmosphere within both the 
members of each and the community at large (inner impetus or social capital). However, NU 
was counterbalanced by paternalism and patrimonialism, which encouraged NU to maximize 
its efforts to put its social capital into practice. At the same time, the spirits of tajdid and 
ijtihad, serving as M social capital,  was challenged by reductionism and “elite biases” 
bringing tajdid into stagnancy and making M members politically uncritical of the New 
Order regime. The progressive leaders and younger generations within M and NU have 
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 attempted to transform the tenacity or status quo within each organization to respond to 
societal dynamics   (see Chapter 4).   
Fourth, within M and NU organizations, members argue Islam has tenets, such as 
shura and adl (justice), congruent with democratic ideas, but their responses to the Western 
conceptions of democracy vary.  Accomodationists in both organizations state that Islamic 
tenets are congruent with the Western ideas of democracy, while rejectionists express that 
Islam has concept of happiness as the goal of democracy, sovereignty, and freedom differ 
from Western concepts of democracy. M and NU’s members define democratic society as a 
society wherein its members uphold such democratic values as individual freedom, respect 
for plurality or differences, tolerance, equality, and justice in various spheres of lives. M 
advocates the ideas of pluralistic, participative, and open society.  Moreover, although most 
informants from M and NU subscribe to democratic values, such as individual freedom, 
respect for differences or plurality, tolerance, open-mindedness, and criticism; some see the 
notions of individual sovereignty, accepting of other religious groups’ beliefs, and gender 
equality as problematic for Muslims in Indonesia. Adopting these values in certain ways, 
they argue, can be seen to contravene core/fundamental Islamic beliefs.      
Fifth, both M and NU members refer to the ideal community (vision or social ideals) 
(see Chapters 5 and 6). Within both M and NU organizations, members agree that citizens 
have to be committed to the state (not to the regime). Commitment to the state can be 
manifested in various dimensions such as respect for the rule of law, criticism of societal 
problems, control of public policy and services implementation, and the like.    In general, M 
 253
 and NU have bylaws to regulate the relationships between board and members, and 
leadership recruitment. However, people join either NU or M as they are more commonly 
motivated by spirits of voluntarism, sincerity and fastabiqul khairat (hasting to do good 
deeds) (social motive rather than economic motive).  
Seventh M and NU work to educate their members and the community at large by 
promoting democratic or civil values, political awareness, and participation. Both 
organizations have developed voter education and education for anti-corruption programs. 
In addition, NU organizes programs to transform orthodox understandings about the fiqh 
tradition and aswaja ideology, “citizen forums” to influence the provision of public services, 
and workshops to disseminate ideas of “inclusive, emancipatory or moderate Islam.” M’s 
programs focus on developing gender sensitivity among officials, candidates, and community 
members as well as on developing civil values for the students of its schools and colleges 
through civic education.   
8.2. Implication and Recommendation 
My field study was originally planned for at least six months. Since the US 
immigration policy or rule131 did not permit the international students to be away from 
America more than four months, my advisor and I had to make adjustment (only four 
                                                 
131 I discussed my plan of field study that it was originally set up at least for six months (at minimum). 
However after I made consultation with the Office for International Students (OIS), an advisor 
strongly advised me to hold strickly the immigration regulation (have to be out of the America no 
more than four months). Otherwise, I had, according to an advisor, to reapply for I 20. 
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 months). During my field study, adjustment was also made because of two important 
national events,132 which involved all Indonesian. So I could not fully implement the 
principles of ethnographic study such as an iterative process.  For example, I only was able to 
interview every key informant for once, so I was unable to dig up data more in depth from 
key informants.   
 Such limits might have affected the implementation of methodological principles and 
results of the study. Considering such limits, I am attempting to employ the findings of this 
study to the maximum in relation to the future of education for democraty in Indonesia 
(perspective, methodology or policy implementation). 
8.2.1. Perspective   
Chapter 5 hihglighted that in 1990s studies pertaining to M and NU in relation to 
contemporary issues such as politics, Islamic thought or movement and Islamic education 
was commonly colored or dominated by the “traditionality–modernity” perspective. Writers, 
for example Azra (1997), Fealy (2003) and (Hefner, 2003), argue that the “traditionality–
modernity” perspetive is assumed to be insufficient to figure out NU and M’s feature in 
current situation, since both of them have developed along with societal dynamics.  For 
example, NU eagerly embraced the ideals of Indonesian nationalism (Hefner, 2003); and 
established economic cooperation with the non-Muslims manifested through, for example, 
                                                 
132 In 2004, there were two important events: electoral voting on 4 April and direct campining for both 
vice and president election. Some key informants were involved in adhoc committees for electoral 
voting and presidential election at the local level.). Some others were involved in PANWASLU (the 
Control body for electoral voting  
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 the establishment of Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (BPR) NU-Summa (Azra, 1997). M, which 
claims to be adaptive and accommodative to modern institutions, is conservative (revivalist) 
with respect to the religious ideology (Puritanism)   (Azra, 1997: 225). 
This study produced evidence that within M and NU organizations members have 
various perspectives in response to Western ideas of democracy including sovereignty, 
tolerance, and gender equality (stated on Chapters 5 and 6).  For instance, M and NU have 
accomodationists (including liberalist), and rejectionists (scholastic traditionalist, literalitst or 
textualists). Some M and NU’s members especially the younger generation promoted and 
advocated critical perspectives, which include the idea of Islamic theology of liberation, to 
study Islam in relation to the contemporary issues.    Therefore, a “traditonality-modernity” 
perspective is not sufficient enough to figure out viewpoints of M and NU’s members with 
respect to contemporary issues. An alternative perspective is needed for the sake of this 
purpose. The ideas of six paradigms of Ramadan (2004) and Islamic theology of liberation of 
Esack (2000), for example, can be used altogether for the study of M and NU in relation to 
contemporary issues. I believe that integrating Esack’s idea into Ramadan may result in a 
new paradigm that may help those who want to study NU and M in the future (the 
description of each paradigm can be seen from footnote 123 in Chapter 7). 
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Figure 1 Paradigms of Islam in relation to contemporary issues (Islamic movement) 
(Adapted from Ramadan and Esack) 
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 8.2.2. Policy Issues 
Aside from diverse perspectives within M and NU’s members, the study noted two  
significant efforts, which were carried out by M and NU, in response to societal dynamics 
(democracy): 1) M and NU have transformed orthodoxy and tajdid stagnancy within 
themselves; and 2) they were involved in promoting the Western ideas of democracy to the 
community at large through projects; for example, disseminating the ideas of moderate Islam 
and gender sensitivity, voter education, deliberative democracy, and education for anti-
corruption movement. Being involved in such projects, both M and NU have first hand 
experiences in promoting political awareness in the community at large (procedural and 
substantial democracy).   
From this study, I drew several issues or principles can be drawn as the basis for 
policy or program implementation as follows: 
The first issue is reducing tension within M and NU’s members and and the 
community at large who have diverse perspectives or stance (for example conservative, 
literalists, moderate/reformist) in response to democracy including gender equality, 
(religious) pluralisms and tolerance.  In fact, such various groups present within M and NU 
organizations. Any party who wants to promote the Western ideas to the Indonesian Muslim 
society has to understand such a reality.  M and NU have to continue their roles in 
promoting a dialogue among their members and other Islamic groups. Dialouge does not only 
serve as a means to communicate the Western ideas of these contemporary issues with Islam 
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 but also to reach better mutual understanding among those groups within both M and NU as 
well as the Muslim community at large who have diverse perspectives. 
The second issue is linking the contemporary issues such as (procedural and 
substantive) democracy, gender equality, pluralism and tolerance with the Islamic tenets and 
Muslim intellectual heritage. This, I believe, has to do with the promotion of approaches and 
materials for education for democracy. Shura, as stated earlier, connotes a system of 
government’ and the new Islamic political or “Islamic democracy. Usually Muslims, who 
learn the ideas of shura and gender issue, make fiqh siyasah (Islamic jurisprudence on 
politics) and fiqh an-Nisaa (Islamic jurisprudence about women issues) reference.  The ideas 
of tolerance, respect for differences, care, and mutual understanding are congruent with 
Islamic tenets regarding to ethics in relation to the worldly affairs (hablun min annas) such 
as relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims. Nowadays, the younger generation of 
Muslims (including NU and M) has developed intensely the Islamic theology in relation to, 
for example, justice, land ownership, water resources, environment and other issues which 
were not discovered in the classical works. To develop education for democracy within the 
Muslims community, any party has to see at least three dimensions: fiqh, theology and 
ethics. For those who have concerns with curriculum development, these three aspects have 
to be integrated into a curriculum and its implementation.    
The third issue is posing problems. This issue particularly has a connection with 
disseminating the ideas of democracy to the community at large (non-formal schooling 
system). From the field it was apparent that introducing the ideas of democracy through life 
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 experiences, such as by the involvement of people who have diverse  backgrounds in 
discussing  serious and sensitive issues such as religious pluralism, tolerance and the like will 
be more effective than organizing a seminar or workshop.  The more that people with 
diverse backgrounds interact the sooner they can be open-minded and establish mutual 
understanding. Therefore, in promoting democratic and civil values to the community at the 
large any party, including M and NU, are more encouraged to develop such approaches 
(forums). To the Muslims society, Islamic civil society associations such as NU and M have to 
develop participatory approaches, and to play a role as catalyst to promote democratic and 
civil values to the community at large.  
The fourth issue is the sustenance for a program of educating for democracy. This 
sustenance (sustainability) is easy to be delivered on the paper, but it will be a matter to be 
upheld in reality. Since democracy itself cannot be separated from other issues such as 
economy, and day to day issues (people cannot be separated from daily basic needs such as 
meals), therefore the introduction of democracy, which includes educating for democracy, 
has to be integrated into programs which can guarantee people’s basic needs. M and NU have 
to integrate their programs on democracy and educating for democracy into the practical 
deeds (anal usaha) of each. Regarding this point, cooperation among agencies (civil society 
asssocitons, government agencies and other development agencies) including participants has 
to be set up. These agencies should set up program and models of implementation to keep 
education for democracy working effectively, including integration into amal usaha or 
practical deeds (what model of integration will be aptly applied to NU and MU?).   
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 The fifth issue is maximixing M and NU first hand experiences in promoting political 
awareness in the community at large (procedural democracy).  To make their experiences 
more useful for the academic community at large, NU and M, for instance, would better 
formulate:  a) criteria of quality of democratic life and b) a method or a tool for the 
assessment of educating for democracy in term of public awareness of problems which rise in 
a community, public policies and the like. Regarding the point (a), for instance, M and NU 
have to formulate several issues, for example, an effective rule of law, democratic policy 
decision making, the electoral system, public institutions’ treatment of the public, local 
government, political parties’ internal affairs, civil society, citizens’ participation in public 
policy making, public opinion; and civic culture, which have to be linked with the principles 
of Islam and local culture.  Pertaining to the point (b), both NU and M would better develop 
the idea of “citizen audit” as (a) a system for monitoring and assessing the strength and 
weaknesses of democratic life with citizens’ participation in its different steps of 
implementation; (b) a new practice of political deliberation or public affairs; (c) an 
exploration of people’s day-to-day experience of living in a democracy using the notion of 
quality of democracy; and (d) a tool for societal criticism and improvement ( see for instance 
Cullell (2004)). 
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 APPENDIX A: List of Terms (Glossary) 
   
Al-‘aadat muhakkam   A local custom can be law 
  
Ahlu al-kitab Christian and Jews. Liberal NU and M have 
extended this concept to Confucianism, Thabiin, 
Zoroaster, and Buddhism 
  
Ahlu al-‘adli wa at-Tawhed The people of justice and divine oneness 
  
Amal saleh Good deed  
  
Ahlussunna wal jamaah or 
aswaja 
The Sunni ideology 
  
Al-u’tiqaa al-usuulu al-thalathah The basic principles of  NU, i.e. theologically 
affiliated with the ideas of imam Al-Ashari and al-
Maturidy; committed to the practice of one of four 
schools of thought in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), 
i.e., Shaifii’sm, Hanafiism, Malikiism and 
Hanbalism; affiliated with two schools of Sufism, 
i.e., Abu Hamid al-Ghazaly and Al-Junaidy al-
Baghdady 
  
Asbabu an-nuzul The occasion or the causes of revelation (with 
respect to the Qur’an) 
  
Al-khuruj min al-khilafah 
mutahak 
To deviate from the general or standardized rules 
  
Al-mujtama’ al-fadllah The excellent society 
  
Al-mutagayyar Flexible elements 
  
Ar-rijaalu qawwamu ala an-nisa A verse used by the exoteric Qur’anic 
commentators of the medieval age with respect to 
the prohibition of women to charge leadership in 
public sphere. 
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Ar-rujuu ila al-mujtama al-
madani 
Civil social movement 
  
Ar-rujuu’ ila al-Qur’an wa as-
sunnah 
Calling for a return to the pristine ways of 
scripture and the recorded example of the Prophet 
Muhammad 
  
Asbaabu al-wurud The occasion of narration of  hadith 
  
Aishiah Female Autonomous Body of Muhammadiyah 
  
APBD Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah (local 
government budgets) 
  
BMI Bank Muamalat Indonesia (Indonesian Muamalat 
or Islamic Bank) 
  
Berdikari To be independent of outside assistance and 
investment 
BPD Badan Perwakilan Desa (village council) 
  
Bhineka Tunggal Ika Diversity in unity (Indonesian motto) 
  
Da’iah Female proselytizers/clerics 
  
Darajah Literally means a degree. This word is stated on a 
verse of the Qur’an which was used by  the 
exoteric Qur’anic commentators (in medieval age) 
that  male has a degree over a female and/or a male 
is the leader of a female (women’s innate physical 
and mental deficiency) 
 
Ewuh pakewuh tradition Less critical of and feeling uneasy to criticize the 
state or regime. 
Fastabiqu al-khairaat Hasting (competing)to do good deed 
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 Fatayat-NU Youth Female Autonomous Body of NU 
  
Fiqh technical rules of law, positive ‘black’ prescription 
(Islamic jurisprudence) 
  
Fitrah  Innate potential or an innate, God-given sense of 
right and wrong 
  
Forum Warga Citizen Forum 
  
FORDEM Forum for democracy 
  
FPI Forum Pembelaan Islam or Forum for Islam 
Defense (Indonesian Islamic fundamentalists) 
  
GBHN Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara (the state policy 
on the national development) 
  
Golkar Golongan Karya (Functional Group) 
  
Hujja proof 
  
HW Hizbul Wathan (boy scout of M) 
  
Ibadah Observing devotion to God 
  
ICCE Institute for Community and Civic Education 
Development (an autonomous body of the UIN) 
  
Ikatan Pencak Silat Pagar Nusa Pagar Nusa Traditional Defense (association of NU 
youth traditional defense) 
ICMI Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia (The 
Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) 
  
ICRP Indonesian Coalition for Religious Pluralism 
  
Ijtihad  The intellectual efforts of trained Islamic scholars 
to arrive at legal rulings on matters not covered in 
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 the sacred book 
  
INPRES the presidential assistance 
  
Istihsan General interests of the community 
  
Jamaah number of Muslim group [similar to umma] 
  
Jam’iyya Ahli Thariq al-
Mu’tabarah an-Nahdliyya 
The Association of NU Spiritualism/Sufism 
  
Jamiyyah al-Qurra wa al-
Huffadz 
the association of those who memorize and 
understand  the Qur’an 
  
JIMM Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah or M 
intellectual Network (an NGO establish by  M 
young generation who advocate critical 
perspectives in relation to the studies of Islam and 
contemporary issues) 
  
Khalifah fi al-ardl The concept of Vicegerent on the earth 
  
Khiaru umma ideal society (best society) where its members 
enjoin good and forbid wrongdoing or evil (amar 
ma’ruf and nahyi munkar) 
  
Kitab kuning the rulings or wisdoms of the Islamic clerics of the 
medieval age 
  
Kittah 1926 Khitah 1926: the spirit of 1926, the year of NU’s 
function as a social and religious body implying 
that NU might soon shed its political character and 
function. 
Lakpesdam-NU The NU Center for Human Resource Study and 
Development 
  
LP3 Lembaga Pengkajian dan Pengembangan 
Pendidikan or Center for Educational Research 
and Development of Yogjakarta Muhammadiyah 
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 University 
  
LEMHANNAS Lembaga Pertahanan dan Keamanaan Nasional 
(the Institute for National Defense) 
  
Litsus The New Order regime policy with respect to 
screening legislature candidates  from especially 
non-ruling political parties 
  
Madzhab Fiqhiyya The wisdoms of Sunni clerics in the medieval age 
or the four traditional schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence 
  
MPR Majlis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s 
Consultative Assembly) 
  
MPKSDI Majlis Pembinaan Kader and Sumber Daya Insani 
(Council for Cadre and Human Resource 
Development of Muhammadiyah) 
MTDK Majlis Tabligh and Dakwah Khusus (Council for 
Proselytization and Special Islamic Calls) 
  
Majlis Tarjih Fatwa Council of Muhammadiyah 
Maqasidu as-samaa God’s will 
  
Masaalihu umma Public interests 
  
Masyumi Majlis Syuro Muslim Indonesia or Confederated 
Muslim Party 
  
Mufassir The exoteric commentator of the Qur’an 
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Mu’tazilla The name of the great theological school that creates 
the speculative dogmatism of Islam. 
 
Mufakat Consensus 
  
Muslimat-NU Women Autonomous Body of NU 
NASAKOM Trilogy power of Indonesia (Nationalist, Religious 
and Communism) 
  
Pancasila  Five principles (the Indonesian state ideology). 
  
PAN Partai Amanat Nasisonal or [National Mandate 
Party (founded by Amin Rais). 
    
PDI Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesia Democratic 
Party). 
   
PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or Nation Awakening 
Party (the NU party). 
    
PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist 
Party). 
    
PMII Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (NU 
Student  Movement) 
    
PPBK/PPWK Program Pengembangan Berfikir Kritis /Program 
pengembangan Wacana Kiyai [program for 
promoting critical nuances of kiyais or clerics]. 
   
P4D Perencanaan Partisipatif Penyusunan Program 
Pembangunan Desa (Participatory Planning for 
Rural Development Program). 
   
PPP Partai Persatuan pembangunan (United 
Development Party) 
    
P3M Pusat Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyrakat or 
Center for Pesantren and Community 
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 Development (an NGO established by NU and 
non-NU activists and affiliated wit the NU 
ideology). 
  
PPIM Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat or Center 
for the Study of Islam and Society [an autonomous 
research body of the Islamic State University in 
Jakarta or UIN]. 
   
P4 Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila 
(A Guide on Appreciation and Application of the 
State Ideology)  
   
PRRI Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (The 
Revolutionary Government of Indonesian 
Republic) 
   
PSI Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist 
Party) 
   
Pesantren Traditional religious boarding schools 
  
RMI Rabitah Ma’hadil Islamiyah (the association of 
pesantren) 
  
Rawi Narrator 
  
RUKUB Rancangan Undang-undang Kerukunan Umat 
Beragama  (the bill of law with respect to 
Harmony among believers) 
  
Salafi The name given to those who follow the ideas and 
practices of the righteous ancestors (al-salaf al-
salih) 
  
Salafi literalists Who reject both medieval jurisprudence and 
reinterpretation of the original Islamic sources 
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Sami’na wa atha’na Obedient to the high authority such as cleric and 
leader without reserve 
  
SDSB Sumbangan Dermawan Sosial Berhadiah (a 
national lottery) 
  
Selametan Sacrificial meals 
   
Shura designates democracy in Islam or political Islam 
  
Tajdid A mode of reform that does not depend upon a 
concept of “progress” for their validity 
  
Tanwir the M National Meeting “per annum” (Assessment 
forum) 
  
Taqlid the adherence to the opinions of the preceding 
generations of the Muslim clerics of medieval age 
  
Tapak Suci Putera 
Muhammadiyah 
 Traditional Defense of M youth 
  
Tasarruf al-imaan alaa al-raiyya 
manuut bii al-masalaha 
 Public interests serve main points (criteria) to assess  
the state policy and implementation 
  
The Qur’an and as-Sunnah   The sacred text 
  
Ukhuwah bashariah NU in relation to all human beings 
  
Ukhuwah bashariah NU in relation to the state 
  
Ukhuwah wathnoniyah NU in relation to the state 
  
Ulumul al-qur’an the knowledge of the Qur’an   
  
Usulu al-khamsah The five basic human needs (daruriyaat) (see al-
Ghazaly) 
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 Usul fiqh Islamic legal theory 
  
Wawasan Nusantara National outlook 
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APPENDIX B: Interview Guide  
 
Key informant/actor code:  ……………        Interview date: ………………………. 
Position :  ………………………………         Time:  ……………. to ……………… 
Affiliation:  NU/Muhammadiyah                    Place of interview: ………………….. 
 
Note:  Describe the actual settings for interviews. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
I. Organizational issue 
1. What do you see the mission and objectives of your association? 
2. What are the approaches and programs developed to achieve the mission and 
objectives of your association? 
3. How do the tenets of Islam influence programs of your association? 
4. Has your association developed its mission, objectives and programs in response to 
particular societal dynamics? If yes, what factors does your association consider in 
developing its missions and programs? 
5. In your association, how are decisions made in designing, planning and implementing 
programs? 
6. How would you describe the roles your association plays in developing members of 
the community in such spheres as education, economics, and religion?   
7. How does your association evaluate its programs? 
  
  
II. Democracy  
1. How do you (personally) define democracy? Do you think others in yours associations 
would define democracy in the same way or differently? 
2. What do you think of the key characteristics of a democratic society and of a 
democratic state? Do you consider (the following): (a) popular sovereignty, (b) 
freedoms [freedom of speech or expression, freedom of religion, freedom from fear 
and danger, freedom from want, freedom of association], (c) respect for differences or 
plurality/ dignity of others, (d) critical and (e) equality, as a key characteristic of 
democracy? Why or why not? 
3. As you think about democracy, do you see aspects that are compatible or 
incompatible with basic principles or tenets of Islam?  
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 4. To what extent and in what ways do you view Indonesia to be a democracy?  
5. Previously, you describe how various kinds of decisions are made in your association. 
To what extent and in what ways do such decision-making processes resemble your 
conception of democracy? 
II. Citizenship and Democratic Citizens 
 
1. When you hear word ‘citizenship,’ what do you think? How do you define or 
conceptualize citizenship? Do you think that others in your association would define 
citizenship in the same way or differently? 
2.  What do you view to be the rights, responsibilities, and roles of citizens?  
3. Do you think that loyalty and commitment to state characterize a responsible citizen? 
How do you define loyalty and commitment to state? What are other characteristics 
of a responsible citizen? What are the rights of citizens? 
4.  Please describe the rights, responsibilities, and roles of members of your association? 
5. To what extent and in what ways do such roles resemble your ideal conception of 
citizenship?   
 III. Education for democratic citizenship 
1. In your view, how should one organize education to develop people’s capacity and 
commitment to be citizens for democracy?  
2. Do you think that others in your association would agree or disagree with you? 
3. What kinds of programs does your association have to develop citizens for democratic 
society? What knowledge, attitudes, and skills are taught/transmitted in such 
programs? What are the sources of content for such programs? How are such 
educational programs organized? What kinds of activities are included in such 
programs? Who are involved as participants in such programs? Who are involved in 
planning and implementing such programs?  
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For each program, please tell me: 
 
 Trainings/workshops/programs 
a. How many times/year is this 
program organized? 
   
b.  How many participants? 
Who are the participants? 
   
c. Content/material    
    
    
    
    
    
d. Methods/approaches 
employed 
   
    
    
    
e. Where are programs held?     
    
    
 
 
   
4. What resources does (ideas, contacts, networks, facilities, good teachers, etc.) your 
association have that facilities such educational programs designed to develop 
democratic citizens?    
5. What challenges does your association experience in developing education for 
democratic citizenship to your members and to a larger community? 
6.  What are your suggestions to improve your association’s program for education for 
democracy for people, especially Muslim in Indonesia? 
   
 
 273
 APPENDIX C: Approval Letter from Muhammaddiyah 
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 APPENDIX D: Letter from the President  of Muhammadiyah University of Yogjakarta 
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 APPENDIX E: Approval Letter from LAKPESDAM-NU 
 
 276
                                                                                                                                                     
BIBILIOGRAPHY  
Abdalati, Hammud. (1995). Islam in Focus. USA: Islamic Teaching Center 
Abdullah, M. Amin. (2001).”Muhammadiyah’s Experience in Promoting Civil Society.” In 
Nakamura Mitsuo, Sharon Siddique & Omar Farouk Bajunid, Islam and Civil Society 
in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
 
Abdillah, Masykuri (2000). “Muhammadiyah, Politik Orde Baru, dan Peran Amien Rais 
(Muhammadiyah, the Political Stance of the New Order, and the Role of Amien 
Rais).” In Abd. Rahim Ghazali, Dua Yang Satu: Muhammadiyah dalam Sorotan 
Cendikiawan NU (Two In oneness: Muhmmadiyah in the Eyes of NU Scholars). 
Bandung: Mizan.  
 
 Abdur Rashid, Ahmed. (2004). “Islam at the Crossroads of Extremism and Moderation: 
New Science, Global Peace, and Democracy.” In David Odell-Scott,  Democracy and 
Religion; Free Exe cise and Diverse Visions. Kent & London: The Kent State 
University Press. 
r
 
 
Al’anani, Hasan. (1990). Freedom and Responsibility in Qur’anic Perspective.  Indianapolis: 
American Trust Publication. 
 
Alatas, Syed Husein. (1990). Corruption: Its Nature, Causes and Function. Singapore, 
Brookfields Vt: Gower Pub.Co.  
 
Ali, Abdullah Yusuf. (1999). The Qur’an Translation. New York: Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an, 
Inc. 
 
Ali, Zeenat Shaukat. (2002). “Democracy at the Heart of Islam.” In Alan Race & Ingrid 
Shafer, Religions in Dialogue from Theocracy to Democracy. England, Burlington VT: 
Ashgate Publishing Company. 
 
Al-Sulami, Mishal Fahm. (2003). The West and Islam: Western Liberal Democracy versus
the System of Shura. London, New York: Routledge Curzon. 
 
Amstrong, Karen. (2000). Islam: A Short History. New York: A Modern  Library. 
 
Andersen, Jorgen Goul; Hoff, Jens. (2001). Democracy and Citizenship in Scandinavia. 
Hampshire: Palgrave. 
 277
  
Ansari, Muhammad Fazlurahman. (n.a),The Qur’anic Foundation and Structure of Muslim
Society. Lahore: Indus Educational Foundation. 
 
s
 
‘Ata ur-Rahim, Muhammad. (1991). Jesus Prophet of Islam. New York: Tahrike Tarsile 
Qur’an, Inc. 
 
At-Taba’taba’i, Husayn, Sayyid Muhammad. (1982). Al-Mizan: An Exegesis of the Qur’an. 
Vol. 3. Tehran, Iran: Wofis.   
 
The Asia Foundation. (2000). Annual Report. Jakarta: The Asia foundation. 
 
Aslan, Adnan.(1998). Religious Pluralism in Christian and I lamic Philosophy: The Thought 
of John Hick and Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Great Britain: Curzon. 
 
Audigier, Francois. (2000). Basic Concept and Core Competences Education for Democratic 
Citizenship: A Second Consolidated Report. Geneva: Council of Europe.  
 
Axtmann, Roland. (1996). Liberal Democracy into twenty-First Century: Globalization, 
Integration and the Nation State. New York: Manchester University Press. 
 
Bank, Janet A. (1997). Educating Citizenship in a Multicultural Society. New York: teacher 
College Press. 
 
Barber, Benjamin R. (1999). “Clansmen, Consumers and Citizens.” In Robert K. 
Fullinwider, Civil Society, Democracy and Civic Renewal. New York: Rowman  
&Littlefield, Inc.   
 
Barlas, Asma. (2002). “Believing Women” in Islam Unreading Patriarchal Interpretation of 
the Qur’an. Austin: University of Texas Press. 
 
Behbudi, Muhammad Baqir. (1997). Translation from The Qur’an; A New Interpretation, 
Textual exegesis. Britain: Curzon. 
 
Beiner, Ronald. (2003). Liberalism, Nationalism, Citizenship: Essays on The Problem of 
Political Community. Toronto: UBC Press.  
 
Bekker, Theo & Pretorious, Joelien (eds.). (2001). Dialogue among Civilizations: A 
Paradigm for Peace: President Mohammad Khatami. Johannesburg: Center for 
International Political Science (CIPS), University of Pretoria. 
 
 278
 Bertrand, Jacques. (2004). Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Billah, M.M. (2004). “Pergolakan NU dan Kelompok Islam: Interplay antara “gerakan’ 
dengan “Gerakan Tandingan” dan “Tandingan atas “Gerakan Tanding” (The NU 
Struggle and Islamic groups: the Interplay between a Movement and a Counter 
Movement, Counter Movement vs. a Counter Movement).” In Asep Gunawan (ed.), 
Artikulasi Islam Kultural: Dari Tahapan Moral ke Periode Sejarah (The Articulation of 
Cultural Islam: from a Moral Stage to the Historical Periods). Jakarta: Srigunting. 
 
Black, Herry Campbell. (1990). Black’s Law Dictionary. St. Paul, Minn: West Publishing 
Co. 
 
Black, Anthony. (2001). “ The Concept of Civil Society in Pre-modern Europe.” In Sudipta 
Kaviraj & Sunnil Khilnani, Civil Society: History and Possibilities. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
  
Blair, Harry. (1998). “Civil Society and Building Democracy: Lessons from International 
Donor Experiences”. In Amanda Bernard, Henny Helmich & Percy B. Lehning, Civil 
Society and International Development. Paris: OECD. 
 
Berry, Christopher J. (1989). The idea of Democratic Community. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press. 
 
Bogdan, Robert C. &Biklen, Knopp, Sari. (1992). Qualitative Research for Education: An 
Introduction to Theory and Methods. Second Edition. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
 
Biggs, Donald; Colasante, Robert; Smith, Joshua &  Hook, Gary. (2000).”Citizenship 
Education for Adolescent Offenders.” In Mal Leicester, Ceclia Modgil & Sohan 
Modgil, Politics, Education and Citizenship. Vol. VI. New York:  Falmer Press. 
 
Brethan, David & Bayle, Kenn. (1995). Introducing Democracy: Policy Paper. Cambridge: 
Unesco.  
 
Caliendo, Stephen M. (2000). Teachers Matters: The Troubles with Leaving Political 
Education to Coaches. Westport: Praeger. 
 
Carter, April & Stoke, Geoffrey. (1998). Liberal Democ acy and Its Critique. Oxford: 
Blackwell 
r
 
 279
 Chamber, Simone. (2002). “A Critical  Theory Civil Society.” In Simone Chamber & Will 
Kymlicka, Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society.  Princeton, Oxford: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Christopher, Jerry J. (1989). The Idea of Democratic Community. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press.  
 
Clarke, Paul Barry. (1996). Deep Citizenship. London, Chicago: Pluto Press. 
 
Clarke, Paul Barry & Foweraker, Joe. (2001). Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought. New 
York: Routledge. 
 
Cogan, John J. (1998).”Citizenship Education for the 21st Century: Setting the Context.” In 
John J. Cogan & Ray Derricott, Citizenship for the 21st Century: an International 
Perspective on Education. London: Kogan Page. 
 
Cohen, Jean L.  & Arato, Andrew. (1992), Civil Society and Political Theory. Massachusetts: 
MIT Press. 
 
Conley, Marshall William. (1993). “Introduction: Political Education, Political literacy and 
Political Development.” In Marshall William Conley, Carlos Alberto Torres 
(eds.).Political Education: North American Perspectives. Hamburg: Kraemer. 
 
Corrother, Andra L. & Suryatna, Estie W. (1995). “Review of NGO Sector in Indonesian and 
Evaluation of the Asia Pacific Regional Community Concept among Indonesian 
NGOs.” In Tadashi Yamamato, Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Community. 
Singapore: Institute for Southeast  Asian Studies (ISEAS). 
 
Craig, Edward. (1998). Routhledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York: Routhledge.   
 
Craigh, Stephen C. (1993). The Malevolent Leaders Popular Discontention in America. 
Boulder, Oxford: Westview Press. 
 
Crittenden, Jack. (2002). Democracy’s Mid Wife: an Education to Deliberation. Maryland: 
Lexington Book. 
 
Cullell, Jorge Vargas. (2004). “ Democracy and the Quality of Democracy: Empirical Findings 
and Methodological and Theoretical Issues Drawn from the Citizen Audit of the 
Quality of Democracy in Costa Rica.” In Guillermo O’Donnell, Jorge Vargas Cullell & 
Osvaldo M. Iazzetta (edts.) The Quality of Democracy: Theory and Applications. Notre 
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. 
 280
  
Dahl, Robert A. (1998). On Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Dekker, Henk. (1994). “Socialization and  Education of Young People for Democratic 
Citizenship—Theory and Research”. In Lynn Edwards, Pamela Munn & Ken Fogeman, 
Education for Democ atic Citizenship in Europe- New Challenges for Secondary 
Education. Hamburgh: UNESCO. 
r
f
r
 
Delue, Steven M. (1997). Political Thinking, Political Theory and Civil Society. Boston: 
Allyn and Bacon.  
 
Denzin, Norman K & Lincoln, Yvonne S.  (2000) “Introduction: The Discipline and Practice 
of Qualitative Research”. In Norman  K. Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln, Handbook of 
Qualitative Research. Second Edition. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publication Inc.  
 
Denzin, Norman K. (1978). “The Research Act: a Theoretical Introduction to Sociological 
Methods”. In Norman K. Denzin, & Yvonne S Lincoln, Handbook of Qualitative 
Research. Second Edition. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publication Inc. 
 
Diamond, Larry. (1999). Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: The 
John Hopkins University Press. 
 
Larry, Diamond & KIM, Byung-Kook. (2000). Consolidating Democracy in South Korea. 
Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner.  
  
Dobbert, Marion Lundes. (1982). Ethnographic Research and Application: Theory and 
Application for Modern Schools and Societies. New York: Praeger. 
 
Effendy, Bachtiar. (2003). Islam and the State in Indonesia. Singapore: ISEAS 
 
Eklof, Stefan. (1999). Indonesian Politics in Crisis The Long Fall o  Suharto 1996 -1998, 
Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS).  
 
Eldridge, J.P. (1995). Non-Government Organizations and Democ atic Participation in 
Indonesia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Engle, Shirley H & Achoa, Ann S. (1988). Education for Democratic citizenship. New York; 
Teachers College Press. 
 
Esack, Farid. (2000).Qur’an, Liberation and Pluralism: an Islamic Perspective of 
Interreligious Solidarity against Oppression. Oxford: Oneworld. 
 281
  
Esposito, John L. (1995). The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Esposito, John L. (1998). Islam and Politics. 4th edition. New York: Syracuse University press.   
 
Esposito, John. L (2003). “Islam and Civil Society.” In  John L. Esposito & Francois Burgat 
(Eds.), Modernizing Islam: Religion in The Public Sphere in Europe and Middle East. 
New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutger University Press.  
 
Esposito, John L (2001). “Islamic Values Are Compatible with Western Values”. In  Jennifer 
A Hurley, Islam Opposing Viewpoints. California: Greenhaven Press, Inc.  
 
Esposito, John L & Voll, O. John. (1996). Islam and Democracy. New York, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Etzioni, Amitai. (1993). The Spirit  of Community: Rights, Responsibility,  and the 
Communitarian Agenda. New York: Crown. 
 
Etzioni, Amitai. (2000). The Third Way to a Good Society. London: Demos. 
 
Falaakh, Muhammad Fajrul.(2001).”Nahdhatul Ulama and Civil Society in Indonesia.” In 
Nakamura Mitsuo, Sharon Siddique & Omar Farouk Bajunid, Islam and Civil Society 
in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
 
Farnen, Russell F. (1990). Integrating Political Science, Education and Public Policy: 
International Perspectives on Decision Making, System Theory and Socialization 
Research. New York: Peterlang. 
 
Fealy, Greg. (2004).”Islam in Southeast Asia. Domestic Pietism, Diplomacy and Secuirty.” In 
Mark Beenor (ed.), Contemporary Southeast Asia Regional Dynamics, National 
Differences. London; New York: Palgrave Macmillian. 
 
Fealy, Greg. (2003).”Divided Majority.” In Shahram Akbarzadeh & Abdullah Saeed, Islam 
and Political Legitimacy. London: Routhledge Curzon. 
 
Feldman, Noah. (2003). After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy. New 
York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux. 
 282
  
Fetterman, David M. (1998). Ethnography Step by Step. Second Edition. Thousand Oakes: 
Sage Publication. 
 
FK3 (Forum Kajian Kitab Kuning). (2001). Wajah Baru Relasi Suami-Istri: Telaah Kitab 
“uquud  al-Lujayn (New Perspective with respect to Husband-Wife Relationship; an 
Analytical Study on  the classical work “Uquud al-Lujayn”) Jakarta: FK3. 
 
Flap, Henk. (2004). “Creation and Returns of Social Capital: A New Research Program.” In 
Henk Flap & Beate Volker, Creation and Returns of Social Capital: A New Research 
Program. London, New York:Routledge. 
 
Foster, Victoria. (1997). “Feminist Theory and the Construction of Citizenship Education”. In 
Kerry J. Kennedy, Citizenship Education and the Modern State. London, Washington, 
DC: The Falmer Press. 
 
Francois, Burgot. (2003). Face to Face with Political Islam. New York: I.B. Taurus & Co. Ltd. 
Franks, Myfanwy. (2001). Women and Revivalism in the West: Choosing ‘Fundamentalism’ 
in a Liberal Democracy. New York: Palgrave.  
 
Frazer, Elizabeth. (1999). The Problems of Communitarian Politic  Unity and Conflict. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
s
 
 
Gaffar, Afan . (2004). “Islam dan Politik Era Orde Baru: Mencari Bentuk Artikulasi  yang 
Tepat (Islam and the Politics in the New Order Era: Seeking an Appropriate Model of 
Articulation).” In Aep Gunawan (ed.). Artikulasi Islam Kultural: Dari Tahapan Moral ke 
Periode Sejarah [The Articulation of Cultural Islam: From a Moral Stage to a Political
Purview]. Jakarta: Srigunting. 
 
Gaylin, Willard & Jennings, Bruce. (2003). The Perversion of Autonomy Coercion and 
Constraints in a Liberal Society. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
 
Gilbert, Rob. (1997). “Issues for Citizenship in a Postmodern World”. In Kerry J. Kennedy, 
Citizenship Education and the Modern State. London, Washington, DC: The Falmer 
Press. 
 
 283
 Gimaret, D. (1990). “Mu’tazilla.” In  CE Bosworth, WP E van Donzel; WO Heinrich; Ch 
Pellat. The encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition. Vol. VII. Leiden:  EJ  Brill. 
 
 Ginsburg, Mark B. (2001). “Democracy, Worker-Consumer-Citizens, and Teachers 
Education: Theoretical Musings with Findings from Research in Mexico”. In Leslie 
Linage (ed.) Democratizing Education and Educating Democratic Citizens. New York: 
Routledge Falmer. 
 
Giroux, Henry A & McLaren, Peter.  (1988). “ Teacher Education and the Politics of 
Democratic Reform”. In Henry A. Giroux Teachers As Intellectuals Toward a Critical 
Pedagogy of Learning. Massachusetts: Bergin & Garvey Publishers, Inc. 
 
Green, Andy. (1997). “Education and State Formation in Europe and Asia”. In Kerry J. 
Kennedy, Citizenship Education and Modern S ate. London, New York: Routledge. t
s s
i
 
Gutex, Gerald L. (2004). Philosophical and Ideological Voices in Education. New York: 
Pearson Education Inc. 
 
Hadinata, Bob S. (2003). The Politics of NGO  in Indone ia: Developing Democracy and 
Managing a Movement. London, New York: Routledge Curzon. 
 
Halton, Robert J. (2000) “Multicultural Citizenship”. In Eugi F Isin, Democracy Citizenship 
and Global City. London: Routledge. 
 
Hakim, Lukman. (2004). Perlawanan Islam Kultural Relasi Asosiat f  Pergolokan Civil 
Society dan Tradisi Aswaja NU (The Struggle of Cultural  Islam in association with Civil 
Society Movement and the NU Sunni Ideology). Surabaya:Ureka. 
 
 Hamersley, Martyn & Atkinson, Paul. (1983). Ethnography, Principles in Practice. New 
York: Tavistock Publications. 
 
Hamzawy, Amr. (2003).”Normative Dimensions of Contemporary Arab Debates on Civil 
Society: Between the Search for a New Formulation of Democracy and the Controversy 
over the Political Role of Religion”. In Amr Hamzawy (Ed.)Civil Society in the Middle 
East. Berlin: Schiler.  
 
Hanafi, Hasan. (2002). “Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society: a Reflective Islamic 
Approach”. In Hasmi, Sohail H, Islamic Political Ethics: Civil Society, Pluralism, and 
Conflict. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
 284
 Hanafi, Hasan. (2002). “Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society: a Reflective Islamic 
Approach”. In Simone Chambers & Will Kymlicka, Alternative Conceptions of Civil 
Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Harris, Robert. (2003). Political Corruption in and Beyond the Nature State. London, New 
York: Routhledge. 
 
Harley, David. (1990). The condition of Pos modernity: an enquiry of the O igins of 
Cultural Change. Cambridge: Blackwell. 
t r
a
r
 
Hasan, Mohammad Tholhah. (2003). Ahlussunah wal Jama’ah dalam Persepsi dan Tradisi 
NU (Sunni from the perspective  and the Tradition of NU). Jakarta: Lantabora Press. 
 
Hasyim, M. Syafiq. (2000). “Muhammadiyah: Antara Masyarakat Utama, Sipil dan Politik 
(Muhammadiyah Stance amidst Excellent Society, Civil Society and Politics).” In Abd. 
Rahim Ghazalim(ed.), Dua yang satu: Muhammadiyah dalam Sorotan Cendikiawan 
NU (Two in Oneness: Muhammadiyah in the eyes of NU Scholars). Bandung: Mizan.  
 
 Heater, Derek. (1999). What is Citizenship? Malden, MA: Polity Press. 
 
Hebert, Yvonne M. (2002). Citizenship in Transformation in Canada. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press. 
 
Heidenheimer, Arnold & Johnston, Michael. (2002). Political Corruption: Concept and 
Context. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers. 
 
Held, David. (1987). Models of Democracy. California: Stanford University Press. 
 
Hefner, Robert W. (2003). “Public Islam and The Problem of Democratization.” In Bryan S. 
Turner, Isl m Critical Concept, in Islam, State and Politics. Vol. II. London: 
Routhledge. 
 
Hefner, Robert W. (1998). “A Muslim Civil Society”? In Robert W. Hefner, Democratic 
Civility—on the History and Cross-Cultural Possibility of Democ atic Ideal. New 
Brunswick-USA: Transaction Publisher. 
 
Hellman, Joel; Kassum, Jemaluddin; Kharas, Homi & Steer, Andrew. (2003). Indonesia 
Combating Corruption in Indonesia: Enhancing Accountability for Development. The 
World Bank Report No 27246-IND. November 13. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
 
Hick, John. (1985). Problems of Religious Pluralism. London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 
 285
  
Hindess, Barry. (1993). “Citizenship in the Modern West”. In Bryan S. Tuner (ed.) 
Citizenship and Social Theory. Newbury Park: SAGE Publication. 
 
Hogan, David. (1997). “The Logic of Protection: Citizenship, Justice and Political 
Community”. In Kerry J. Kennedy, Citizenship Education and the Modern State. 
London, Washington, DC: The Falmer Press. 
 
Howell, Jude & Pearce, Jenny. (1999). Civil Society and Development: A Critical 
Exploration. Boulder: Lynne Riener Publisher. 
 
Hooker, M.B. (2003). Indonesian Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatawa. 
Hawai’i: University of Hawaii Press.  
 
Hurley, Jennifer A. (2000). Islam Opposing V ewpoints. San Diego, California: Greenhaven 
Press, Inc. 
i
t
r
r
 
Jaenuri, Ahmad. (2002). The Forma ion of Muhammadiyah Ideology. Surabaya: LPAM. 
 
Janesick, Valerie J.  (2000) “The Choreography of Qualitative Research Design: Minutes, 
Improvisations, and Crystallization”. In Norman  K. Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln, 
Handbook of Qualitative Resea ch. Second Edition. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publication 
Inc.  
 
Janoski, Thomas. (1998). Citizenship and Civil Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Jarvie, Iain (1999). “ Popper’s Ideal Types: Open and Closed, Abstract and                           
Concrete Societies.” In Ian Jarvie & Sandra Pralong, Popper’s Open Society After Fifty 
Years: The Continuing Relevance of Karl Popper.” London & New York: Routledge.  
 
Jahanbakshsh, Forough. (2001). Islam, Democ acy and Religious Modernism in Iran (1953-
2000) from Bazargan to Sorouth. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, NV. 
 
Johnson, Jeffrey C. (1990). Selecting Ethnographic Informants. Newbury Park, California: 
Sage Publications, Inc. 
  
Keane, John. (1998). Civil Society : Old Image, New Vision. California: Stanford University 
Press. 
  
 286
  Kazemi, Farhad. (2002). “Perspective on Islam and Civil Society”. In Nancy L Rosenblum 
and Robert C. Post, Civil Society and Government. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Kelsay, John. (2002). “Civil Society and Government in Islam”. In Nancy L Rosenblum & 
Robert C. Post, Civil Society and Government. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
 Khadduri, Majid (1984). The Islamic Conception of Justice. Baltimore & London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press.  
 
Khatami, Mohammad. (1998). Islam, Liberty and Development, New York: Binghamton 
University. 
 
Khilnani, Sunil. (2001). “ The Development of Civil Society.” In Sudipta Kaviraj & Sunnil 
Khilnani, Civil Society: History and Possibilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
 Kingsbury, Damien. (2002). The Politics of Indone ia. 2s nd Edition. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
 King, Dwight L. (2003). Half-Hearted Reform: Electoral Institutions and the Struggle for 
Democracy in Indonesia. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. 
 
Kuhle, Lene. (2003). “Religious Pluralism in Multireligioucity.” In Viggo Wortensen (ed.), 
Theology and the Religious Dialog. Cambridge: William B. Erdmans Publishing 
Company. 
 
Kurdi, Abdurrahman Abdulkadir. (1984). The Islamic State: A Study based on the Islamic 
Holy Constitution . New York: Mansell Publishing Limited.  
 
Kymlicka, Will. (1998).”Citizenship”. In Edward Craig, Routhledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. London: Routhledge. 
 
Laskpesdam NU Jombang (2003). Program Lakpesdam. 
     http://www.ngo.or.id/lakpesdam/program.htm
 
Lane, Jane-Erik & Errsson, Svante (2003). Democracy: A Comparative Approach. London: 
Routledge. 
 
 287
  Lazarus-Yafeh, Hava. (1986)”Tajdid al-Din: A Reconsideration of Its Meaning, Roots, and 
Influence in Islam.” In William M. Brinner & Stephen D. Ricks, Studies in Islamic and 
Judaic Traditions. Atlanta: Scholar Press. 
 
LeCompte, Margaret D & Schensul, Jean J. (1999). Designing & Conducting Ethnographic 
Research. Walnut Creek: Altamira Press. 
 
LeCompte, Margaret D. & Schensul, Jean J. (1999).  Analyzing & Interpreting Ethnographic 
Data. Walnut Creek: Altamira Press. 
 
 Ledge,  G.D. (1965). Indonesia. Englewood Cliffs. New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc. 
 
Lehner, Rober G. (1976). American Institutions, Political Opinions, and Public Policy. 
Illinois; The Dryden Press. 
 
Liddle, R. William. (1999).”Regime: The New Order”. In Donald K. Emerson, Indonesia 
Beyond Suharto Policy Economy Society. London, New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Lipset, Seymour Martin. (1965).”Introduction”. In TH Marshall, Class, Citizenship and 
Social Development. Garden City, New York: Anchor Book. 
 
Lister, Ruth. (2003).Citizenship Feminist Perspective. Second Edition. New York: New 
York University Press. 
 
 Little, Adrian. (2002). The Politics of Community: Theory and Practice. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press.  
 
Lomasky, Loren E. (2002). “Classical Liberalism and Civil Society.” In Simone Chamber & 
Will Kymlicka, Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society.  Princeton, Oxford: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Lukman, Hakim. (2004). Perlawanan Islam Kultural Relasi Asosiatif Pertumbuhan Civil 
Society dan Dokktrin Aswaja NU  (The Struggle of “Cultural Islam” : A Study on the 
Relationship between Civil Society Movement and NU Sunni Ideology).  Surabya: 
Pustaka Eureka. 
 
Madjid, Nurcholis. (2001).”Potential Islamic Doctrinal Resources for the establishment and 
Appreciation of the Modern Concept of Civil Society”. In Nakamura  Mitsuo, Sharon 
Siddique & Omar Farouk Bajunid, Islam and Civil Society in Southeast Asia. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
 288
  
Magsino, Romula F. (2002) “From Eclectic Theory to Coherence: Citizenship Virtues for 
Our Times.” In Yvonne M Heber Citizenship in Transformation in Canada. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press. 
 
Maududi, Sayyid Abul A’la. (1997).  Islamic Way of Life. Riyadl: IIFSO. 
 
Mir-Hosseini, Ziba. (1999). Islam & Gender The Religious Debate in Contemporary Islam. 
Princeton:  Princeton University Press.  
 
Mitsuo, Nakamura. (2001). “Introduction”. In Nakamura Mitsuo, Sharon Siddique & Omar 
Farouk Bajunid, Islam and Civil Society in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies 
 
Moten, Abdul Rashid.  (1996). Political Science: An Islamic Perspective.  London: 
Macmillan Press Ltd. 
 
Mouffe, Chantal (1995) “ Citizenship”. In Seymour Martin Lipset, The encyclopedia of 
Democracy . Vol. 1, Washington, Dc: Congressional Quarterly Inc. 
 
Moussalli, Ahmad S. (2001). Islamic  Quest for Democracy, Pluralism, and Human Rights. 
Florida: University Press of Florida.  
 
Moussalli, Ahmad S. (1999). Moderate and Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The  Quest for 
Modernity, Legitimacy, and the Islamic State. Orlando: University Press of Florida.  
 
Mulia, Musdah. (2002). “Pembaharuan Muhammadiyah dan Wacana Kesetaraan Gender 
(Muhammadiyah Renewal and the Discourses of Gender Equality).” In Abd. Rahim 
(ed.), Dua yang Satu: Muhammadiyah dalam Sorotan Cendikiawan NU (Two in 
Oneness: Muhammadiyah in the eyes of NU Scholars) Bandung: Mizan. 
 
Mulkhan, Munir. (2000). Islam Murni dalam Masya akat Petani (Puritan Islam within 
Agricultural Society). Yogjakarta: Bentan. 
r
 
 Nawawi, Sheikh Muhammad ibn Umar, (n.a.) Sharhu ‘uquudu al-lujain. Semarang: Pustaka 
Al-‘Alawiyyah. 
 
  Notturno, Mark A. (1999). “ The Open  Society  and Its Enemies:  Authority, Community,  
and Bureacracy.” In Ian Jarvie & Sandra Pralong, Popper’s Open Society After Fifty 
Years: The Continuing Relevance of Karl Popper.” London & New York: Routledge.  
 
 289
 O’Byrne, Darren J. (2003). The Dimensions of Global Citizenship: Political Identity beyond 
the Nation State. London, Portland: Frank Class. 
 
Osman, Fathi. (2002). “Democracy and the Concept of Shura.” In Alan Race & Ingrid Shafer, 
Religions in Dialogue from Theocracy to Democracy. England, Burlington: Ashgate 
Publishing Company.  
 
Palmer, Tom G. (2002). “Classical Liberalism and Civil Society: Definitions, History and 
Relation.” In Nancy  L. Rosenblum & Robert C. Post, C vil Society and Government. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
i
i
 
 Pennock, J. Roland (1950). Liberal Democracy: Its merits and Prospects, New York: 
Rinehart & Company Inc. 
 
Pipe, Daniel. (2003). In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power. New York: Basic Book. 
 
PP Muhammadiyah. (Central Board of Muhammadiyah). (2000). Profil Muhammadiyah 2000 
(The Profil of Muhammadiyah 2000). Yogjakarta: PP Muhammadiyah. 
 
PP Muhammadiyah. (Central Board of Muhammadiyah). (2000). “Tanfidz Mukamar  
Muhammadiyah ke-44.” Berita Resmi Muhamamdiyah. BRM 01/2000-2005.  
Yogjakarta; PP Muhammadiyah. 
 
Praeger, Robert J. (1968).  The Encyclopedia of Citizenship. New York: Halt, Reinhart and 
Waston.  
 
Prasetyo, Hendro & Munhanif, Ali et all. (2002). Islam & Civil Soc ety: Pandangan Muslim 
Indonesia (Islam & Civil Society: The Perspectives of Indonesian Muslims). Jakarta: 
Gramedia Pustaka Utama. 
 
Putnam, Robert D. (2001). “Community-Based Social Capital and Educational Performance.” 
In Daine Ravith & Joseph P. Veteriti, Making Good Citizens  Education and Civil 
Society. New Haven: Yale University Press.  
 
 Qomar, Mujammil (2002). ‘NU Liberal’  dari Traditsionalisme Ahlussuna ke ‘Universalime 
Islam’ (Liberal NU from  Sunni Traditionalism to Universalism of Islam). Bandung: 
Mizan. 
 
Rais, M. Amien (2004). Hubungan antara Politik dan Dakwah: Berguru kepada M. Natsir 
(The Relationships between politics and Religious Call [Proselytization]: Learning from 
Mr. M. Natsir). Bandung: Mujahid Press. 
 290
  
Rais, M. Amien (1998). Tauhid  Sosial (Socail Tauhid or the Unity of God)  Bandung: Mizan. 
 
Rais, M. Amien (1998). Memabangun Politik Adiluhung Membumikan Tauhid Sosial 
Menegakkan Amar Ma’ruf Nahi Munkar (Upholding High Politics Translating the Idea 
of Social Tawheed  into Reality)  Bandung: Zaman. 
 
Ramage, Douglas E. (1995). Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of 
Tolerance. London: Routhledge. 
 
Ramadan, Tariq. (2004). Western Muslim and the Future of I lam. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
s
 
 Rimmerman, Craig A. (1997).” Teaching American Politics through Service: Reflections on 
Pedagogical Strategy.” In  Grant Reeher & Joseph Cammarano, Education for 
Citizenship: Ideas and Innovations in Political Learning. Boulder: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publisher, Inc., 
 
Rippin, Andrew & Knappert, Jan. (1990). Textual Sources for the Study of Islam. Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Rosenthal, Franz. (1960). The Muslim Concept of Freedom. Leiden: E.J. Brill. 
 
Rosenthal, EIJ. (1962). Political Thought in Medieval Islam: an Introductory Outline. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Russell, Roberta J. (2002). “Bridging the Boundaries for a More Inclusive Citizenship 
Education”. In Yvonne M. Hebert, citizenship in Transformation in Canada. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press Incorporated. 
 
 Sachadena, Abdulaziz. (2001). The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
 Saeed, Abdullah & Saeed, Hassan. (2004). Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam. 
Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company. 
 
Saleh, Fauzan. (2001). Modern Trends in Islamic Theological Discourse in 20th Century 
Indonesia; A Critical Survey. Leiden, Boston: Brill. 
 
Schwarz, Adam. (2000). A Nation in Waiting Indonesia’s Search for Stability. Boulder: 
Westview Press. 
 291
  
Schwarz, Adam. (1994). A Nation in Waiting Indonesia in the 1990s. Boulder: Westview 
Press. 
 
Schwarzmantel, John. (2003). Citizenship and Identity toward a New Republic. London: 
Routhledge. 
 
Sehr, David T. (1997). Education for Public Democracy. New York: State University of New 
York Press. 
 
Shehadeh, Lamura Rustum. (2003). The Idea of Women under Fundamentalist Islam.  
Gainesville, Florida: university Press of Florida.  
 
Sisk, Timothy D. (1992). Islam and Democracy: Religion, Politics, and Power in the Middle 
East. Washington, D.C.: United State Institute of Peace Press. 
 
Smart, Barry. (1993). Posmodernity. London: Routhledge. 
 
Smith, Anthony L. (2001). “Indonesia Transfroming Leviathan.” In John Funston, 
Governmen  and Politic  in Soputheast Asia. New York: Palgrave.  t s
t
 
Smock, David. (2002). Islam and Democracy: Special Report. Washington, DC: US Institute 
for Peace. 
 
 Soekarno. (1945). “The Panca Sila”. In Herbert Feith & Lance Castler (1970), Indonesian 
Political Thinking 1945-19665. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Solomone, Rosemary C. (2001)”Common Education and the Democratic Ideals.” In Diane 
Ravith & Joseph P. Viteritti, Making Good Citizens: Educa ion and Civil Society. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Stetson, Brad. (1994). Pluralism and Particularity in Religious Belief. Westport, 
Connecticut: Praeger. 
 
Stokes, Geoffrey. (2002).”Democracy and Citizenship.” In April Carter & Geoffrey Stoke, 
Democratic Theory Today Challenges for the 21st Century.  Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Stowasser, Barbara Freyer. (1998).”Gender Issues and Contemporary Qur’an 
Interpretation.” In (Eds.) Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and John L. Esposito, Gender and 
Social Change. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 292
 Stowasser, Barbara Freyer. (1994). Women in The Qur’an, Traditions, and Interpretation. 
New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Sukma, Rizal. (2003). Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy. London, New York: Routhledge 
Curson. 
 
  Suryadinata, Leo. (2001). “Nation Building and Nation Destroying: The Challenging of 
Globalization in Indonesia.” In Leo Suryadinata, Nationalism and Globaliza ion.t  
Singapore: Institute for South East Asian Studies (ISEAS). 
 
Suryadinata, Leo; Arifin, Evi Nurvidaya & Ananta, Aris. (2003). Indonesia‘s Population: 
Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape. Singapore: Institute for 
South East Asian Studies (ISEAS). 
 
Sutton, Peg. (2000). School of Education Civic Education Project in Indonesia. Indiana: 
CIEDA. 
 
Suwarno. (2002). Muhammadiyah sebagai Oposisi (Muhammadiyah as opposition). 
Yogjakarta: UII Press.  
 
Taha, Mahmud Mohammad. (1998). “The Second Message of Islam .” In Charles Kuzman 
(ed.), Liberal Islam: A Source Book. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Trend, David. (1996) “Democracy Crisis Meaning”. In David Trend  (Ed.) Radical 
Democracy, Identity, Citizenship, and the State. London: Rutledge. 
  
Trentmann, Frank. (2000). Paradox of Civil Society: New Perspectives on Modern German
and British History. New York: Berghahn Books. 
 
 
Tuner, Bryan S. (1993).”Contemporary Problem in Theory of Citizenship”. In Bryan S 
Turner, Citizenship and Social Theory. Newbury Park: SAGE Publication. 
 
Tuner, Bryan S. (1986). Citizenship and Capitalism: The Debate over Reformism. Boston: 
Allen & UNWIN. 
 
Tuner, Bryan S. (2000). “Islam, Civil Society, and Citizenship”. In Nils A Butenschon, Uri 
Davis & Manuel Hassassian, Citizenship and The Sate in The Middle East. New York: 
Syracuse University Press. 
 
Uhlin, Anders. (1997). Indonesia and Third Wave of Democratization: The Indonesian pro-
democracy movement in a changing world. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 293
   
 Vasil, Raj. (1997). Governing Indonesia; The Development of Indonesian Democracy. 
Singapore: BH Asia. 
 
 van Dehsen, Eleanor. (2000). Encyclopedia of Democracy. Washington, DC: Congressional 
Quarterly. 
 
van Gunsteren, Herman. (1998). A Theory of Citizenship: Organizing Plurality in 
Contemporary Democracy. Boulder: Westview Press. 
 
van Bruinessen, Martin. (1995).”Muslim of the Dutch East Indies and the Caliphate 
Question.”  Studia Islamika. Vol. 2. No 3 (pp. 115-140). 
 
Vatikiotis, Michael R.J. (1998). Indonesia Politics under Suharto the Rise and Fall of the 
New Order. Third Edition. London/New York: Routledge. 
 
Voll, John O. (2004). “Salafiyya.” In Richard C. Martin, Encyclopedia of Islam and the 
Muslim World. Vol. 2. New York & London: Thomsan & Gale. 
 
Voll, John O. (1983). “ Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: Tajdid and Islah.” In John L. 
Esposito, Voices of Resurgent Islam. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Wadud-Muhsin, Amina. (1992). Qur’an and Women. Kualalumpur: Penerbit Fajar Bhakti 
SDN, BHD. 
 
Wadud-Muhsin, Amina. (1998).”Qur’an and Women.” In Charles Kurzman (ed.), Liberal 
Islam: Resources Book. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Wahid, Abdurrahman. (1986).”The Nahdlatul Ulama and Islam in Present Day Indonesia.” 
In Taufik Abdullah & Sharon Sideique (edts). Islam and Society in Southeast Asia. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia  Studies.  
 
Waldron, Jeremy. (1998)”Liberalism”. In Edward Craig, Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. London: Routhledge. 
 
Warren, Mark E.  (1999). Democracy and Trust, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 Weatherbee, Donald E. (1966). Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno’s Indonesian Revolution. 
Monograph Series No. 8. Michigan: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies. 
 
 294
 Welton, Katherine. (1998). “Richard Rortry: Postmodernism and a Pragmatic Defense of 
Democracy.” In April Carter & Geoffrey Stroke, Liberal Democracy and its Critics. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
White, Gordon. (1996). “Civil Society, Democratization and Development”. In Robin 
Luchan and Gordon White (Edts.). Democratization in South: The Jagged Waves. 
New York: Manchester University Press. 
 
Young, Iris Marion. (1998).”Policy and Group Difference: A Critique of Ideal of universal 
Citizenship.” In Gerson Shafir (ed.), The Citizenship Debates. Minneapolis: University. 
 
Yusuf, Slamet Effendy. (2000). “Muhammadiyah dan Dinamika Politik Umat  
(Muhammadiyah and the umma’s Political Dynamics).” In Abd. Rahim Ghazali, Dua 
Yang Satu: Muhammadiyah dalam Sorotan Cendikiawan NU [Two in Oneness: 
Muhammadiyah in the Eyes of NU Scholars]. Bandung: Mizan.  
 
Zaidan, Abdul Karim. (1982). Individual and the State. Malaya: International Islamic 
Federation of Student Organization. 
 
Zartman, I.William. (2001). “Islam, the State, and Democracy: The Contradictions”. In 
Charles E. Butterworth & I. William Zartman, Between the State and Islam. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Zilbershats, Yaffa. (2002). The Human Right to Citizenship. New York: Transnational 
Publisher Inc. 
 
Zubaida, Sami. (2001). ”Civil Society, Community, and Democracy in the Middle East”. In 
Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani, Civil Society: History and Possibilities. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Zettersteen, KV. (1987). “Al-Mu’tazila.” In M.Th. Houstma; Aj Wensinck, A Levi-
Provendal; H. A.R. Gibb; W Hefferning,  (1987). E.J Brill’s First Encyclopedia of Islam 
1913-1936. Leiden & New York: E.J. Brill. 
 
Wahid, Salahuddin. (2000). “Muhammadiyah dan Politik: Berdirilah di atas Kepenting 
Bersama (Muhammadiyah and Politics; Upholding the Principle of Public Interests).” 
In Abd. Rahim Ghazali, Dua Yang Satu: Muhammadiyah dalam Sorotan Cendikiawan 
NU (Two in Oneness: Muhmmadiyah in the Eyes of NU Scholars). Bandung: Mizan.  
 
Wie, Thee Kian. (2003). Recollections: The Indonesian Economy, 1950-1990s. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
 295
  
 
 
 
Journals: 
  
 Ahmad, Khurshid. (2000).”Islam and Democracy: Some Conceptual and Contemporary 
Dimensions.” The Muslim World. 90 (1-2). 
 
Ariev, Hodri. (1999). “At-Tafkiiru al-Fiqhi ‘Inda Nahdlatul Ulama [NU].” Studia Islamika. 
Vol. 6. No. 1. 
 
Arjomand, Said Amir. (2000). “Civil Society and the Rule of Law in the Constitutional 
Politics of Iran under Khatami (Iranian President Mohammad Khatami”. Social 
Research, Summer.     
http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/m2267/2_67/63787333/p2/article.jhtml. 
 
Bhalul, Raja. (2000).”People vs God: the Logic of ‘Divine Soverignty’ in Islamic Democratic 
Discourse.”  Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations. Vol. 11. No.3. October.  
 
Barber, R. Benjamin. (1989).”Public Talk and Civic Action: Education for Participation in a 
Strong Democracy.” Social Education 53.  
 
Barber, R. Benjamin & Richard, Battistoni M. (1993).”A Season of Service: Introducing 
Service Learning into the Liberal Arts Curriculum.” Political Science and Politics  26: 2. 
 
 Bird, Judith. (1998). “Indonesia in 1997: The Tinderbox Year.” A ia Survey. Vol. 38. Issue 2 
(February). 
s
 
Change, Jerry M. (1993) ”On the Development of Democratic Citizens”. The Social Studies. 
Vol. 8. No. 4.  
 
Editor. (2003) “Aswaja: di Mata Kang Said: Wacana Perdebatan tentang Pluralisme (Said’s 
Perception about Aswaja in Relation to Pluralism) .” Fatayat NU. Edisi 5. Tahun II 
 
El-Hodaiby, Muhammad M. (1997).”Upholding Islam.” Harvard International Review. 
Spring. Vol. 19. Issue 2. 
 
 Encarnacion, Omar G. (2001).”Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy in Spain.” 
Political Science Quarterly. Volume 116. No. 1. Spring. 
 
 296
 Esposito, John L. (1997).”Claiming Center.” Harvard International Review. Spring. Vol. 19. 
Issue 2. 
  
Etzioni, Amitai. (2003).”Particularistic Obligations: A Communitarian Examination.” The 
Responsive Community. Winter 2003/2004 
 
 Fanni, Muchyar. (2002).”Mempertimbangkan Kembali Hubungan Islam dan Demokrasi: 
Upaya Kompromi melalui Fiqh Dharuri [Rethinking about the Relationship bewteen 
Islam and Democracy from the “Fiqh Dharuri” Perspective].” Tarjih. Edisi ke-3. Januari. 
 
Fatimah, Siti. (2004).”Representasi Presiden Perempuan [Represenation of Female 
President].” Fatayat  NU. Edisi 6, Tahun III. 
 
 Finkel, Steve E; Bevis, Gwendolyn G. (2000). “Civic Education, Civil Society, and Political 
Mistrust in Developing Countries: The Case of the Dominican Republic. World 
Development. Vol. 28, No. 1.  
 
Fish, Steven, M. (2002).”Islam and Authoritarianism.’  World Politics . Vol. 55:1. 
 
Frazer, Elizabeth. (1999). “Introduction: The Ideas of Political Education”, Oxford Review of 
Education. Vol. 25, Nos 1 and 2. 
 
Ghadbian, Najib. (2003). “Democracy or Self-Interest? An Investigative Look into Islamic 
Democracy and US  Policy.” Harvard International Review. Summer. 
 
Goddard, Hugh. (2002). “Islam and Democracy”. The Political Quarterly. Vol. 73. Issue 1. 
 
Gutmann, Amy. (1995). “Civic Education and Social Diversity”. Ethics. Vol. 105, Issue 3, 
April.   
 
Hamdi, Mohammad Elhachmi. (1996). “Islam and Liberal Democracy: The Limits of the 
Western Model.” Journal of Democr cy 7.2.  a
 
Hepburn, A. Mary. (1993). ”Concepts of Pluralism and Implicatioin for for Citizenship 
Education,” Social Studies 84 . 
 
 297
  Hefner, Robert W. (2001).”Public Islam and The Problem of Democratization.” A Quarterly 
Review 62 (4). 
 
Hefner, Robert W. (1993). “ Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the 
Indonesian Middle Class.” Indonesia. No. 56 (October).Cornell Southeast Asia Program. 
 
Hindess, Barry. (2003).”Neo-Liberal Citizenship”. Citizenship Studies. Vol. 6. No. 2 (pp. 127-
143). 
 
Hoge, John Douglas. (2002).”Character Education, Citizenship, and Social Studies.” The social  
Studies. Vol. 93. No.3.May/June.  
 
Honna, Jun. (1999). ”Military Ideology in Response to Democratic Pressure During the Late 
Suharto Era: Political and Institutional Contexts.” Indonesia. No. 67 (April). Cornell 
Southeast Asian Program.   
 
Huntington, Samuel P.(1993).”The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs. Vol. 72. No.3. 
 
Kaltsounit, Theodore. (1990).”Democracy and Democratic Citizenship.” The Social Studies. 
September/October. 
 
Khan, Muqtader. (2003).”Prospect for Muslim Democracy: The Role of U.S. Policy”. Middle 
East Policy. Vol. X. No. 3. Fall. 
 
Kramer, Gudrun. (1993)”Islamist Notions of Democracy”. Middle East Report. Vol.0, Issue 
183 
 
Kubba, Laith. (1996). “Islam and Liberal Democracy: Recognizing Pluralism.” Journal of 
Democracy 7.2. (pp. 86-89). 
 
Kymlicka, Will; Norman, Wayne. (1994). “Return of Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on 
Citizenship Theory.” Ethics. Vol. 104. Issue 2. 
 
Kramer, Martin. (1997).”Ballots and Bullets.” Harvard International Review. Spring. Vol. 19. 
Issue 2. 
 
Lapayese, Yvette. (2003). “Toward a Critical Global Citizenship Education.”  Comparative 
Education Review. Vol. 47. No 4. November. 
 
Levin, Benjamin. (1998). “The Educational Requirement for Democracy”. Curriculum 
Inquiry. 28: 1. 
 298
  
Lewis, Bernard. (1993). “Islam and Liberal Democracy.” The Atlantic Online. February. 
 
Lewis, Bernard (1993). “Islam and Liberal Democracy: A Historical Overview.”  Journal of 
Democracy 7.2. 
 
Liddle, R. William. (1996). “Indonesia’s Democratic Past and Future”. Comparative Politics.  
Vol. 24. Issue 4. 
 
Lister, Ruth; Smith, Noel; Middleton, Sue & Cox, Lynn. (2003). “ Young People Talk about 
Citizenship: Empirical Perspective on Theoretical and Political Debts.” Citizenship 
Studies. Vol. 7. No. 2. 
 
Maarif, Ahmad Syafii. (1988). “ Islam di Masa Demokrsi Liberal dan Demokrasi Terpimpin 
(Islam during the eras of Liberal Democracy and Guided Democracy). Prisma. No. 5 
Year XVIII. 
 
Manent, Pierre. (2003). “Modern Democracy As A System of Separations”. Journal of 
Democracy. Vol. 14. No. 1. January. 
 
Mazrui,  Ali A. (1997).”Islamic and Western Values.” Foreign Affairs. Vol. 76. No. 5. 
 
 McCormack, Brian, (1999), “Fifty Years of Inonesian Development : One Nation under 
Capitalism”, Journal of World System Research, Volume 5, No. 1, Spring. 
 
McGinn, Noel. (1996). “Education, Demoractization and Globalization: A Challenge for 
Comparative Education”. Comparative Education Review 40:4. 
 
Mehran, Golnar. (2003).” Khataami, Political Reform and Education in Iran”. Comparative 
Education. Vol. 39. No. 3. August. 
 
Merry, Michael Yousif. (2004).”Islam versus (Liberal) Pluralism? A Response to Ahamad 
Yousif.” Jou nal of Muslim Affairs. Vol. 24. No. 1. April. r
 
Meyer, John R. (1990).”Democratic Citizenship and Their Development.” The Social Studies. 
September/October. 
 
Morrill, L. Richard. (1982)”Educating for Democratic Values.” Liberal Education 68.  
 
Morse, W.Suzane. (1993). ” The Practice of Citizenship : Learn by Doing,” Social Studies 84.  
 
 299
 Muhibuddin, MA. (2004). “Principles of Islamic Polity toward Ahlu al-Kitab and Religious 
Minorities.” Journal of Muslim Affairs. Vol. 24. No. 1. April.  
 
Mujiburrahman, KH. (1999).”Islam and Politics in Indonesia: the Political Thought of 
Abdurrahman Wahid.” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relation. Vol. 10. No.3.  
 
Mulkhan, Munir. (2004). “Akuntabilitas Publik dalam Praktek Kekuasaan dan Keagamaan 
(Public Accountability within the spheres of Power and Religion).”  Inovasi. No. 2. 
Year XIII. 
 
Naval, Concepcion; Print, Muirray & Veldhuis, Ruud. (2002).”Education for Democratic 
Citizenship in the New Europe: Context and Reform.” European Jou nal of Education. 
Vol. 37. No. 2. 
r
 
Newton, Kenneth. (1997).” Social Capital & Democracy.” American Behavioral Scientist. 
March-April. Vol. 40. No. 5.  
 
Patrick, John J. (2000). Concept at the Core of Education for Democratic Citizenship. 
http://www.civnet.org/journal/demo.ciitizen
 
Pring, Richard. (1999).”Political Education: The Relevance of the Humanities.” Oxford 
Review Education. Vol. 25. Nos. 1&2.  
 
Print, Murray & Coleman, David. (2003).”Toward Understanding of Social Capital and 
Citizenship Education.” Cambridge Journal of Education. Vol. 33. No. 1 
 
Print, Murray; Ornstrom, Susane & Skovgaard, Henrik. (2002).”Education for Democratic 
Process in Schools and Classrooms.” European Journal of Education. Vol. 37. No. 2. 
 
Perczynski, Piotr; Vink, Marteen. (2002). “Citizenship and Democracy: A Journey to 
Europe’s Past.” Ciitizenship Studies. Vol. 6. No. 6. 
 
Putnam, Robert D. (1995). “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital’.  Journal of 
Democrcy. July. 
 
Riddell, Peter G. (2002). “The Diverse Voices of Political Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia.” 
Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations.  Vol. 13. No.1. 
 
Said, Salim. (2998). “Suharto’s Armed Forces: Building a Power Base in the New Order of 
Indonesia”. Asian Survey. Vol. 38. Issue 6 (january).  
 
 300
 Sander, Mary Fearley. (2000). “Preparation for Ethical Community: Learning from 
Education for Sittichkeit in New Order Indonesia”. Citizenship Studies. Vol. 4. No. 3. 
 
Shanker, Albert. (1995). “The importance of Civic Education”. USIA Electronic Journal. 
Vol. 1, No 8, July. 
 
Shaver, P. James. (1985). “ Commitment to Values and the Study of Social Problems in 
Citizenship Education.” Social Education 49: 194-97. 
 
Sher, George. (1989). “Educating Citizens.” Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 18. Issue 1. 
Winter.  
 
Snauwaret, Dale T. (2001). “Cosmopolitan Democracy and Democratic Education”. CICE 
(Current Issues in Comparative Education), Vol. 4, No. 1, December. 
 
Stanley, Mary. (1988).”Six Types of Citizenship.” Civic Arts Review 1.  
Stepan, Alfred. (2000).”Religion, Democracy, and the “Twin Toleration.” Journal of 
Democracy. Vol. 11: 2. 
 
Terren, Eduardo. (2002).”Post-modern Attitudes: a Challenge to Democratic Education.” 
European Journal of Education. Vol. 37. No. 2. 
 
Trifkovic, Srdja. (2001).”Multiculturalism and Islam: Liberal Fiction and Historical Truth.” 
Chronicle Magazine 
 
Taylor, Charles. (2003).”No Community, No Democracy: Communitarian Theory.” The 
Responsive Community. Winter 2003/2004 
  
Voll, John O & Esposito, John L. (1994).”Islam’s Democratic Essence.” The Middle East 
Quarterly. Vol. 1. September. 
 
Wright, Ian. (1993).”Citizenship Education and Decision Making.” International Journal of 
Social Studies 3.  
 
Wright, Ian. (1993).”Civic Education is Value Education.” Social Studies 84.  
 
Wright, Robin. (1996).”Two Visions of Reformation: Islam and Liberal Democracy.” Journal 
of Democracy.  Vol. 7. Issue 2. 
 301
  
Wright, Robin. (1992).”Islam, Democracy and The West.” Foreign Affairs. Summer  Vol. 
71. Issue 3. 
 
Dissertation, paper, and articles in the newspaper: 
Ali, Fachry. (2003). “Islam dan Pemberdayaan Politik Ummat: Telaah Peran NU dan 
Muhammadiyah (Islam and Political Empowerment of Ummah (Moslem Society)”, 
paper, presented on a serial discussion of politics of International Institute of Islamic 
Thought, Indonesia, January 16 2003. 
 
Amin, Nuruddin, 1996 “Masyarakat NU “Pasca-Fiqh”, Kompas, 18 Janaury 
Abdillah, Masykuri (2001). “Budaya NU dalam Konteks Sosial dan Politik [The NU Culture in 
relation to Social and Political  Spheres of Life]”. Kompas, May 04. 
 
Falah, Muhamamd Fajrul,(1998).  “NU dalam Reformasi Kehidupan Bernegara [NU and the 
Reformation of Nation-State of Indonesia].” Media Indonesia,13 August.  
 
Hadzik, M. Isom & Asnafi, A. Halim, (1996). “Fiqh Siyasah dan Budaya Politik NU [Political 
Fiqh and the NU Political Culture] , Jawa Pos, 25 October. 
 
Hafis (1996).”Kiprah dari Masa ke Masa  [The NU Involvement in the Political Sphere of Life 
in Indonesia].” Media Indonesia. 10 November. 
 
Hasyim, Syafiq. (2004). “Tiga Jenis Politik di NU [Three Trends of the NU Politics]. Kompas. 
July 4. 
 
Johnson, Carolyn Y.  (2005. “Culture a crucial factor in science gender gap.” Post Gazzete. 
January 31. 
 
Ka’bah, Rifyal (1998). “Keputusan Lajnah Tarjih Muhammadiyah dan Lajtnah Bahtsul Masail 
NU Sebagai Keputusan Ijtihad Jami’i di Indonesia (Decrees of M Lajnah Tarjih and NU  
Laajnah Bahtsul Mastail as as Collective Ijtihad in Indonesia.” Dissertation. Jakarta: 
Graduate School University of Indonesia. 
 
 302
 Misrawi, Zuhairi (2001) “Mencari Konvegensi Aktivis NU and Muhammadiyah: Tanggapan 
Balik untuk Mutohharun Jinnan (Seeking a convergence between NU and 
Muhammadiyah Activists: a Response to Muhohharun Jinna).”   Kompas, 6 July.    
Mulkhan, Abdul Munir. (2000).”Muhammadiyah, Politik, dan Presiden [Muhammadiyah, 
Politics, and President].” Kompas, July 6.  
 
Mulkhan, Abdul Munir. (2004).”Repolitisasi Kaum Santri (Re-politicizing the Santri Group).” 
Kompas, December 4.  
 
Muzadi, Hasyim. (2004).  “ Fatwa Haram Pilih Presiden Perempuan Pendapat Pribadi 
(The NU Cleric Fatwa about prohibiting Female from charging presidency is personal 
opinion).” Kompas, 6 Juni 
 
Natsir, Lis-Marcus; Abd. Kadir, Faqihuddin (2004).” Fatwa Haram Pemimpin Perempuan 
(The NU Cleric Fatwa about prohibiting Female Leadership).” Kompas, Monday, 7June. 
Rabithahul Ma’hadil Islamiyah.  (1999). “Memacu Peranan Pesantren (Enhancing the Role of 
Pesantren).”  Kompas, 7 May    
Rahmat, Abdi. (1999).”NU-Muhammadiyah: kelompok Strategis Santri (NU-Muhammadiyah 
as the Santri (Devout Muslims) strategic group). Republika. 20 November.   
 
Rais, M. Amin. (1996).”Representasi Umat harus Diperjuangkan (The Umma Representation 
/Aspiration has to be fighted for).” Jawa Pos. 6 Desember. 
 
Rais, M. Amin. (1996).”Islam dan Demokratisasi di Indonesia: High Politics Muatannya 
Moral bukan Kursi (Islam and Democratization in Indonesia: The Mission of High 
Politics is moral endorsement).” Jawa Pos. 7 Desember.  
 
Riyadi, Hendar. (2003).”Respon Muhammadiyah dalam Dialektika Agama (Muhamadiyah’s 
Response to Religious Dialectics).” Pikiran Rakyat. February.  
 
Safi, Louay M. (2002). “Understanding Islam: Challenge to Democracy and Diversity”. 
Working paper presented in The Journalism Conference. Alexandria: Regent 
University. 
 
Umam, Rafiqul. 1996, “70 Tahun Pasang Surut Hubungan NU dengan Negara (70 years of NU 
age and Dynamical Relationships between NU and State).”Media Indonesia, 6 February. 
 
 
 303
